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Chapter 1  
Introduction1 
 “The answer may be more complicated than you think; the amount of autonomy that 
parent companies grant each venture (subsidiary) should vary depending on the local 
culture and the type of activity that is being delegated”. 
Professor Yoram Zeira – co-author of  “Role conflict and role ambiguity of chief executive 
officers in international joint ventures” published in Journal of International Business Studies 
(1992) – answering the question: how much decision-making autonomy should corporate 
parents give their joint ventures or foreign subsidiaries (interview in Harvard Business Review 
newsletter, January/February, 1998). 
 
1.1. The importance of subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can be conceptualized as an inter-organizational network 
(Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989) or a social community crossing national boundaries (Kogut & 
Zander, 1993), in which subsidiaries are established in foreign countries. Within this 
perspective, a subsidiary is viewed as an important source of knowledge, thus contributing 
to the competitive advantages of the MNE (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Birkinshaw et al., 2000). 
One of the core issues in the study of MNEs is how to structure and manage the 
relationships between the headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries. The management of 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship is never a simple one (e.g., Asakawa, 1996; Birkinshaw 
                                                            
1 This entire thesis uses the style “we” instead of “I” for reasons of readability.  
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et al., 2000; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Johnston, 2005). Foreign subsidiaries require decision-
making autonomy to foster creativity and new idea generation for the purpose of increasing 
their competitive advantages, while the headquarters often demands coordination and 
control of foreign subsidiaries to ensure their goals (Akasawa, 2001; O’Donnell, 2000). The 
control-autonomy tension in the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries makes 
research of a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy relevant and important. Decision-
making autonomy reflects a key characteristic of the value system and the overall 
organizational structure of a subsidiary in an MNE network as well as a subsidiary’s 
incentives of doing foreign business (Asakawa, 1996, 2001; Brooke, 1984; Brooke & 
Remmers, 1978). Decision-making autonomy provides a sustainable platform for 
establishing initiatives of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; 
Mudambi, 2011) and indicates the current power-dependence structures between 
headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. In the end, this affects foreign subsidiaries’ 
performance (Asakawa, 2001; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). 
 Given the importance of decision-making autonomy in the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship, several theories have been developed that focus on subsidiary’s decision-
making autonomy. For example, the perspective focusing on the role of headquarters in 
innovative operations of subsidiaries argues that the headquarters has a reasonable 
understanding of what kind of knowledge it lacks and knows how to organize the firm’s 
operations best (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b; Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Forsgren & Holm, 2010). 
Based on this understanding, the headquarters can find ways of intervening that will 
guarantee the proper application of its knowledge at the local level. This implies that the 
degree of a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy is relatively low. Other theories point 
however to opposite forces. Business network theory, for example, claims that the 
headquarters is an outsider of the specific business networks in which subsidiaries are 
embedded. The headquarters thus lacks the local knowledge and faces uncertainty for 
accessing local information (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Andersson et al., 2007; Forsgren et 
al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008). Consequently, the headquarters will decentralize decisions to 
subsidiaries for the purposes of local responsiveness (e.g., Ambos et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et 
al., 1998).  
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Our contributions to subsidiary decision-making autonomy research are threefold. 
First, although the literature on the relationship between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and characteristics of the parent company or of the subsidiary is relatively well 
developed, the relationship between decision-making autonomy and home- and host 
country contexts is under-explored. Autonomy from a perspective of home- and host 
country contexts is important because country institutional environments determine an 
MNE’s organizational behavior, overall strategy and predisposition for particular power 
structures (Kostova, 1999), and resource and knowledge capabilities (Bineto et al., 2003; 
Verbeke, 2009). This affects the performance of an MNE in general and that of a subsidiary 
in particular (de Jong et al., 2011; de Jong & van Houten, 2013).   
Second, as said above, decision-making autonomy fosters creativity and generates 
new ideas, which on the one hand benefits subsidiary innovation. On the other hand, a 
subsidiary with too high decision-making autonomy may hinder a coherent innovation 
strategy of an MNE (Asakawa, 2001). The literature has focused on the effects of subsidiary- 
and MNE-level factors as well as internal and external knowledge sources on subsidiary 
innovation. The role of decision-making autonomy in subsidiary innovation is 
underexplored. Understanding this relationship is important because innovation is an 
important source of increasing subsidiary competitive advantages (Frost et al., 2002; Phene 
& Ameida, 2008), and thus the overall MNE group (Venaik et al., 2005). Our study offers 
new insights for innovation research at subsidiary level showing the importance of decision-
making autonomy in innovative activities of subsidiaries.  
Third, several studies have addressed the effect of subsidiary embeddedness on 
subsidiary innovation (e.g., Andersson et al., 2002; Ciabuschi et al., 2011). Embeddedness 
concerns the type of internal and external linkages of the subsidiary (Garcia-Pont et al., 
2009). Linkages with other partners are crucial to obtain and develop firm-specific strategic 
assets required for innovation the more so when markets are volatile and risky. However, 
little is known about the relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy, 
subsidiary embeddedness, and subsidiary innovation. We study this relationship. 
Understanding this relationship is important because subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
reflects in part the organizational structure and intra-organizational management of an 
4  Chapter 1 
  
overall MNE network (Ambos et al., 2011; Asakawa, 2001), which affects the innovative 
performance of a subsidiary. 
1.2. The structure of this thesis 
As we describe in Chapter 2 of this thesis, existing theories used in the context of 
subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy include, among others, the integration-
responsiveness framework (Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Medcof, 2001), business network theory 
(Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008), agency theory 
(O’Donnell, 2000; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996), institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1997), the perspective on the headquarters’ role in MNE networks (Ciabuschi et al., 
2011; Ciabuschi et al., 2012), and information-processing theory (Egelhoff, 1982, 1993; 
Galbraith, 1973, 1977). According to Brooke (1984: 9), autonomy refers to “one in which units 
and sub-units possesses the ability to take decisions for themselves on issues which are 
reserved to a higher level in a comparable organization”. In line with this definition, we 
argue that decision-making autonomy of a subsidiary can be assessed by the perception of 
the manager of the sub-unit. Hence, in this thesis subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
assessed and measured by the perception of subsidiary managers at the subsidiary side.  
As discussed previously, the relationships between country contexts and decision-
making autonomy, and the role of decision-making autonomy in subsidiary innovation have 
not been explicitly explored in both theoretical and empirical studies of subsidiary 
operations. These research gaps are addressed by using and extending specific theoretical 
frameworks building upon institutional theory (Chapter 3), business network theory and 
agency theory (Chapter 4), the perspective focusing on the importance of headquarters’ role 
in subsidiary operations (Chapter 5), and business network theory (Chapter 6). Institutional 
theory offers a valuable insight on the role of isomorphism: it explains the level of subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy when a subsidiary operates in and belongs to different 
institutional environments. It also helps to assess the level of decision-making autonomy 
subsidiary needed for the purpose of local responsiveness. Next to this, business network 
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theory captures subsidiary decision-making autonomy by looking at how the relationship 
between headquarters and subsidiary matters when subsidiaries engage in specific business 
networks, both inside the MNE network and externally. Solving agency problems emanating 
from information asymmetry between headquarters and subsidiaries through subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy is the approach of agency theory. The perspective centering on 
the role of headquarters in subsidiary innovation emphasizes the importance of 
headquarters knowledge and its understanding of subsidiary operations. Together with 
business network theory, the theoretical perspective of the headquarters view explains what 
role decision-making autonomy plays in understanding subsidiary innovation. The 
aforementioned theories each helps to understand the causes and consequences of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy. The overall structure of this thesis is presented in 
Figure 1.1. 
 













Our research is embedded in subsidiary decision-making autonomy research that is 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 captures the effect of home- and host country institutional 
environments on subsidiary decision-making autonomy. This chapter appeared in the 
Problems and Perspectives in Management (de Jong & Dut, 2010). The impact of distance 
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Chapter 4, which was presented at the 12th annual conference of European Academy of 
Management 2012 Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Chapter 5 focuses on 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation. This chapter was 
presented at the 38th annual conference of the European International Business Academy 
2012 University of Sussex, Brighton, the United Kingdom, and the 55th annual conference of 
the Academy of International Business 2013, Istanbul, Turkey. Finally, Chapter 6 captures 
the relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy, subsidiary embeddedness 
and subsidiary innovation. This chapter was also presented at the 55th annual conference of 
the Academy of International Business 2013, Istanbul, Turkey. 
1.3. The scope of this study 
The empirical studies presented in this thesis use different data sources. The first empirical 
study in Chapter 3 uses secondary data-sources (that is, the Orbis database) to collect 
information for a sample of subsidiary companies and their institutional environments. 
Using Orbis, we collected data for subsidiaries of eighteen MNEs in twenty-five European 
countries. Although the secondary data derived from the Orbis database are valuable, the 
Oribis database does not include a direct measure of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
In addition, secondary data do not provide detailed information concerning subsidiary 
innovation and local embeddedness. For these reasons, we used survey data in the 
subsequent empirical studies. The survey data come from the Institute for Economic 
Research Halle (IWH) and contain information on subsidiaries from a set of five European 
countries. The survey was held in 2011 (see for more detail Chapters 4, 5, and 6). Our 
research has directly contributed to the IWH data collection process, by developing 
questions that directly measure decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Based on our 
research, IWH has fine-tuned the questions used to measure subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. Previously IWH used questions that measure the scope of business activities by 
measuring business functions. This scope measure of decision-making autonomy is well 
established in the literature (see Chapter 2). From 2011 onwards, IWH uses a direct measure 
of subsidiary decision-making autonomy asking respondents to indicate who takes decisions 
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on certain business activities rather than whether certain business functions were 
performed. This revised measure of decision making autonomy is a reflection of the 
progress of the field as a whole. As chapter 2 shows, empirical studies on subsidiary 
autonomy have relied on both measures of business functions and direct measures of 
decision making. Over time, the more direct measures of decision making have come to 
dominate. This thesis uses both measures of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. We use 
a measure of decision-making autonomy based on business functions in Chapter 3, and a 
measure based on decision-making in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the 2011 survey of the IWH FDI micro database is used. This 
database offers the opportunity to focus on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
This context is important for this thesis. Since the early 1990s, the CEE countries – in this 
thesis: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic that are 
covered in the IWH databases – have been characterized by institutional change from a 
planned to a market economy. This process entailed policies targeted at privatization, 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization (Gabrisch & Hölscher, 2006). Post-
communist countries also quickly integrated with the global world, and in particular the 
West European economy, via international trade and foreign direct investments. This 
process was influenced significantly by MNEs with regard to firm restructuring (Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002), private enterprise R&D (Kalotay & Hunya, 2000; UNCTAD, 2005), export 
competitiveness (Rugraff, 2006; UNCTAD, 2002), and productivity growth (Jindra, 2006; 
Schadler et al., 2006). Differences in the development of individual transition economies are 
largely explained by initial conditions, macroeconomic policies and structural reforms (Berg 
et al., 1999).  
MNEs from all over the world enter in these markets using different entry modes 
and applying diverse patterns of ownership and control (Jindra et al., 2009). It results in 
different parent-affiliate relationships. Differences in the relationships between parent firms 
and subsidiaries operating in the transition economies are subject of ongoing debate. In this 
context, subsidiary decision-making autonomy has been described as an issue of profound 
tension between the two parties (Asakawa, 2001; Birkinshaw et al., 2000). The reason is that 
the relationship can be modeled as a “mixed motive dyad” in which the interests and 
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perceptions of the two parties are frequently not aligned with one another (Ghoshal & 
Nohria, 1989). Where the subsidiary desires decision-making autonomy, headquarters 
prefers to control; where subsidiary managers see entrepreneurial endeavor, headquarters 
sees opportunism. And where the subsidiary is acting primarily in the interests of the local 
business, headquarters is far more concerned about the MNE’s worldwide profitability 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Consequently, the causes and consequences of decision-making 
autonomy are of particular importance to fully comprehend the potential for development 
of foreign subsidiaries in this part of the world. 
1.4. Contributions and theoretical implications 
The contributions of this thesis to the international business and management literature 
embody both theoretical insights and empirical findings. First, we contribute to institutional 
theory in Chapter 3 by developing theoretical arguments that explain how different home- 
and host country institutional environments determine the decision-making autonomy of 
subsidiaries. In particular, we enhance the theoretical understanding of how the production 
regimes of a home country’s advanced economies, i.e. “coordinated market economies” 
(CMEs) and “liberal market economies” (LMEs) affect subsidiary’s decision-making 
autonomy. Similarly, this classification of national regimes is applied to host countries, that 
is, whether there are differences in subsidiary decision-making autonomy between CMEs 
and LMEs in host countries.  
Second, Chapter 4 contributes to business network theory and agency theory. We 
develop a theoretical framework that shows whether and how distance between home and 
host countries determines subsidiary decision-making autonomy. The theoretical model 
presented in Chapter 4 provides an important contribution to existing business network 
theory (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008) and agency theory 
(O’Donnell, 2000; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996).  
Third, Chapter 5 presents two different predictions regarding the nature of the 
relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation. We 
offer a theoretical contribution to the innovation literature at subsidiary level by specifying a 
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theoretical model that specifies the relationship between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and subsidiary innovation. We develop theoretical argumentations to support a 
non-linear U-shaped relationship between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary 
innovation. These theoretical arguments for the autonomy-innovation relationship 
presented in Chapter 5 provide new insights to existing business network theory and the 
perspective focusing on the headquarters’ role in innovation at subsidiary level.  
Fourth, in Chapter 6 we provide a theoretical contribution to the literature by 
studying the relationship between subsidiary innovation and two types of relationships. 
That is, we follow the suggestion of Yamin and Anderson (2011) that internal and external 
relationships of a subsidiary have different origins (Meyer et al., 2011) and relate each of 
these to subsidiary decision-making autonomy. In addition, we develop theoretical 
arguments capturing the intricate relationship between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy, subsidiary embeddedness and subsidiary innovation. 
The theoretical contributions are complemented with empirical findings reported in 
this thesis based on the 2007 Orbis database and the 2011 IWH survey database. The 
empirical contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, the findings in Chapter 3 report 
that home and host institutional environments affect a subsidiary’s decision-making 
autonomy. That is, the subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy is strongly associated with 
home- and host country institutional environments, such that subsidiary decision making 
autonomy is higher in coordinated market economies. Second, a fine-grained analysis of 
distance in Chapter 4 shows that a higher cultural, geographic and economic distance is 
associated with lower levels of decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Third, the results 
in Chapter 5 indicate a non-linear U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-
making autonomy and innovation intensity of a subsidiary. This result suggests that 
increasing levels of decision-making autonomy first lead to lower levels of subsidiary 
innovation and after a certain level to higher levels of subsidiary innovation. Fourth, the 
results in Chapter 6 show that the impact of subsidiary decision-making autonomy on 
subsidiary innovation (as shown in Chapter 5) is contingent on the degree of subsidiary 
external embeddedness. Taken together, the empirical findings reported in this thesis 
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increase our understanding of the causes and consequences of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy in international business and management research. 
 The theoretical contributions and empirical findings of this thesis have important 
implications. First, the results in Chapter 3 emphasize that the home- and host country 
institutional environments in combination with parent-company and subsidiary 
characteristics simultaneously determine the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. 
This implies that although individual characteristics have been addressed elsewhere, our 
study is among the first that explicitly focuses on the institutional environment and that 
offers an integrative perspective of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. In particular, it 
suggests that home- and host country institutional environments co-determine the overall 
strategy of MNEs including to what extent MNEs apply decentralizing or centralizing 
strategies to their foreign subsidiaries. This implication complements the existing arguments 
of institutional theory with respect to MNE organization.  
Second, in Chapter 4 we find that distance between home and host countries has a 
negative effect on a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. The negative distance role fits 
the prediction of agency theory. The results imply that a larger distance to the host country 
can be associated with the need to be locally responsive (as business network theory 
suggests) for which high levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy are required. The 
fact that we find a negative association implies that multinationals respond differently to 
distance. This does however not exclude the possibility that for certain processes for which 
local embeddedness is required – for example subsidiaries focusing on innovation – it would 
be beneficial for the multinational to have subsidiaries with high levels of decision-making 
autonomy, even when faced with increased distances between home and host countries.  
Third, the empirical findings in Chapter 5 show that there is a non-linear U-shaped 
relationship between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary autonomy. This result 
implies that higher levels of subsidiary innovation are associated with either a situation in 
which subsidiaries have relatively high levels of decision-making autonomy or almost no 
decision-making autonomy (i.e. full control by headquarters). This implication fits both 
business network theory and the complementary perspective centering on the function of 
headquarters.  
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Fourth, the empirical findings in Chapter 6 imply that the non-linear association 
between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is contingent on 
the level of external embeddedness. That is, the non-linear U shaped relationship between 
subsidiary innovation and subsidiary decision-making autonomy becomes more 
pronounced at higher levels of external embeddedness. A key theoretical implication of this 
chapter is that a fine-grained contingency perspective is needed to understand the precise 
role of subsidiary decision-making autonomy in situations where subsidiary innovation and 
subsidiary external embeddedness matter. 
1.5. Managerial implications  
This thesis provides a series of managerial implications for subsidiary and headquarters 
managers. First, our empirical results clearly show that the level of decision-making 
autonomy of each subsidiary may be different depending on home- and host country 
institutional environments, and the distance between home- and host countries. That is, 
subsidiaries belonging to CME MNEs and operating in CMEs have a higher level of 
decision-making autonomy for the purpose of implementing and ensuring parent firm’s 
global strategy. A subsidiary with larger cultural, geographic and economic distance from 
the home country has a lower level of decision-making autonomy for the purpose of 
reducing information asymmetry between headquarters and subsidiaries. Understanding 
these fundamental differences may help subsidiary managers to reduce and prevent 
potential tension between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Second, our empirical results indicate that the relationship between the level of 
decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is complex as it also depends on 
external embeddedness. A higher level of decision-making autonomy is not always best for 
the innovation process. The positive effect of both the lowest and highest level of decision-
making autonomy on subsidiary innovation is higher only when external embeddedness is 
important. Understanding this helps subsidiary and headquarters managers in designing 
strategies to obtain the optimal level of subsidiary innovation, and thus enhance the 
subsidiary’s competitive advantages. Subsidiary managers may have an incentive to 
12  Chapter 1 
  
decentralize decision making as this increases their absolute and relative power within the 
MNE network. However, headquarters managers may have the opposite incentive. The risk 
is that MNEs will end up with medium levels of decision-making autonomy in subsidiaries 
as an attempt to satisfy both groups of managers. Our results suggest that this is the worst 
possible outcome (especially when external embeddedness is high). To reduce the potential 
tension between headquarters and subsidiary managers both need to be aware that they 
have to arrive at an appropriate level of decision-making autonomy for subsidiaries to be 
charged with specific roles in countries with different country institutional environments 
and at different country distances. The insights generated in this thesis help to increase this 
understanding: it helps headquarters managers to design appropriate governance structures 
and strategies, which reduce the autonomy-control tension inherent in many the 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
1.6. Empirical regularities 
In closing we would like to mention that taken together, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 in this thesis 
provide “empirical regularities”. The overall conclusion from our research is that MNEs face 
a trade-off: when distance to the host country increases it is likely that the headquarters 
relies/needs to rely on the subsidiary for local expertise and knowledge, especially in 
institutionally thick countries where local embeddedness is important (Chapter 3) but with 
increasing distance the degree of decision-making autonomy will go down (Chapter 4), 
whereas to increase innovation both low or high levels of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy are actually best (Chapter 5), especially when subsidiary’s external 
embeddedness is high (Chapter 6). This overall conclusion is a reflection of a well-known 
tension in the corporate reality of international business and management, namely how to 
balance local responsiveness with global coordination and integration. Despite the already 
acknowledged limitations of this study, we are confident that this thesis provides novel 
insights on how subsidiary decision- making plays a pivotal role in understanding this 
tension and formulating an appropriate response to it. 
 
  




Rapid changes in the nature of global competition have caused international managers and 
management researchers to search for new ways to frame problems and answer questions about 
how to manage multinational enterprises (MNEs) effectively (O’Donnell, 2000). Several authors 
have pointed out that the subsidiary is playing an increasingly important role in generating 
competitive advantage for the MNE (Edwards et al., 2002; Gammelgaard et al., 2012a, b; 
Takeuchi et al., 2008). However, ambivalence in headquarters-subsidiary relationships 
frequently arises since the subsidiary requires a degree of decision-making autonomy that the 
parent is not always disposed to concede (Johnston & Menguc, 2007). Subsidiary decision-
making autonomy has been identified as one of the critical contemporary issues for researchers 
and managers (Young & Tavares, 2004), and a thorough understanding of the determinants and 
consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy has become pivotal to both practitioners 
and management scholars. Several different explanations are displayed for these statements. 
First, the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is a key reflection of the overall 
organizational structure of subsidiaries as well as power-dependence structures between 
headquarters and subsidiaries (Asakawa, 2001; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Preffer & Salancik, 
1978). Second, decision-making autonomy is a key feature of the value system and incentive 
structure for effectively doing research and development (Asakawa, 1996, 2001; Brooke, 
14  Chapter 2 
  
1984), and provides a platform for establishing initiatives of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 
1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Mudambi, 2011). These important characteristics reflect a 
control–autonomy tension in the relationship between headquarters and subsidiary 
(Asakawa, 2001). 
In this chapter we review theories and previous empirical studies explaining (a) the 
determinants and (b) consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Although a broad 
literature exists on autonomy in general (e.g. autonomy research on self-managing teams, or 
autonomy research on individuals), we focus here on autonomy in the context of subsidiaries 
and multinational firms. Our approach is twofold. First, a variety of theoretical perspectives has 
been applied to examine the determinants and consequences of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. We identify theoretical frameworks that have been used to explain the determinants 
and consequences of decision-making autonomy. These are the integration-responsiveness 
framework, resource dependence theory, agency theory, institutional theory, business network 
theory, the perspective centering on the role of headquarters in subsidiary operation, and 
information-processing theory. Second, we undertake a comprehensive review of empirical 
studies explaining the causes and consequences of differences in the level of subsidiary decision-
making autonomy.   
We take a systematic approach to reviewing relevant theoretical and empirical studies, 
selecting articles by accessing the particular content of each issue in the leading journals in the 
fields of international management, strategy and international business. We focus on highly-
ranked journals publishing research on subsidiaries and MNEs: Journal of Management, Journal of 
Management Studies, Journal of Word Business, Journal of Business Research, Management Science, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of International Management, International Business 
Review, Journal of International Business Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Academy of Management Journal and Management International Review. We 
accessed all issues of these journals in the period from January, 2000 to June, 2013. The key 
words included subsidiary decision-making autonomy, subsidiary 
centralization/decentralization, decision-making autonomy, autonomy, decision-making 
authority, control, multinational, MNE, and subsidiary. We cross-validated our search 
results by checking other references of the journals (“snowballing effect”) and with a 
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keyword search for monographs and PhD theses in both Picarta and EBSCO Host. Our 
search yielded a large number of theoretical contributions and a more limited set of eighteen 
large scale empirical studies focusing on the determinants of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy, and thirteen studies focusing on the consequences of subsidiary decision making 
autonomy. 
Through the literature search and by identifying the common characteristics of 
variables, we group the determinants of decision-making autonomy in five clusters. Those 
groups relate to the strategic role of the subsidiary (13 of the 18 studies), organizational 
complexity (16 of the 18 studies), decision- and control structure (11 of the 18 studies), 
general MNE characteristics (14 of the 18 studies), and industry- and country- level features 
(13 of the 18 studies). The results are generally consistent with theoretical predictions. Most 
of these studies focus on one particular level of analysis (e.g. subsidiary or multinational), a 
few studies pay attention to a combination of levels of analyses. Surprisingly, the role of 
home and host country context as a main effect on subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
underexplored. The thirteen empirical studies relating subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy to outcomes use subsidiary decision-making autonomy as an independent 
variable or a moderating variable to explain how decision-making autonomy affects, for 
example, the performance of a subsidiary (Ciabuschi & Martín 2011; Gammelgaard et al., 
2012a), entry mode of MNE (Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Slangen, 2011), local linkages of 
subsidiary (Giroud et al., 2012; Jindra et al., 2009) and knowledge transfer within MNE 
network (Rabbiosi, 2011). The results of the thirteen empirical studies are generally in line 
with the theoretical predictions. Our literature search also revealed that – despite the recent 
interest in knowledge generation and innovation in subsidiaries - little attention has been 
paid to the subsidiary decision-making autonomy when explaining subsidiary innovation as 
well as its role in tapping external knowledge for enhancing innovation at subsidiary level. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on definitions of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and why subsidiary decision making autonomy matters. We identify and discuss 
the most important theories used in subsidiary decision-making autonomy research. We 
focus on determinants and consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Our 
review and the critical assessments of the empirical studies will lead us to identify several 
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research gaps. At the end of this chapter, we provide a conclusion and delineate a research 
program with specific research questions that will be answered in the subsequent chapters 
(3, 4, 5 and 6) of this thesis. 
2.2. Definitions of subsidiary decision-making autonomy and why it 
matters 
When discussing the different theories used to explain the determinants and consequences 
of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, it is pivotal to first define subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. According to Brooke (1984: 9) decision-making autonomy refers to an 
organization “in which units and sub-units possess the ability to take decisions for 
themselves on issues which are reserved to a higher level in comparable organizations”. 
O’Donnell (2000: 528) states that decision-making autonomy is “the degree to which the 
foreign subsidiary of the MNEs has strategic and operational decision-making authority”. 
Young and Tavares (2004: 228) relate subsidiary decision-making autonomy to the 
constrained freedom or independence available to or acquired by a subsidiary, which 
enables it to take certain decisions on its own behalf. Taggart (1997) proposes that 
“autonomy may be regarded as a decision-based process that evolves through bargaining 
between centre and periphery in an organization”. Hence, irrespective of the foci of the 
studies, subsidiary decision-making autonomy in general refers to “the degree to which an 
MNE subunit may make significant decisions, referring to the whole spectrum of inter-and 
intra-firm relationships, with or without the consent of the headquarters” (Manolopoulos, 
2006: 49).  
Although several definitions have been suggested, their nature and characteristics are 
not exclusive and opposite. For that reason, this thesis will use the definition of O’Donnell 
(2000) as an important departure point for empirical studies in the chapters to follow. Hence, 
we define subsidiary decision-making autonomy as: “the extent to which the subsidiary 
managers are able to make decisions without headquarters’ involvement”. Moreover, 
decision-making autonomy equals to “decision-making authority”, or “decentralization” 
(Brooke, 1984). The latter implies a comparison with centralization (Brooke, 1984), and hence 
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decentralization is an inverse of centralization (Luo, 2006). Gupta and Govindarajan (1991: 
785) refer to decentralization as “the extent of decision-making authority that is delegated to 
the general manager of a subsidiary by corporate superiors”. Centralization is used when 
decision-making is biased towards the top. To be consistent and relevant for the 
“subsidiary” context we use the term – “subsidiary decision-making autonomy” in this 
thesis. It is the equivalent of decentralization meaning that subsidiary managers have a 
“right” to make decisions relating to business activities at the subsidiary without the 
involvement of their headquarters.  
As our definition of subsidiary decision-making autonomy already indicates, 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy is important to understand the headquarters-
subsidiary relationship. Our theoretical overview will show that a variety of reasons exists 
why subsidiary decision-making autonomy matters and is worth further study. First, 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy is a key reflection of the overall organizational 
structure of subsidiaries and current power-dependence structures between headquarters 
and subsidiaries (Asakawa, 2001; Preffer & Salancik, 1978) as well as intra-organizational 
management of MNE network (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Second, decision-making 
autonomy is a key feature of the value system and incentive structure for effectively doing 
research and development (Asakawa, 1996, 2001; Brooke, 1984), and provides a platform for 
establishing initiatives of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; 
Mudambi, 2011). Third, decision-making autonomy strengthens the diffusion of knowledge 
within the MNE (Chiao & Ying, 2013), encourages subsidiaries to contribute to research and 
development and innovation creation (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988) leading to further 
knowledge flows (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991), and facilitating the interactions among 
subsidiaries (Ambos et al., 2011). Subsidiary decision making autonomy not only has 
positive effects. Decision-making autonomy may hinder coherent innovation strategy as a 
multinational (Asakawa, 2001), because of a lack of integration in the MNE network 
(Birkinshaw et al., 1998). Moreover, decision-making autonomy reduces the possibility of the 
recombination of technological knowledge resources available from both home headquarters 
and other subsidiaries in other host countries (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Fang et al., 2010; 
Gammelgaard et al., 2012b). Taken together, we conclude that decision-making autonomy 
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plays an important role in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. It affects the operations 
of both MNE and subsidiary, and affects the performance of the subsidiary and in the end 
also the competitive position of the MNE as a whole. 
Having defined decision-making autonomy and having argued how it matters for 
subsidiary and MNE, it is time to turn to the drivers of differences in decision-making 
autonomy and its consequences. In the remainder of this chapter we review the literature on 
the determinants and consequences of subsidiary decision making autonomy. We identify 
seven theories that are frequently used in the context of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. Note that these seven theories are not 100 percent mutually exclusive, and that 
the arguments put forward in the specific theories are often related. Despite the overlap, the 
core of the argument is different, which explains why we can distinguish between these 
seven theoretical frameworks. The seven theories are the integration-responsiveness 
framework, resource dependence theory, agency theory, institutional theory, business 
network theory, the perspective centering on the role and the function of headquarters in 
subsidiary operation (also called the headquarters view), and information-processing theory. 
2.3. Theoretical perspectives 
2.3.1. Integration-responsiveness framework 
A commonly used framework to understand the degree of decision-making autonomy of 
subsidiaries has been developed by Prahalad and Doz (1987) and focuses on integration (i.e., 
the centralized management of geographically dispersed activities on an ongoing basis) and 
local responsiveness (i.e., resource commitment decisions taken autonomously by a 
subsidiary in response to primarily local competitive or customer demands). Jarillo and 
Martinez (1990) have extended the original framework by using the degree of localization 
(i.e., whether the extent of activities such as R&D and purchasing are performed in the host 
country) and the degree of integration (ranging from “very autonomous” to “highly 
integrated”). Their study has three important characteristics. First, it demonstrates the value 
of integration and decision-making autonomy as analytical variables. Second, it 
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characterizes the strategic role of each subsidiary type in their framework. Third, it identifies 
autonomous strategy (a subsidiary taking a position that is relatively independent of its 
parent organization) as occupying an important node in examining subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. This framework’s main prediction is that the subsidiary’s level of 
integration within the MNE network is negatively associated with subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. This is because subsidiaries operating in a host country face several 
pressures from the local market, e.g., differences in customer preferences or host 
government. Thus, the lower the level of the subsidiary’s integration, the lower the global 
interdependence is. The higher the local market embeddedness, the more local managers 
require decision-making autonomy to meet these distinctive local market requirements.  
Next to local market pressure, a parent company may grant more decision-making 
autonomy to more competent subsidiaries. Simões et al. (2002) as well as Taggart and Hood  
(1999) argue that competent subsidiaries that possess local knowledge can respond quickly 
to local market forces and pick-up market signals, which is associated with higher levels of 
independence (cf. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; 1989). This especially holds for knowledge-
seeking investments in which subsidiaries are part of a knowledge augmenting strategy. 
This is related to the argument that in high-technology industries, embeddedness in the 
form of close relationships with local suppliers or customers can be expected to play a more 
important role than in low-technology industries (Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Männik et al., 
2005), leading to higher levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy in the former. 
2.3.2. Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory, stemming from the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), proposes that the power of an organization depends on the resource 
dependency relationships it has with other organizations. If a focal organization is highly 
dependent upon another organization for an important resource, that other organization 
will have power over the focal organization (Medcof, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Applied to MNEs, research has found that when a subsidiary remains small and depends on 
a headquarters for resources, the headquarters has substantial control over the subsidiary 
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(Preffer, 1981). Doz and Prahalad (1981) report that “as subsidiaries mature and become 
autonomous with respect to strategic resources, [...] the headquarters’ ability to control the 
strategies of subsidiaries is substantially reduced” (Prahalad & Doz, 1981: 5). In addition, 
subsidiaries become the gateway to external counterparts for headquarters, which generally 
lacks such direct external linkages with communities in a foreign environment. Usually R&D 
subsidiaries play the role of a knowledge broker, bridging gaps between their headquarters 
and the external community. Such a central position fosters the subsidiary’s power and 
decision-making autonomy (Ambos et al., 2011). Several other studies have also indicated 
that when a local subsidiary holds important resources that are neither substitutable nor 
obtainable through a third party, it enjoys power over other units that are in need of that 
resource (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Medcof, 2001). 
Eventually, the main prediction of resource dependence theory is that the degree of 
central control over subsidiaries is conditioned by the mutual dependency of resources that 
headquarters and subsidiaries provide to each other. As resource levels of the subsidiary 
increase, interests with headquarters may diverge. As a result, dependency on the 
subsidiary may increase. Decentralization will be more where local resources are high. This 
implies that as the subsidiary matures and grows, it develops increasingly heterogeneous 
sets of relationships with other organizations and intra-firm units (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
and becomes autonomous with regard to its most needed resources (Blau, 1964; Kumar & 
Seth, 1998; Prahalad & Doz, 1981). 
A crucial resource affecting subsidiary decision-making autonomy is knowledge that 
enables subsidiaries to conceive of and implement value-creating strategies that improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency (Barney, 1991; Daft, 1983). Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) as 
well as Rabbiosi (2011) argue that flows of knowledge between the subsidiary and the rest of 
the MNE network would recognize the subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. The 
distinctive resources and capabilities of subsidiaries provide other subunits with the 
opportunities to identify and implement independent productive roles. Subsidiaries with 
considerable knowledge in- and outputs are more independent and autonomous and 
therefore subject to less control from the headquarters. Subsidiaries whose current 
commercial success relies upon knowledge and technology provided by the parent’s 
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technological platform and operational procedures are more managed through bureaucratic 
monitoring mechanisms which decrease their decision-making autonomy.  
Several studies (e.g., Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Johnston & Menguc, 2007) have used 
resource dependence theory to argue that when the (relative) size of a subsidiary is large, its 
bargaining position will be better. Subsidiary size in an absolute sense has the ability to 
support a full management staff, thus leading to more decentralization of decision-making 
because of its bargaining strength. Although larger size implies that the subsidiary can 
develop its own resources and become less dependent on central management, a very large 
subsidiary is likely of great importance to the overall company, and may therefore require 
much attention from parent firm (Hedlund, 1981). Large size is, however, also associated 
with increased coordination complexity. The increased information flows and the ensuring 
expansion in volume and complexity of decision-making require increasing managerial 
input from the parent. This in turn brings about increased headquarters influence (Shen, 
1970). Taken together, the impact of subsidiary size on decision-making autonomy is often 
predicted to be non-linear. 
 Similar to the integration-responsiveness framework, resources related to knowledge 
and technology also play a key role in resource dependence theory. The causal argument 
that links such resources with the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
different however. In the integration- responsiveness framework it is based on external 
embeddedness. In resource dependence theory, it is based on internal considerations. 
Nonetheless, there is a comment element in the two perspectives. Birkinshaw and Hood 
(2000) argue that subsidiaries established in leading-edge clusters will develop relationships 
with local customers and suppliers, experiment with new ideas, and transfer some of their 
new knowledge back home. To do any of these requires a significant level of decision-
making autonomy as predicted by the integration-responsiveness framework. In addition, 
once some level of self-determination has been achieved, the subsidiary finds itself in a more 
powerful position vis-a-vis its parent company since it is in control of valuable local 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Prahalad & Doz, 1981). This offers even greater degrees 
of freedom, and thus the possibility to further enhance its local embeddedness as predicted 
by resource dependence theory. 
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2.3.3. Agency theory 
The third theoretical perspective is agency theory that studies how information asymmetry 
affects economic decisions (Akerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1961). Agency theory postulates that 
monitoring is more difficult when the relationship between the agent and the principal is 
increasingly characterized by information asymmetry (Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992; Tosi 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1989). This theory has also been applied to the analysis of the headquarters-
subsidiary relationship (Andersson & Holm, 2010). This means that the headquarters 
delegates work on behalf of subsidiary and implements formal and informal control 
mechanisms to ensure that the subsidiary pursues the goals of the headquarters (O’Donnell, 
2000). Factors that increase information asymmetry between the headquarters and the 
subsidiary as well as increased discretion on the part of subsidiary managers should 
diminish the effectiveness of monitoring by headquarters.  
An agency problem essentially exists when subsidiary managers make decisions that 
are not desired by headquarters as a result of the information asymmetry and the 
incongruence between the goals of headquarters and the subsidiary (O’Donnell, 2000; Roth 
& O’Donnell, 1996). It is argued that the information asymmetry and goal incongruence can 
be driven by the lateral centralization of value added activities and a cultural difference 
between headquarters and subsidiary markets. The later implies that distance between home 
and host countries is likely to increase the agency problem in the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship (Chang & Taylor, 1999). To solve the agency problem, the headquarters can use 
monitoring, that is, supervise the behavior of the subsidiary, which limits the ability of the 
subsidiary to engage in self-interested behavior (Andersson & Holm, 2010; O’Donnell, 2000). 
In this reasoning, a higher distance between home and host countries increases agency 
problems, and leads to lower levels of decision making autonomy, a hypothesis we test in 
Chapter 4. 
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2.3.4. Institutional theory 
A fourth perspective is institutional theory that focuses on the role of isomorphism. In order 
to survive, firms need to obtain legitimacy and do so through isomorphism with salient 
institutions. That is, they tend to conform to the rules, norms and belief systems prevailing 
in their environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – a process also referred to as normative 
rationality (Oliver, 1997). Scholars applying this theory have argued that subsidiaries 
experience conformity pressures from both their internal (parent) and external (host 
country) environments. This means that they experience pressures for global integration to 
achieve internal consistency on the one hand and a need for a local orientation to achieve 
local external legitimacy on the other hand (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Although this theory is close to the integration-responsiveness 
framework, the key difference is that the reason for being locally responsive in institutional 
theory is the need to adapt to local circumstances for legitimacy reasons.  
The above argument has been applied by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2008). They use 
Hall and Soskice (2001)’s distinction concerning different institutional systems and the 
subsequent impact on firms. According to Hall and Soskice, the production regimes of 
advanced economies can be classified into two main patterns, namely “coordinated market 
economies” (CMEs) and “liberal market economies” (LMEs). Firms operating in the former 
are regarded as significantly more institutionally constrained than those that operate in the 
latter because they operate within contexts whose legal frameworks and systems of 
industrial relations constrain managers’ decision-making autonomy in applying market-
driven or technologically contingent management practices. Thus it has been argued that 
subsidiaries in CME countries are more institutionally constrained than subsidiaries in LME 
countries (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008). As a result it can be expected that higher levels of 
decision-making autonomy are granted to subsidiaries in institutionally “thick” countries, 
like CMEs, a hypothesis we will test in the next chapter.  
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2.3.5. Business network theory 
Business network theory assumes that business networks exist both within the subsidiary 
and outside of it. This implies that the business network extends around every subsidiary 
that engages in business activities, and that each subsidiary differs in terms of its history, 
quality, and level of embeddedness inside and outside to the MNE group (Forsgren et al., 
2005; Forsgren, 2008). The key argument is that subsidiaries are highly embedded in their 
local business networks, which make the MNE “distributed” when it comes to knowledge 
and control. In this view, the headquarters is always an outsider vis-à-vis the business 
networks in which the subsidiaries are embedded (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Forsgren & Holm, 
2010). This creates a continuing divergence between the existing knowledge areas of the 
headquarters and the subsidiary (Andersson et al., 2007; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Forsgren et 
al., 2005). These standpoints mean that a subsidiary’s embeddedness in external 
relationships decreases the headquarters’ possibility to influence the subsidiary’s day-to-day 
activities. This is associated with relatively high levels of the subsidiary’s decision-making 
autonomy, which enhances its ability to understand local business environment (Andersson 
& Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998), and to obtain local business legitimacy (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). As a result, the subsidiary can actively obtain new 
knowledge and ideas needed to explore new opportunities that foster its innovation 
potential and outcome (Ambos et al., 2011). Business network theory relates to both the 
causes and the consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. It acknowledges that 
the headquarters is a separate unit with regard to the business networks in which 
subsidiaries are involved. The headquarters lacks knowledge about subsidiary’s operations, 
and this deficiency can be dealt with by way of decentralization (and a higher level of 
decision-making autonomy). This theory also proposes that high levels of decision-making 
autonomy enables subsidiaries to increase their ability to absorb external knowledge, which 
benefits for innovative activities at the subsidiary level, a hypothesis we test in Chapter 5. 
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2.3.6. The headquarters view: the role and function of headquarters 
The sixth perspective relates to the role and the function of headquarters in subsidiary 
operations and is recently stressed in the current literature (see Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; 
Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Forsgren & Holm, 2010). This perspective assumes that the 
headquarters has a reasonable possibility of controlling value-creation processes at the 
subsidiary level through various control mechanisms. Headquarters has been described as 
the unit responsible for the long-term strategic planning of the MNE and for administration 
and monitoring (Chandler, 1991; Ciabuschi et al., 2012). The headquarters plays a crucial 
role as a controller and coordinator of various innovation processes within MNE. The reason 
is that even though the headquarters has constrained knowledge of the subsidiary 
operations (as business network view and integration-responsiveness theory suggest), it still 
has a reasonable understanding of what kind of knowledge it lacks and of how to organize 
the subsidiary’s operations. Based on this understanding, the headquarters can choose 
which innovation processes to support for subsidiaries. It is also able to access to what 
extent the subsidiary possesses valuable expertise for the innovation project and finds ways 
of intervening that will guarantee the proper application of its knowledge at the subsidiary 
level (Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Forsgren & Holm, 2010). Eventually, this perspective predicts 
that the lower the level of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, the higher the level of 
subsidiary innovation is, an argument we return to in Chapters 5 and 6. In short, the 
perspective on the role and the function of headquarters addresses the crucial importance of 
headquarters involvement in innovation processes at the subsidiary level. This perspective 
shows that to obtain the optimal level of subsidiary innovation the involvement of 
headquarters has to increase (and the lower the level of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy).  
2.3.7. Information-processing theory 
Information-processing theory argues that the impact on an organization of its strategy and 
the environmental factors with which it chooses to deal can be expressed in terms of the 
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information-processing requirements they create (Egelhoff, 1982, 1993; Galbraith, 1973, 
1977). The potential of the organization to confront these requirements can be expressed in 
the terms of information-processing capacities furnished by its organizational design. The 
organization’s design affects the information-processing requirements of the organization 
(Egelhoff, 1993). These include technology, size, environmental change, environmental 
complexity, subunit interdependency, and goals. Similarly, the features of an organization’s 
design, such as structure, degree of centralization, planning and control systems, 
interpersonal communication patterns, must be measured or expressed in terms of the 
information-processing capacity they provide.  
Several scholars have used information-processing theory to argue that subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy is likely to be affected by several components of global 
diversification, organization features (Vachani, 1999), or of environmental and 
organizational conditions (Luo, 2006). For example, MNEs with higher related international 
geographic diversification can create opportunities for benefits from economies of scale, 
“spillover” effects such as those in advertising (Daniels & Radebaugh, 1998), or lower costs 
of technology transfer within a region (Vachani, 1999). Such companies have an opportunity 
to reduce coordination cost made possible by physical and cultural proximity among a 
group of countries and by similarities in their level of economic development (Grant, 1987). 
Companies that choose to take advantage of this opportunity to reduce coordination costs 
will probably find it easier to do so by decentralizing decision-making, since subsidiaries are 
more likely to have the information necessary for taking advantage of regional synergy 
(Vachani, 1999).  
2.3.8. In conclusion 
We have described several relevant theories that have been used to explain the determinants 
and the consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Many of these theoretical 
perspectives are related. The differences are not so much the specific determinant(s) of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy. For example, several perspectives predict that 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy will increase when the need for local embeddedness 
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increases. According to the integration-responsiveness framework this is because the 
subsidiary has to be able to respond to changes in the environment. Information-processing 
theory claims that decision-making autonomy enables subsidiaries to respond to 
environmental complexity and uncertainty. The resource dependency theory argues that in 
order to tap into local resources, a subsidiary has to have more decision-making power. 
Agency theory, however, argues that agency problems caused by information asymmetry 
between headquarters and subsidiaries explain decreasing subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. According to institutional theory, greater decision-making autonomy derives 
from the need to be locally embedded coinciding with isomorphic pressures. Whereas the 
direction of a hypothesized determinant is often similar in the theoretical perspectives, the 
differences arise regarding underlying causal mechanism.  
Concerning the consequence(s) of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, business 
network theory argues that the headquarters is an outsider of the local business networks of 
subsidiaries, and that it is thus better that subsidiaries take decisions to respond to local 
contingencies. Through decision-making autonomy, subsidiaries can tap into knowledge 
and resources, which increases for example subsidiary innovation (more on that in Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6). On the other hand, according to the perspective focusing on the role and 
the function of headquarters in subsidiary operations, headquarters has a fair understanding 
of knowledge about innovation and has valuable expertise supporting for the innovation 
project. The headquarters therefore guarantees the proper application of its knowledge at 
the subsidiary level. Consequently, the headquarters centralizes its decision making 
reducing subsidiary decision making autonomy (see Chapter 4 for an application on 
distance and Chapter 5 for an application on innovation). 
2.4. Empirical findings 
2.4.1. Determinants of subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the eighteen empirical studies using various theories to 
explain the determinants of decision-making autonomy included in our assessment of 
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empirical results obtained so far.2 These eighteen studies measure subsidiary decision-
making autonomy with multi-item scales. Some studies (e.g., Männik et al., 2005) measure 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy indirectly via an assessment of subsidiary business 
functions. Others (e.g., Johnston & Menguc, 2007, Gammelgaard et al., 2012b) apply more 
direct measures by assessing the degree of decision-making. An evolutionary process can be 
observed here regarding the measurement of decision making autonomy; whereas earlier 
studies have focused on business functions, more recent studies use actual decision-making 
authority as a measure of autonomy.  This evolutionary process is also reflected in this 
thesis. In Chapter 3 we use the first type of measurement based on business functions. In 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we use the measure that captures decision making. Using these two 
proxies for subsidiary decision-making autonomy, a range of independent variables has 
been included in extant literature. These independent variables are sometimes measured in 
different ways, but often related and occasionally exactly similar. 
 
                                                            
2 We initially identified twenty-five empirical studies. Six of these twenty-five studies (Aylmer, 1970; Bowman et al., 2000; 
Garnier et al., 1979; Goehle, 1980; Picard, 1977; Stopford & Wells, 1972) were excluded because these were merely descriptive 
studies, making it difficult to identify statistically significant variables and compare their findings with other studies. We also 
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By identifying the most common characteristics of the independent variables through the 
definitions in these empirical studies, we classify the determinants of decision-making 
autonomy in five clusters. That is, those determinants that relate to the strategic role of the 
subsidiary, organizational complexity, decision- and control structure, general MNE 
characteristics, and industry- and country-level features (see Table 2.2). Within each of these 
clusters, scholars have used a specific independent variable that has been associated with 
the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. For example, a subsidiary’s strategic 
role has been operationalized by world product mandate (Ambos et al., 2011; Edwards et al., 
2002) but also by market scope (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008; Simões et al., 2002). 
Table 2.2 makes a distinction between the sign of the estimated parameter coefficient 
(that shows the direction of a particular decision-making autonomy determinant) and its 
statistical significance. Without discussing each independent variable that has been included 
the eighteen large scale empirical studies separately, our assessment shows general 
convergence in terms of results obtained for the first three clusters, and mixed results for the 
fourth and fifth cluster. Our review of the empirical results indicates that strategic role, 
organizational complexity, decision- and control structure, and general MNE characteristics 
are key determinants of subsidiary decision-making autonomy.  
For the first cluster, we identified eleven different independent variables that are 
used to proxy the strategic role of a subsidiary. Almost all of the eighteen empirical studies 
include one or more measures of a subsidiary’s strategic role, either by measuring the level 
of integration in the value chain (four studies) or by measuring the degree of host market 
orientation (also four studies). For these and other variables – such as the percentage of a 
subsidiary’s purchases from the parent or the presence of a world product mandate – the 
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Next to strategic role, most of the eighteen studies incorporate one or more variables 
capturing the relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and the 
organizational complexity of an MNE by means of variables such as size, degree of 
diversification and information that is owned by the subsidiary. Eight different variables are 
included in eighteen studies yielding forty-nine different results. The results for most of the 
variables in the studies are mixed. For example, most studies report both a positive (and 
often also significant) and negative relationship between a subsidiary’s research competence 
and decision-making autonomy (e.g., Ambos et al., 2011; Gainer, 1982; Johnston & Menguc, 
2007; Luo, 2006; Taggart & Hood, 1999). With respect to size, theory predicts a non-linear 
effect, which is reflected in the mixed empirical results obtained so far (e.g., Hedlund, 1981; 
Johnston & Menguc, 2007). Similar to the results for the variables that proxy a subsidiary’s 
strategic role, the results for organizational complexity are consistent and in line with 
theoretical predictions. 
The third cluster of variables that are used to explain differences in subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy concerns the MNE’s decision- and control structure. Five 
different proxies (e.g., the number of parent representatives on the subsidiary’s board or the 
extent of parent ownership) have been used to capture this. The results are consistent, with 
most studies finding a negative relationship between decision-making autonomy and more 
intense monitoring and control systems. With the exception of Gates and Egelhoff (1986) and 
Garnier (1982), all seven studies examining the impact of a parent’s entry mode on 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy find that greenfields are associated with lower levels 
of decision-making  autonomy (e.g., Chiao & Ying, 2013; Gammelgaard et al., 2012b; 
Garnier, 1982; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Luo, 2006). Besides Johnston and Menguc (2007), who 
reported a non-significantly positive effect, all other studies found a negative effect of parent 
ownership on subsidiary decision-making autonomy (e.g., Garnier, 1982; Schüler-Zhou & 
Schüller, 2013). 
For the fourth cluster of decision-making autonomy determinants, we find that 
almost all of the eighteen empirical studies incorporate subsidiary- and overall MNE 
characteristics such as firm age or performance, the parent’s international experience and the 
divisional structure of the MNE, etc. The results are less consistent compared with the other 
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three clusters. For example, a parent’s international experience is expected to be negatively 
associated with decision-making autonomy, but the empirical findings report the opposite 
(Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Luo, 2006). Regarding subsidiary performance, all studies except for 
Garnier (1982) indicate that high subsidiary performance is associated with high subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy (albeit the results are not always significant here). Several 
studies found that subsidiary age is positively related to subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy (Ambos et al., 2011; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986), although some others report 
insignificant effects (e.g., Garnier, 1982; Taggart & Hood, 1999). The divisional structure of 
the MNE is the only variable in this cluster for which we find consistent results. MNEs with 
a divisional structure based on functional areas have lower levels of subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. The variables in this cluster are mostly included as control variables. 
They are not theorized about explicitly because they are often not the variables of interest, 
but serve as “residual” independent variables. A similar observation holds for our final 
cluster of variables including industry- and country-level characteristics. 
The fifth cluster includes variables that proxy industry- and country-level effects. 
Although these are typically included as control variables, very few studies analyze them as 
main determinants of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Hedlund (1981), for example, 
found that Swedish and Japanese firms are more decentralized than U.S. firms, a finding in 
line with our main result presented in Chapter 3. As foreign subsidiaries tend to conform to 
the rules, norms and belief systems that prevail in their environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983), a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy varies according to the institutional setting 
of the home- and host country (see Chapter 3). Subsidiaries operating in an institutionally 
“thick” context face more and other pressures than subsidiaries that operate in a context in 
which less isomorphic pressures exist. Hence, subsidiaries can be expected to have levels of 
decision-making autonomy depending on the national business systems in which they 
operate.  
 To sum up, our empirical overview on the determinants of decision-making 
autonomy indicates that despite minor differences, the overwhelming majority of the results 
for strategic role, organizational complexity and decision- and control structure are 
consistent and in line with the predictions that can be derived from the different theoretical 
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frameworks (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, although some studies included institutional 
context and national distance between home and host countries as control variables, very 
few studies capture these factors as main effects to examine the determinants of subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. Therefore, we will attempt to explore the role of home and host 
country context in the Chapters 3 and 4. 
2.4.2. The consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Next, we turn to the consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy identified from 
the empirical studies obtained so far. Table 2.3 offers an overview of the thirteen empirical 
studies using different theoretical perspectives to examine the role of decision-making 
autonomy in the operation of both MNE and subsidiary. In line with the preceding 
discussion on the measure of decision-making autonomy, these studies also measure 
decision-making autonomy with multi-item scales on decisions regarding business activities 
of subsidiary, and they are summed into one index, which is used as a proxy for decision-
making autonomy measure. Our literature search yielded the thirteen empirical studies in 
which subsidiary decision-making autonomy is used as an independent variable (direct 
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Table 2.4 provides a distinction between the sign and the estimated parameter 
coefficient that indicates the impact of decision-making autonomy on dependent variables 
and their statistical significance. Similar to the previous section, without discussing the 
impact of decision-making autonomy on each dependent variable, our assessment shows 
general convergence in terms of results obtained for the impact of subsidiary decision-
making autonomy on MNE and subsidiary level outcomes.  
Concerning subsidiary characteristics, we identified twelve different dependent 
variables, which scholars used to examine the role of decision-making autonomy. For 
example, using resource dependence theory, Jindra et al. (2009) found that subsidiary with 
decision-making autonomy in terms of market, product, and value-adding scope are not 
only more likely to form linkages, per se, but also more intense linkages compared to 
subsidiaries with a narrower functional scope and level of decision-making autonomy. 
Albeit using business network theory, the finding of Gammelgaard et al. (2012a) is 
consistent with that of Jindra et al. (2009). 
Concerning MNE characteristics, most of the thirteen studies incorporate variables 
such as entry model of MNE, bureaucratic monitoring mechanisms, supervision of 
headquarters, inverse knowledge transfer, and headquarters’ local relationship. Similar to 
the results for the variables concerning subsidiary characteristics, most results relating to 
MNE characteristics are in line with theoretical predictions. Decision-making autonomy not 
only has direct effects on MNE or subsidiary outcomes. For example, Slangen (2011) argued 
that the positive effects of geographic, native and language barrier on the likelihood of 
MNE’s greenfield entry is weaker at higher levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
Decision making autonomy is a moderating variable in this study. When subsidiaries have 
high decision-making autonomy, they interact less intensely with their headquarters. In such 
cases the management costs of acquisition in culturally distant countries need not exceed 
those of their greenfield counterparts, because the culturally different workforce and 
practices that come with acquisitions will not cause cultural friction when there is little 
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A similar argument is put forward to relate subsidiary decision-making autonomy to 
geographic and language barriers and MNE’s entry mode (see Slangen, 2011). 
To summarize, having taken stock of the theoretical arguments and empirical results 
obtained so far, we conclude that decision-making autonomy plays an important role in 
understanding both the performance of the subsidiary itself and the MNE as a whole. With 
respect to studies on the impact of decision-making autonomy, our review shows that 
despite the importance of innovation for MNEs and the increased importance of subsidiaries 
in generating these innovations, our understanding of the relation between innovation and 
decision-making autonomy is limited. We will concentrate on this relation in Chapters 5 and 
6.   
2.5. Conclusions 
A proper understanding of the role and position of the subsidiary is pivotal to our 
understanding of the overall functioning of the MNE. The strategic changes in the 
subsidiary’s position due to the ongoing process of globalization are associated with a 
tension between the MNE’s wish to control and the need for subsidiaries to have more 
decision-making autonomy. As our review shows, subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
important as it is related to a range of subsidiary and MNE specific characteristics.  
 In our review of the determinants and the consequences of subsidiary decision-
making autonomy we have presented and discussed seven theoretical perspectives to 
explain the differences in levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy and its effect on 
MNE and subsidiary. These perspectives are the integration-responsiveness framework, the 
resource dependence theory, agency theory, institutional theory, business network theory, 
the perspective centering on the role of headquarters, and information-processing theory. 
Together these related perspectives broadly cover the field of international business and 
management. Our review shows that these different theoretical perspectives used to 
understand the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy mostly differ in the nature 
of the theoretical argument but not (much) in the direction of their subsequent prediction. 
We then moved on to the empirical findings obtained in empirical studies on the 
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determinants and the consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, respectively. 
Through our literature review, we found that although the core of these findings is often in 
line with (or at least not opposing) the main theoretical predictions, no study pays attention 
to if and how home and host country institutional context relates to the level of a 
subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. Therefore, the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) in 
this thesis attempts to investigate how institutional environments in home and host 
countries affect the level of a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. A country’s 
institutional environment partly determines a unit’s organizational behaviour and structure 
(Kostova, 1999; Soskice, 1999). Using institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 
1997), Chapter 3 focuses on the country-level determinants of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy, that is institutional environment in home and host countries. This analysis of 
country level institutional factors is continued in Chapter 4 when we study how differences 
between home and host countries affect decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Little is 
known about the impact of distance between home and host country contexts on the 
distribution of decision-making autonomy in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. For that 
reason, Chapter 4 will explore how the distance between home and host country contexts relates 
to the level of a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy.  
 As we argued in this chapter, the subsidiary is increasingly seen as a crucial factor 
determining the competitiveness of the MNE as a whole. Specifically, the subsidiary is 
viewed as important source of knowledge contributing to innovation (Frost et al., 2002; 
Gupta & Govindrajan, 2000; Phene & Almeida, 2008; Tallman & Phene, 2007; Vanaik et al., 
2005). Accordingly, a good understanding of subsidiary innovation is important as 
subsidiary innovation results in increased operational efficiency, better subsidiary 
performance in local markets – e.g., due to first-mover advantages (Damanpour et al., 2009) 
– and better MNE performance through the spill-over of new knowledge and market 
opportunities (Ameida & Phene, 2004; Phene & Almeida, 2008). Our literature review 
revealed that although several studies have focused on the consequences of decision-making 
autonomy, the question of how decision-making autonomy is related to subsidiary 
innovation is still underexplored. Therefore, Chapter 5 aims to examine the relationship 
between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation. As a key role of the 
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subsidiary concerns the possibility to tap into local knowledge pools (such a universities and 
other knowledge intensive organizations) scholars have increasingly stressed the need for 
subsidiaries to become locally embedded in the host country. This external embeddedness is 
supposed to positively affect the subsidiary knowledge pool, and contribute to its innovative 
potential. The link between decision-making autonomy, embeddedness and innovation at 







Home- and host country institutional 
environment and subsidiary decision-
making autonomy3 
3.1. Introduction 
The increasing level of global competition has caused international managers to define new 
strategies for multinational enterprises (MNEs). The relationship between the parent 
company and its subsidiary is becoming central to an understanding of the functioning of 
MNEs because subsidiaries play an increasing role in generating competitive advantages for 
the MNE (Birkinshaw et al., 1998). The decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries is at the 
centre stage in this debate. A multinational company can be conceptualized as a network of 
exchange relationships among organizational units, including the headquarters and the 
different national subsidiaries, which are embedded in what Zaheer (1995b) describes as the 
“meta-environment” or, more recently by George & Zaheer (2006) or de Jong et al. (2011) as 
the “geographic signature”. That is, MNEs operate in multiple national environments, each 
with its own path-dependent institutional characteristics and this differentiates MNEs from 
domestic firms (Dunning & Lundan, 2009; Rugman & Oh, 2010). In this chapter, we present 
a first attempt to explain how variations in the home- and host country environments, next 
to and on top of parent company- and subsidiary characteristics, determine variations in the 
                                                            
3 This chapter appeared in the Problems and Perspectives in Management (de Jong & Dut, 2010). 
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decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. In so doing, we respond to the call for more 
interdisciplinary as well as more empirical work in this field (Geppert & Williams, 2006; 
Paterson & Brock, 2002). 
 A stream of relatively recent studies in organization science – following earlier work 
in the 1980s (Garnier, 1982; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Goehle, 1980; Hedlund, 1981; White & 
Poynter, 1984) and the 1990s (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; 
Blaine, 1994; Gnan & Songini, 1995; Jarillo & Martinez, 1990) – focuses on the analysis of the 
role of the subsidiary, in order to explain inter-organizational differences in MNE behavior 
and performance (Geppert & Williams, 2006; Paterson & Brock, 2002). Several studies (Chiao 
& Ying, 2013; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006; Gammelgaard et al., 2012a, b; Ferner et 
al., 2004) have pointed out that the level of decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries varies 
strongly. That is, some subsidiaries have relatively high levels of decision-making 
independence while others are tightly controlled by the headquarters. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that this strategy may change over time (Ambos et al., 2011; Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2006; Gammelgaard et al., 2012a). Gnan and Songini (1995), for instance, 
show that Japanese firms allow subsidiaries little decision-making freedom in the early 
stages of development, while there has been a significant relaxation of this position in recent 
years (cf. Dirks, 1995). Conversely, Blaine (1994) found that German-owned subsidiaries 
have lost important elements of their decision-making power. All in all, these studies point 
out that the relationship between the parent company and its foreign subsidiaries has 
become more important but also more complicated and sometimes even loaded with 
conflicts. Decision-making autonomy boils down to the essence of power. Given the 
increasing importance of subsidiary activities for headquarters performance the question of 
decision-making autonomy is omnipresent in headquarters-subsidiary relationships 
(Takeuchi et al., 2008). 
 When reviewing the subsidiary literature, two broad conclusions can be drawn, at 
least. First, previous studies of subsidiary offer a helpful but scattered picture of the 
subsidiary’s decision-making position. These studies can be classified into those that 
primarily focus on characteristics of the parent company (e.g., size, the level of product 
diversification) or of the subsidiary (e.g., size, performance, ownership). For example, it has 
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been argued that the size of the parent company or the level of its product diversification 
matters for decision-making autonomy (Johnston, 2005). In a similar vein, the size of the 
subsidiary, its performance and extent of ownership are related to its decision-making 
autonomy as well (Johnston & Menguc, 2007). In comparison to the various firm 
characteristics, however, there has been much less analysis concerning the effects of the local 
institutional environment on subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Hence, we specify 
hypotheses that detail effects on subsidiary decision-making autonomy of home- and host-
country environments. Together with parent and subsidiary characteristics we integrate 
them into one framework. Our integrative research model allows us to disentangle how the 
division of decision-making autonomy between the headquarters and the operational unit 
responds to this complex set of factors. Herein lays the first contribution of this chapter. 
 Ample case study and survey evidence of decision-making autonomy are available. 
Case studies help to identify and explore processes, and for that reason subsidiary studies 
have used this method to investigate particular decision-making autonomy-related events. 
Using case studies, researchers revealed insights into the origin and flow of headquarters-
subsidiary decision-making processes. Notwithstanding the importance of case studies, they 
focus on single events and therefore lack the scope needed to generalize findings. Due to 
differences in measures and samples survey results are difficult to compare. In particular the 
effects of parent-company characteristics on decision-making autonomy have been mixed 
and no clear understanding for these determinants has yet been developed. The evidence for 
the impact of subsidiary characteristics on their decision-making autonomy is somewhat 
more robust and shows a little more consistency than parent-company characteristics. 
 The second contribution concerns the empirical test of the integrated framework. 
This chapter intends to move beyond case-study literature and use secondary data-sources 
(that is, the Orbis database) to collect information for a sample of companies and their 
environments. We collected data from 263 subsidiaries of 18 MNEs in 25 European 
countries. Our European focus aims at complimenting existing work that analyses the 
relationship between US MNEs and their subsidiaries. In addition to that, the majority of the 
European studies on the topic generally include one or two specific European countries (for 
example, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1997; Hedlund, 1981; Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Taggart & 
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Hood, 1999). Our international coverage aims at going beyond the bilateral perspective. In 
so doing, we present three other novel twists to the literature. First, we present a relatively 
new proxy for the decision-making autonomy of the subsidiary. Based on the subsidiary 
literature, we assembled a list of ten different business functions and other activities that 
each requires management attention of subsidiaries and/or headquarters – i.e., R&D, 
manufacturing, marketing, sales, market scope, network activities, outsourcing, cooperation, 
export-import activities and the organisation of the subsidiary establishment (see also, for 
example, Jindra et al., 2009). We used detailed information available in the Orbis database 
for each of these ten dimensions to create our proxy for the overall decision-making 
autonomy of the subsidiary. Second, the headquarters is located in a particular national 
business context or system. We will analyse whether, and if so: how, this national context 
determines the amount of decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Third, we also include 
measures for the institutional environments of the host countries, i.e., the particular context 
in which the subsidiary operates. Decision-making autonomy is not only determined by 
home country contexts but also by national business practices in host country contexts of 
MNEs. Although our research method has limitations – which we will elaborate on in the 
discussion section – the data have enabled us to develop a good insight into the role of 
institutional environments in the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. 
In sum, this chapter makes first steps in unravelling the relation between 
institutional environment and its effects on the determinants of different levels of subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. More precisely, we investigate how home- and host 
institutional environments affect the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
Section 2 in this chapter discusses the theoretical background and presents the model. 
Following this, the research methodology is summarized in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and associated discussion. Finally, the discussion, conclusion and 
limitations of this chapter are provided in Section 5 and 6, respectively.  
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3.2. Theory and hypotheses 
The key proposition in this chapter is that subsidiary decision-making autonomy is partly 
shaped by the nature of the local institutional environment in which the headquarters of the 
MNE and the subsidiary are embedded. Institutional theory argues that, in order to survive, 
organisations need to gain legitimacy that is achieved through isomorphism with salient 
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997). Firms will tend to conform to the rules 
and belief systems prevailing in their environment (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008). As said, 
since the MNE is situated in both its country of origin and, through its subsidiaries, in a 
number of other countries, it operates under multiple, possibly conflicting, institutional 
pressures. In what follows we explain how different home- and host country environments 
determine the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. 
Our first variable captures the impact of the home country environment on subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. Home country environments determine the overall strategy of 
the MNE. Thus, the decision by e.g. a US MNE in regard to exerting centralised control of a 
subsidiary is motivated by deeply held assumptions concerning appropriate goal-setting 
that arise out of the parent company’s embeddedness in a particular (USA) home country 
institutional setting. This is called a home country effect in IB research. 
 In line with Soskice (1999) we take into account that the production regimes of 
advanced economies can be classified into two main patterns, namely coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) and liberal market economy (LMEs) (cf. Hall & Soskice, 2001). Firms 
operating in the former context (e.g., the US, the UK, Ireland and Australia) are regarded as 
significantly more institutionally constrained than those in the latter (e.g., Germany and 
Japan), in the sense that they operate within contexts whose legal frameworks and systems 
of industrial relations constrain managers’ decision-making autonomy in applying market-
driven or technologically contingent management practices. Thus, the MNE headquarters in 
CME countries across the world have a local rather than a global focus and thus are less 
subject to centralized control which impairs their ability to respond to local market 
pressures. For example, German MNEs have recently embarked on a cautious 
internationalization process but still follow a “local responsiveness” strategy of local 
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differentiation among their foreign subsidiaries. Geppert and Williams (2006) argue that 
headquarters management representatives in Germany emphasize that subsidiaries 
worldwide have relative decision-making autonomy in running their own operations. 
Moreover, Lane (1989) shows that German and Japanese MNEs allocate more resources and 
responsibilities as well as organizational and financial decision-making autonomy to their 
subsidiaries to develop networks in host countries similar to those existing in German and 
Japanese industries. In short, we expect that international corporations that are in favour of 
imposing decentralized strategies on their subsidiaries, such as German, Japanese and 
Swedish MNEs, – all else equal – tend to respect the decision-making autonomy of local 
subsidiaries. In contrast, MNEs in Anglo-Saxon economies like to – all else equal – impose 
their standardized global strategies on their subsidiaries. Divergent interests and the local 
power resources of key subsidiary managers and employee representative bodies are played 
down or ignored. Therefore, we propose the following first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Subsidiaries with headquarters located in CMEs are characterized by 
higher levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy than subsidiaries with headquarters 
located in LMEs.  
 
The second hypothesis in this chapter concerns the degree of institutional embeddedness of 
the subsidiaries in the host country. The degree of institutional embeddedness of the 
subsidiary in the host country represents whether the subsidiary operates in a country with 
a highly or weakly integrated national business system (Geppert & Williams, 2006). 
Nationally specific industrial orders and societal effects may create alternative paths for 
organizing businesses and management. The degree of embeddedness, interdependence, 
cohesion and integration of institutions and business organizations in the Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism is much lower than in other capitalist countries, such as Germany and 
Japan (Benito et al., 2003; Ferner et al., 2004). CMEs such as Germany or Japan have a highly 
integrated national business system whose key characteristic is that major institutions are 
more interdependent. For example, they have inter-linkages between national infrastructure, 
corporate strategy and firm behavior as a result of institutional complementarities. The 
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strategic interaction is reflected by dense networks that connect the managers and technical 
personnel inside a company to their counterparts in other firms. The internal structure of the 
firm is based on collaborative and cooperative modes of action (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
Moreover, these economies have developed enterprise-based unions in which labor union 
and government agencies have very strong influences on firms, such as participating in firm 
decision-making. Therefore, MNEs may face several difficulties in implementing global 
practices in subsidiaries located in these countries. However, the LMEs of Anglo-Saxon 
countries have relatively low-level integrated national business systems (Whitley, 1999). 
They have a relatively low level of commitment and cooperation between firms and between 
employers and employees, and a high level of mobility of operations. The main 
characteristics of these LMEs are a lack of integration or systematic coordination of activities, 
limited legal constraints on management’s use of labor resources and weak rights of 
employee representative bodies. Hence, MNEs are relatively easily able to apply a global 
strategy in subsidiaries located in these economies. As a result, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Subsidiaries located in CMEs are characterized by higher levels of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy than subsidiaries located in LMEs.  
 
The main reason for subsidiaries to have higher levels of decision-making autonomy in 
CMEs (compared to LMEs) is the higher need to be integrated in the local environment, 
which increases the need to be relatively autonomous (see also Chapters 5 and 6). Whereas 
the first hypothesis captures the home country effect, the second hypothesis aims to capture 
the host country effect.4 
                                                            
4 We took four options into account, i.e., home CME – host CME, home CME – host LME, home LME – host LME, home LME – 
host CME. However, we did not present the hypotheses and results for each because i) no theory discusses or explains 
arguments concerning each of these four options, and ii) we checked the four pairs of home-host countries combinations, but 
the empirical results were not significant. To nonetheless address this issue, our model was controlled by a dummy variable to 
reflect whether home and host countries have the same business systems or not. This does not affect the result of the model (see 
Table 3.2). 
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3.3. Research methods 
3.3.1. Data collection and sample 
The data used to estimate the theoretical model are derived from Orbis. Orbis is the most 
appropriate single-source firm-level database for our research because it is one of the most 
comprehensive pan-European databases containing detailed information of many public 
and private companies in virtually all European countries. Overall, the database includes a 
wealth of information that represents a substantial amount of economic activity. The 
information is derived from financial reports of the subsidiaries and parent companies for 
2007 including their product lines and trade activity description. This not only allows us to 
determine our key construct (i.e., subsidiary decision-making autonomy) but also to develop 
measures for headquarters and subsidiary characteristics that we included as control 
variables in our model (see below). We selected 263 European subsidiaries of the 18 largest 
MNEs from 25 European countries (including, for example, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Sweden). The data for these large companies allow us to construct datasets 
with complete observations (cf. Rugman & Oh, 2010). Orbis also specifies the geographic 
location of the MNE itself and all its subsidiaries which allows us to determine the 
peculiarities of the particular home and host country environments in question. 
3.3.2. Dependent variable: subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
The dependent variable is the degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Our data-
collection approach does not allow to directly measure decision-making autonomy of 
subsidiary managers versus the headquarters as in a case-study or a survey-based research 
(as we will do in subsequent chapters). Nonetheless, we have been able to construct a proxy 
for subsidiary decision-making autonomy in this chapter based on the following three steps. 
First, we carefully reviewed the definitions and measures of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy employed in leading subsidiary studies – i.e., Garnier (1982), Edwards et al. 
(2002), Hedlund (1981), Johnston and Menguc (2007), O’Donnell (2000), Vachani (1999), and 
White and Poynter (1984). We take the theoretical and empirical achievements in the extant 
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subsidiary literature as the point of departure for our proxy of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. This review resulted in a list of ten decision dimensions that primarily relate to 
business functions of subsidiaries – such as R&D, manufacturing, marketing and sales – but 
also include other potentially important management activities such as outsourcing, export-
import or the organisation of the subsidiary establishment self (cf. Jindra et al., 2009).5 
Second, based on the Orbis database we determined whether or not a subsidiary performs a 
particular business function or activity. Thus, we created a dummy variable for each of the 
ten dimensions, that is, R&D = 1 if the subsidiary undertakes R&D activities, and 0 
otherwise; Manufacturing = 1 if the subsidiary undertakes manufacturing activities, and 0 
otherwise; Marketing = 1 if the subsidiary undertakes marketing activities, and 0 otherwise; 
Sales = 1 if the subsidiary undertakes sales activities in the domestic market, and 0 
otherwise; Market scope = 1 if the subsidiary serves foreign markets, and 0 otherwise; 
Network = 1 if the subsidiary engages in network activities within the MNE, and 0 
otherwise; Outsourcing = 1 if the subsidiary engages in outsourcing activities, and 0 
otherwise; Cooperation = 1 if the subsidiary cooperates with external organizations, and 0 
otherwise; Export-import = 1 if the subsidiary engages in export and/or import activities, 
and 0 otherwise; Subsidiary establishment = 1 if the subsidiary has its own subsidiary, and 0 
otherwise.  
 Third, we summed the scores of the ten different dummies into one overall construct. 
We used this construct – that ranges from 0 to 10 – as the proxy for the degree of subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. There are three additional reasons that support the use of this 
construct as the overall proxy for subsidiary decision-making autonomy rather than, e.g., 
individual dimensions separately. Firstly, it stands to reason that the more business 
functions or activities a subsidiary performs, the higher its decision-making autonomy will 
                                                            
5 White and Pointer (1984), for example, classify the decision-making autonomy of a subsidiary in three categories: market 
scope, product scope and value added scope. Market scope is the range of geographic markets available to the subsidiary, with 
market scope being broad when a subsidiary serves not only a domestic market but also foreign markets. Product scope is the 
latitude exercised by a subsidiary’s business with regard to product line extensions and new product areas. The value added 
scope of the subsidiary will be limited when economies of scale are large, tariffs are low and customer acceptance of a globally 
standardized product is high. Therefore, value added scope refers to the range of ways in which a subsidiary adds value, 
whether through development, manufacturing or marketing activities. Value added scope is broad when the subsidiary is not 
limited to the manufacturing or marketing of established products but also has the capability to develop new products and 
processes. 
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be. A wide range of business functions implies greater managerial complexity and 
specialization opportunities for a subsidiary which will be translated in greater decision-
making autonomy. Secondly, we performed exploratory factor analysis and cluster studies 
on the ten dimensions. These results showed that no sub-dimensions of decision-making 
autonomy exist. Thirdly, we estimated Logit and Probit models for each separate dimension. 
It might be that a subsidiary receives decision-making autonomy for a single dimension and 
not for (all) others which is then masked in a summed scale. These estimates offered no 
significant results. The same applies to models in which we – despite the factor and cluster 
analyses – grouped dimensions into two or three separate scales for decision-making 
autonomy. Again, no significant results appeared. Taken together, this supports the use of 
our proxy for subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
3.3.3. Independent variables 
We measured the first explanatory variable – the home country institutional effect – with a 
dummy variable. As mentioned above, studies in the national business system approach 
make a distinction between LMEs (e.g., the United Kingdom, Ireland) and CMEs (e.g, 
Germany, Japan). The classification of the countries is taken from Hall and Sockice (2001). 
We code 1 if the subsidiary belongs to a multinational corporation whose headquarters is 
located in a CME, and 0 otherwise (hence, if the subsidiary belongs to a multinational 
corporation whose headquarters is located in an LME). We also measured the second 
explanatory – the host country institutional effect – with a dummy variable. We code 1 if the 
subsidiary is located in a CME country, and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.4. Control variables 
We include two sets of control variables in our model. Although our sample includes the 
largest European MNEs there is, of course, variation in MNE characteristics that need to be 
accounted for. The first set of control variables accounts for MNE characteristics, in 
particular the degree of product diversification and company size (Garnier, 1982; Gates & 
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Egelhoff, 1986; Vachani, 1999). First, MNE decentralization can be positively associated with 
product diversification.6 That is, the greater the degree of product diversification of MNEs, 
the more the subsidiary management by MNEs becomes complex and more difficult to 
control, enabling their subsidiaries to assume more decision-making autonomy (Gates & 
Egelhoff, 1986; Vachani, 1999). The degree of product diversification is measured by the 
number of products to be counted through product codes from the annual reports of the 
subsidiaries. Second, increasing size of the parent company may lead to an increase in the 
decision-making autonomy of local managers because size leads to more decentralized 
structuring of activities which then facilitates decision-making autonomy (Garnier, 1982; 
Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Goehle, 1980; Hedlund, 1981). The size of multinational firms is 
measured by the total number of employees of the MNE. 
 The degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is also influenced by subsidiary 
characteristics. The second set of control variables accounts for these, in particular 
subsidiary age, economic performance, extent of ownership and subsidiary size. First, we 
assert that after several years of operation subsidiaries are allowed more decision-making 
autonomy than those with little experience because subsidiaries that have long been 
dependent on the multinational firm will have well-established connections with local 
stakeholders and extensive local experience. Thus, older subsidiaries are expected to be 
more autonomous than subsidiaries that have had a shorter affiliation with their foreign 
parent company (Chiao & Ying, 2013; Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008; Luo, 2006; Taggart & 
Hood, 1999; Young & Tavares, 2004). The age of the subsidiary is measured as the number of 
years since the subsidiary was founded. Second, it can be expected that successful local 
subsidiary managers will enjoy more decision-making autonomy than those who are less 
successful. Good company performance by the subsidiary within an MNE can provide local 
managers with greater bargaining power, even when the company seeks to use an imposed 
and centralized approach to develop an increasing global standardization of local practices. 
Subsidiaries with poor performance do not have the power to resist the implementation of 
an MNE’s global strategy (Ambos et al., 2011; Björkman & Piekkari, 2009; Geppert & 
                                                            
6 In a similar vein, Bartlett and Goshal (1989) relate decision making power to the nature of the product. This information, 
however, was not available in the Orbis dataset.  
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Williams, 2006). The economic performance is measured as the subsidiary’s profit rate (in 
terms of a percentage) relative to that of the whole MNE, representing whether the 
subsidiary performs better or worse than any other across the whole MNE. Third, the extent 
of subsidiary ownership cannot be ignored in our thinking about subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. It is defined as the equity holding authority of an owned subsidiary by 
the parent company. In cases of majority ownership, there are more chances of control and 
direction than in joint venture and minority ownership situations where the interests and 
resistance of local partners have to be taken in consideration. Furthermore, a majority 
ownership reflects a commitment of resources and a governance mechanism to control spill-
over risks of firm-specific knowledge that creates sustainable competitive advantages (Chan 
& Makino, 2007; Männik, 2006). The extent of ownership of a subsidiary is measured by the 
percentage of the local shareholders’ ownership of the subsidiary. Fourth, the size of the 
subsidiary is important because increasing size will offer increasing tangible (e.g. capital) 
and intangible resources (e.g. managerial talent and knowledge) that the MNE can use to 
obtain sustainable competitive advantages provided that they are inimitable, rare, causally 
ambiguous and unique (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). We account for a non-monotonic 
relationship between subsidiary size and decision-making autonomy because as a small 
subsidiary builds up its resources, it becomes less strongly tied to the MNE and its decision-
making autonomy increases. However, after a cut-off point a subsidiary becomes larger its 
role within the MNE becomes greater and the parent company increasingly controls its 
decision-making autonomy (Hedlund, 1981; Johnston, 2005; Johnston & Menguc, 2007). The 
size of the subsidiary is measured in terms of the number of employees of the subsidiary.  
 The final control variable in our model is the relatedness of the home and the host 
countries because we focus on European MNEs. It is defined in terms of the level of 
similarity between the business environment in the parent company’s country of origin and 
the country where the subsidiary is located. In fact, if this similarity level is high, the head 
office managers of MNEs are able to use their knowledge to control foreign subsidies, while 
head offices depend on the local knowledge of foreign subsidiary managers in operating a 
local business where the similarity is low (for example, Edwards et al., 2002; Erramilli & Rao, 
1990). Moreover, the external environment and the host-country environment determine the 
Home- and host country institutional environment…  59 
 
role of the MNE subsidiary, including its decision-making autonomy (Benito et al., 2003). 
Thus, we would expect that if the home and the host countries have similar business 
environments, the decision-making autonomy of the subsidiary will be low, and if there is 
little similarity the decision-making autonomy will be high. The relatedness of the host and 
home countries is measured by a dummy variable. We code 1 if both the home and the host 
countries are highly integrated national business systems (i.e., countries A and B are both 
LMEs or both CMEs), and 0 if the home and the host countries belong to different national 
business systems (i.e., country A is a LME and country B is a CME and vice versa). Again, 
the classification of the countries is derived from Hall and Soskice (2001). In Chapter 4 we 
will make a more elaborate distinction between differences in business environments. 
3.3.5. Method 
We apply negative binomial regression techniques to estimate the significance of the 
hypothesized determinants of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. The dependent 
variable is a discrete counting measure. Hence, we start from the assumption that decision-
making autonomy follows a Poisson distribution. The Poisson model, however, imposes the 
restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent variable is equal to its variance. The 
negative binomial regression model generalizes the Poisson model by introducing an 
individual unobserved effect into the conditional mean, thus allowing for over-dispersion in 
the data (i.e., variance exceeding the mean). Extensive experimentation using both Poisson 
and negative binomial approaches revealed that the Poisson procedure was not suitable for 
our dataset. Therefore, we only report and discuss the results from the negative binomial 
model.  
We used the robust Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure using E-views, 
since this produces more consistent estimates of the parameters of a correctly specified 
conditional mean than the Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure does, even if the 
distribution is incorrectly specified (cf. Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).7 Finally, we 
                                                            
7 We also applied OLS estimation because most empirical studies in the field apply OLS. The regression results for both 
estimation methods are virtually the same. In fact, the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables from the OLS model 
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calculated the marginal effects at the mean values of the explanatory variables. These 
marginal effects can be used to obtain the economic meaning of the explanatory variables 
(see Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).8 
3.4. Empirical results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations are provided in Table 3.1. Results from the 
negative binomial regression analyses are summarized in Table 3.2. In preparing the data for 
the regression analysis, we performed the usual tests to obtain reliable estimates (Hair et al., 
2006). The latter yielded satisfactory results: neither heteroskedasticity nor non-normality is 
an issue. The maximum value of the correlation coefficients is 0.35, which is far below the 
threshold value of 0.80 indicating that there are no issues with multicollinearity. We 
additionally tested for possible biases caused by collinearity among variables by calculating 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression coefficients. The maximum VIF 
value is 3.85 and thus well below the cut-off value of 10 recommended by Neter et al. (1985). 
The regression results are therefore reliable and unbiased.  
Table 3.2 reports the results of the negative binomial regression analyses. These 
regression results offer two conclusions. First, the various fit parameters show that our 
models fit the data increasingly well. Model 1 is a model with control variables and a 
constant only. In Model 2, the main effects were included. The adjusted R-square improves 
for Model 2 compared to Model 1 justifying the inclusion of our key variables. Concerning 
the main effects, the empirical results strongly support Hypothesis 1 which predicts that the 
home country environment of multinational firms shapes their overall strategy concerning 
the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with headquarters located in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
are equal to three times those of the negative binomial regressions. This is perfectly in line with the statistical expectations for 
these models. Our empirical results are robust and do not depend on the statistical method that is used. Given the scale of the 
dependent variable we discuss the results with reference to the negative binomial regression estimates.  
8 The Poisson regression model is: Ŷi = eβ0 + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + β3Xi3 + β4Xi4 + β5Xi5 + β6Xi6 + β7Xi7 + β8Xi8 + β9Xi9 + β10Xi10 + ε   
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we have: 
LnYi = β0 +β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 + β10X10 + ε  
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CMEs are characterized by higher levels of decision-making autonomy than subsidiaries 
with HQs in LMEs (β = 0.12, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 is also supported (β = 0.09, p < 0.05). 
This result emphasizes the important role played by the national business environment in 
the host country. The degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is higher for 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2. The determinants of subsidiary decision-making autonomy of European MNEs1 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Marginal effect 
Constant 0.24** 0.18  
 (0.11) (0.14)  
Main effects    
Home country is CME (not LME)  0.12** 0.34** 
     (0.04) (0.12) 
Host country is CME (not LME)   0.09* 0.31* 
  (0.04) (0.11) 
Control variables: MNE characteristics     
Degree of product differentiation  −0.003 −0.01 −0.03 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Company size (10,000) 0.18 0.41 1.38 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.70) 
Control variables: Subsidiary characteristics    
Subsidiary age  0.21** 0.20** 0 .65** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Economic performance 0.001** 0.01** 0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.02) (0.001) 
Extent of subsidiary ownership 0.24** 0.26** 0.86** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.21) 
Subsidiary size (log) 0.008* 0.01* 0.03* 
 (0.004) (0.04) (0.01) 
Subsidiary size (log) squared −0.003 −0.01 −0.03 
 (0.000) (0.07) (0.000) 
Control variables: Institutional relatedness     
Home-host both same business system  −0.02 −0.01 −0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) 
Model  Summary    
N 263 263  
Adjusted R-Square 0.39 0.43  
Log likelihood   −606.3  
Notes: (1) White’s heteroscedasticity – consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
Second, the results for the control variables indicate that in particular the age of the 
subsidiary (β = 0.20, p < 0.01), its economic performance (β = 0.01, p < 0.01) and the extent of 
ownership (β = 0.26, p < 0.01) increase subsidiary decision-making autonomy.9 Our results 
for the control variables are consistent with other empirical studies on subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. While some previous studies have provided inconclusive and/or no 
significant results, none have contradicted the positive relationship supported by the present 
study. For instance, a significant positive relationship between the degree of decision-
making autonomy and the age of subsidiary coincides with the findings of Ambost et al. 
(2011), Chiao and Ying (2013), and Luo (2006), while the finding of Fenton-O’Creevy (2008) 
                                                            
9 For some of the variables in the model the variation is low in particular with respect to subsidiary ownership. In a robust test, 
we excluded subsidiary ownership. This does not affect the results.  
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was inconclusive. Table 3.2 also reports that the hypothesized non-linear relationship 
between subsidiary size and decision-making autonomy – suggested by Hedlund (1981) and 
Johnston and Menguc (2007) is not supported (with β = 0.01, p < 0.05 for the main term and 
β = –0.01, non-significance for the squared term). This means that subsidiary size has a 
positive relationship with subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Finally, the result rejects 
the hypothesis that home-host both same business system is negatively associated with 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
3.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Studies on subsidiaries have evolved over time with the research strategy becoming 
specifically concerned with headquarters-subsidiary relationships and subsidiary roles. 
Consequently, an important aspect of recent research is the degree of subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. Our results emphasize that the institutional environment – both the 
home and the host - in combination with parent-company and subsidiary characteristics are 
important drivers of the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. Although individual 
characteristics have been addressed elsewhere, ours is one of the first that explicitly focuses 
on the institutional environment. Subsidiaries of MNEs in CME countries can be argued to 
have a relatively local focus and are therefore subject to decentralized and negotiated 
control. The head office management representatives in these MNEs are in favour of 
respecting the decision-making autonomy of local subsidiaries because of their 
understanding of local markets. MNEs (for example, German, Japanese) applying 
decentralized and negotiated strategies to their subsidiaries can be argued to delegate much 
decision-making autonomy to their subsidiaries, while MNEs from LMEs (for example, 
British, American) applying centralized strategies to subsidiaries are – ceteris paribus - likely 
to restrict the autonomy of their subsidiaries. Next to this home country effect, we also find 
support for a similar effect in host countries, with subsidiaries located in CMEs having 
higher levels of decision-making autonomy than subsidiaries in LMEs. 
The result rejects the argument of Ohmae (1990) and others, which assumes that 
MNEs are becoming “placeless”, as national identity is replaced by the commitment to a 




single unified global mission in global corporations (Ohmae, 1990). This study suggests that 
MNEs have distinctive strategies for different subsidiaries. Indeed, subsidiaries in highly 
integrated NBSs such as CMEs enjoy more decision-making autonomy than those in NBSs 
such as LMEs with relatively low levels of integration.  
 We would like to mention that the findings of this chapter are consistent with the 
“sociopolitical” approach which emphasizes the role of the power, politics and strategic 
choices of local management in effecting the implementation of the global strategies of 
MNEs. First, the performance of a subsidiary is positively associated with its decision-
making autonomy. In fact, the outstanding performance of a subsidiary provides its 
managers with huge bargaining power, which allows them to actively resist the imposition 
of global strategies by the parent firm and protect local practices (cf. Geppert & Williams, 
2006). Second, the size of the subsidiary is positively associated with its decision-making 
autonomy. In fact, parent firms suffer various difficulties in directly controlling their large 
subsidiaries (Taggart & Hood, 1999) because larger subsidiaries usually reside in large 
markets and engage in several complex activities, such as R&D or innovation. This can be 
interpreted as a threshold point at which the subsidiary begins to establish greater decision-
making autonomy and eventually loosens its dependence on head office. 
 Finally, our study finds no support for the effect of the same national business 
system both the home and host countries on degree of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. Thus, for this chapter, the difference in business environments between the 
parent company’s country of origin and the country where the subsidiary is located is not a 
determinant of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. One possible explanation for this 
insignificant effect is the measure of overlap, which is based on a dummy. In Chapter 4 we 
use a set of continuous measures of home-host distance. 
3.6. Limitations and future research 
There are certain limitations to this study making us careful in interpreting our findings. 
First, in this chapter the level of subsidiary’s business functions was used as a proxy for 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Although used by others as well, this is not a perfect 
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proxy for subsidiary decision-making autonomy. In fact, the measure may be picking up the 
scope and the level of autonomy. It would be better in future research to directly measure 
the degree of decision-making autonomy concerning specific business activities by 
subsidiary. This is in fact what we do in the next chapters. Second, this chapter only 
examines one factor concerning the characteristics of the host country – that is institutional 
environment. Several studies stressed that the control issues in the organizational network 
relationship between headquarters and subsidiary may be affected by distance between 
home and host countries (Wilkinson et al., 2008) and home-country characteristics 
(Gammelgaard et al., 2012b). We recommend that future research should take these factors 
into account. This is exactly what we do in the next chapter when we explore the relation 
between home-host distance and decision-making autonomy. Third, this chapter employed 
a cross-sectional dataset (in the year 2007) which raises limitations in relation to the 
generalization of the results. Birkinshaw (1996), for instance, developed the so-called 
“mandate life cycle framework” to describe the broad change in the roles of subsidiary units 
in MNEs. In this life-cycle framework, the role of a subsidiary changes across three periods: 
mandate gain, mandate development and mandate loss. Therefore, due to the changing role 
of subsidiaries over time, future research may apply panel data or time series in order to test 
the dynamics in the relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries. The decision-
making autonomy of subsidiaries may also vary across developmental levels of foreign 
countries in which subsidiaries are located. For example, according to James and Anthony 
(1995), MNEs are more important for overall economic activity when the host and home 
countries are more similar in incomes, relative factor endowments and technologies. This 
means that an MNE from a developed country would have more room to develop in foreign 
countries with high development levels than in those with low development levels. Thus, 
the subsidiaries of this MNE found in developed countries would be granted more decision-
making autonomy than those in developing countries. However, this chapter does not make 
a distinction with respect to the level of decision-making autonomy found in subsidiaries 
existing in developed as opposed to developing countries, nor does it examine which of the 
decision-making powers granted by MNEs are the most critical. These limitations provide 











Chapter 4  
The impact of distance on subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy 
4.1. Introduction 
Foreign subsidiaries have the potential to embed themselves within different types of 
knowledge networks, in order to accumulate their capabilities needed for innovation, 
thereby strengthening their sustainable competitive advantages (Cantwell & Mudambi, 
2005; Phene & Almeida, 2008), and thus the whole multinational enterprise (MNE) group. 
This focus on subsidiary innovation has direct implications for the role of foreign 
subsidiaries, particularly regarding the distribution of decision-making autonomy in 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with high levels of 
decision-making autonomy are able to respond to changing circumstances, develop local 
business networks, gain local market legitimacy thereby fostering creativity and new idea 
generation. Alternatively, to exclude the risk of subsidiaries not following corporate R&D 
strategy, headquarters will be inclined to take key decisions themselves ensuring that 
subsidiaries pursue the goals of headquarters. The latter is associated with lower levels of 
decision-making autonomy for subsidiaries (centralization) (Brooke, 1984; O’Donnell, 2000). 
In the context of MNEs crossing national borders, the distance between headquarters and 
subsidiaries complicates the above trade-off between centralization and de-centralization 
substantially.  
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International business theory clearly informs us that crossing borders implies a 
change of the context in which business is done (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995a). These 
contextual changes lead to a liability of foreignness for multinationals. An increased distance 
between home and host country contexts is of direct relevance to the question on the 
distribution of decision-making autonomy between headquarters and subsidiary. 
Theoretically, a larger distance is associated both with higher and lower levels of decision-
making autonomy for subsidiaries. A larger distance arguably triggers the need for more 
direct control by headquarters, but also increases the importance of subsidiaries to be locally 
responsive. In this chapter we address the question how distance – conceptualized and 
measured as a multidimensional construct including economic, geographic, and cultural 
dimensions – affect the level of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, while controlling for 
MNE and subsidiary specific characteristics. 
The previous chapter showed that home- and host country institutional 
environments are associated with the level of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. In 
this chapter, we continue to explore whether home- and host country context affects 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy. In particular, we aim to study how distance between 
home- and host countries determines subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. Together 
with the preceding chapter, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings developed in 
this chapter provide new insights on the role of home- and host country context in the 
distribution of decision-making autonomy between the headquarters and the subsidiary.  
Our hypotheses on how distance affects levels of decision-making autonomy are 
derived from two complementary theoretical perspectives often used in the context of 
studies on headquarters-subsidiary relationships: agency theory and business network 
theory. Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) deals with bounded 
rationality resulting in information asymmetry between headquarters and subsidiaries that 
may create goal incongruence between the two sides of the relationship (O’Donnell, 2000; 
Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). This explains why headquarters implements control mechanisms 
and limits decision-making autonomy to ensure that the subsidiary aligns with the 
headquarters strategy (O’Donnell, 2000). Business network theory highlights the importance 
of local legitimacy for the performance of affiliates (Andersson & Holm, 2010; Ciabuschi et 




al., 2011a; Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008). It assumes that headquarters predominantly 
suffers from accessing and obtaining local information and knowledge. This requires a 
decentralization rather than a centralization of decision-making autonomy (Andersson et al., 
2007). These two theoretical perspectives are associated with two different predictions on the 
nature of the relationship between distance and subsidiary decision-making autonomy.  
We test our distance hypotheses on a dataset of 170 subsidiaries located in five 
Central and Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
and the Slovak Republic. These countries are relevant because they have been entered by 
MNEs worldwide following the support for foreign direct investments of these countries 
and new market opportunities due to liberalization policies of these transition economies. 
The 170 subsidiaries serve headquarters in twenty-one different home countries resulting in 
55 country pairs. Controlling for multinational and subsidiary specific characteristics, and 
for industry and country characteristics, we find that geographic, economic and cultural 
distance are associated with lower levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Our 
study re-affirms the central role of distance in international business research. Our study 
also implies that business processes for which local responsiveness and subsidiary decision-
making autonomy are required are complicated when contextual distance between home 
and host countries increases. Our finding that distance is generally associated with lower 
levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy means that multinationals face a tension: 
distance to the host market has been argued to increase the need to be locally responsive for 
which subsidiary decision-making autonomy helps (especially in the case of innovation, 
more on that in the next chapter), but distance – as our study shows - is at the same time 
associated with lower levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy.  
4.2. Background 
4.2.1. Distance 
Firms and managers are faced with additional challenges when crossing borders and 
becoming operationally active in a host country context that differs from their home 
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country. Although the change in context might in principle also relate to intra-country 
variation, IB research is concerned with firms crossing national borders and the 
development of economic activities in other nations (Beugelsdijk, 2011). In order to explore 
and exploit the location specific advantages abroad, firms and managers have to overcome 
the distance between the home and the host country. These contextual differences – driven 
by the geographic, cultural, institutional and economic differences – are associated with a 
liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995), meaning that internationalizing firms 
incur costs that domestic firms do not have. As the contextual differences between the home 
and the host country increase, the liability of foreignness is generally argued to increase as 
well. 
 The role of contextual differences has a long history in IB, and is fundamentally 
related to the concept of psychic distance. Psychic distance refers to perceptions of managers 
and was originally defined as “the sum of factors” contributing to perceived differences in 
home and host country contexts following “differences in language, culture, political 
systems, level of education, level of industrial development, etc.” (Johanson & Wiedersheim-
Paul, 1975: 308). The concept of psychic distance puts an emphasis on the extent to which 
environmental differences between home and host countries present information flows and 
generate barriers to learning about these markets (Dikova, 2009; O’Grady & Lane, 1996). For 
that reason, firms tend to select overseas markets in accordance with the psychic distance 
from the home country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). A lower psychic distance means that a 
country is more likely to be selected, and vice versa. The greater the psychic distance 
between home and host countries, the more difficult it is to collect, analyze and correctly 
interpret information about these differences (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010).  
Over the years, the importance of psychic distance for IB theory and MNE practice 
has been consistently reported (see, for example, Boyacigiller, 1990; Brewer, 2007; Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006; Evans et al., 2008; Nordstrom & Vahlne, 1994; O’Grady & Lane, 1996). 
Psychic distance matters for subsidiary performance (Dikova, 2009; Evans & Mavondo, 2002; 
O’Grady & Lane, 1996), the selection of foreign markets (Stottinger & Schlegelmilch, 1998; 
Whitelock & Jobber, 2004) and a firm’s entry strategy (Ellis, 2007, 2008). Notwithstanding the 
importance of psychic distance, the theory focuses on perceptions of managers per se (and 




hence, requires ditto measures to address these). Such data is often not available, at least not 
at a large scale. Very often, IB researchers use distance measure such as economic, language, 
geographic and cultural distance, also referred to as drivers of psychic distance (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006). Although managerial perceptions of distance are ideally used to proxy 
for such contextual differences, the lack of such measures on a large scale leads scholars to 
use sets of (secondary) distance measures taken from databases such as the World Bank (for 
economic distance), Hofstede (1980) and Globe (House et al., 2004) (for cultural distance), 
and CEPII (for geographic distance). 
4.2.2. Subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Research on the headquarters-subsidiaries relationship is a classic research theme in IB 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008), and received a substantial push in recent years (Birkinshaw & 
Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). It is widely acknowledged that subsidiary decision-
making autonomy plays a pivotal role in the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries (Asakawa, 1996, 2001; Garnier, 1982; Gammelgaard et al., 2012a, b; Gates & 
Egelhoff, 1986; Hedlund, 1981; Johnston & Menguc, 2007; O’Donnell, 2000 for 
comprehensive reviews). Research on the determinants of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy has focused on MNE and subsidiary characteristics (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2008; 
Schüler-Zhou & Schüller, 2013; Simões et al., 2002; Taggart & Hood, 1999; Vachani, 1999; 
Williams & Van Triest, 2009), industry peculiarities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000; Männik et 
al., 2005) or the embeddedness of the subsidiary in the host country (Ambos et al., 2011; 
Chiao & Ying, 2013). For example, several studies report that subsidiary innovation 
(measured by, for example, R&D intensity) is positively related to subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. This decision-making autonomy enhancing effect of innovative 
orientation is explained by the need to quickly respond to local market forces and 
preferences (Simões et al., 2002; Taggart & Hood, 1999). Other studies show that decision-
making autonomy is related to the entry mode chosen. A greenfield entry mode, for 
instance, is negatively associated with decision-making autonomy (Gammelgaard et al., 
2012b; Luo, 2006; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Birkinshaw and Hood (2000) found that 
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subsidiaries in leading-edge industries are more autonomous as well as more locally 
embedded and more internationally oriented than subsidiaries in other sectors. Subsidiaries 
in high technology industries develop cooperative and close ties with suppliers and 
customers, experiment with new ideas and transfer some of their learning to headquarters, 
all of which require high levels of decision-making autonomy (Männik et al., 2005). Despite 
the crucial role played by distance in IB research in general, no study has explicitly 
addressed how distance between home and host countries affects subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. In what follows we develop hypotheses on exactly this relationship, 
thereby combining distance research with headquarters-subsidiary research. 
4.3. Hypothesis development 
4.3.1. Agency theory and subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Agency theory sheds light on the potential negative effects of distance on subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. High levels of distance between home and host countries are 
likely to increase agency problems in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship and therefore 
increase the control of headquarters over subsidiaries (that is, decrease the level of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy) (Chang & Taylor, 1999). Different explanations exist 
for a negative relationship between distance and decision-making autonomy. First, a large 
distance between two groups of individuals in a business network increases the cost of 
interpreting information flows between parties and also increases the risks of 
misinterpretation (Boyacigiller, 1990). It means that the costs of doing business in foreign 
countries increase with distance, or at least accelerates at a rate higher than the benefits do. 
As distance increases, subsidiaries face difficulties in being locally responsive because more 
specific information from the headquarters is required to effectively coordinate local R&D, 
production or marketing (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989).  
Second, subsidiary managers will have an information advantage over their 
headquarters management (Vachani, 1999) when differences in characteristics between 
headquarters market and the market of foreign subsidiary increase. This implies that agency 




problems arise when subsidiary managers make self-interested decisions that are not 
congruent with those desired by the headquarters. Furthermore, with increased distance, 
complete and accurate information about subsidiaries’ performance becomes more difficult 
and expensive to attain, and subsidiary activities thus become more difficult to interpret 
(Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Agency problems occur because subsidiary managers have 
greater specialized knowledge regarding the influence of the local environment and 
strategic context on its task performance (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). In essence, as 
distance increases, a headquarters becomes more dependent on the subsidiary for 
information that is either not directly available to the headquarters or extremely costly to 
acquire. Thus, this information asymmetry occurring from distance increases the agency 
problem in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. A crucial note that the argumentations 
of agency theory on problems in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship stem from 
subsidiary side, not the headquarters and these argumentations are sticked in central 
decisions made by headquarters. Hence, several scholars stated that to reduce the agency 
problem headquarters takes decisions over their foreign subsidiaries (Chang & Taylor, 1999; 
O’Donnell, 2000).10 
Third, high levels of distance are likely to constitute a barrier to headquarters 
learning about a foreign environment not only because there are differences with how 
business is conducted locally, but also because it impedes information flows which 
headquarters attempt to obtain (Gregersen & Hite, 1996; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). These 
constraints result from the fact that headquarters faces high levels of uncertainty (Evans & 
Mavondo, 2002) and generic management difficulties in distant markets (Ellis, 2008). It is the 
root cause of inconsistencies in cognitive firm frameworks. Consequently, distance between 
home and host countries increases uncertainty, which increases agency problems in the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship. To reduce the agency problem, the headquarters will 
take decision-rights over the subsidiaries for ensuring the interests of the headquarters 
(Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). 
                                                            
10 This prediction is also in line with transaction cost theory: uncertainty, high distance, high transaction cost, and control. 
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Taken together, the arguments above suggest that distance between home and host 
countries increases information asymmetry, which increases agency problems in the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship. To resolve these agency problems, the headquarters 
cannot relinquish decision-rights to the subsidiaries since the local interests of subsidiaries 
may not always be in line with those of the headquarters (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). 
Therefore, the headquarters will closely monitor and supervise the behavior of a subsidiary, 
which limits the ability and the incentives of subsidiaries for engaging in self-interested 
behavior.  
To summarize, in line with agency theory, it can be argued that when distance 
between home and host countries increases, agency problems arise increasing the need to 
control subsidiaries and hence, lowering subsidiary decision-making autonomy. We propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A larger distance between home and host countries is associated with 
lower levels of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. 
4.3.2. Business network theory and subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy 
Business network theory offers an alternative perspective on distance and decision-making 
autonomy (Andersson et al., 2007; Andersson & Holm, 2010; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a;  
Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008). Following business network theory, it can be argued 
that increasing distance between home and host countries is likely to enhance subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy. Several explanations exist for a positive relationship between 
distance and decision-making autonomy.  
First, each subsidiary operates in its own unique task environment in a host country, 
which constrains or determines the activities of that subsidiary. In order to survive, 
subsidiary managers need to conform and adapt to the rules, norms and belief systems 
prevailing in their local business environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – a process also 
referred to as normative rationality (Oliver, 1997). Accordingly, to increase a subsidiary’s 




ability to understand its local business environment (Birkinshaw et al., 1998), and to obtain 
local business legitimacy (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), business network 
theory suggests that headquarters will delegate decision-making autonomy to distant 
subsidiaries to increase local legitimacy. 
 Second, first-hand knowledge of local circumstances is a crucial competence within 
an MNE network because it allows subsidiaries to develop and adopt new products, 
processes or administrative systems locally using their own technical and managerial 
resources to respond to local circumstances (Forsgren, 2008). High levels of uncertainty 
accompany subsidiaries operating in a particular business network in distant markets from 
the MNE point of view (Dikova, 2009; Evans & Mavondo, 2002). Headquarters will 
decentralize decisions to subsidiaries for the purpose of reducing uncertainty. As a result, 
the subsidiary can undertake more extensive research and planning, which improves 
performance (Evans & Mavondo, 2002; Evans et al., 2008). To sum up, greater distance 
between home and host countries increases the cost of doing business and the level of 
uncertainty for obtaining local resources and legitimacy. Therefore, headquarters will 
decentralize decision-making autonomy to subsidiaries. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A larger distance between home and host countries is associated with 
higher levels of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. 
 
Whereas agency theory suggests a negative relationship, business network theory suggests a 
positive relation exists between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and distance. In what 
follows, we describe our data and method to test this relationship empirically. 
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4.4. Research methods 
4.4.1. Data sources, surveys and samples 
To test our hypotheses, we used data from a unique multi-country, multi-industry database. 
We constructed the database from different sources of information. Our first data source 
was the 2011 subsidiary-level survey of MNE subsidiaries conducted in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic by the Institute for Economic Research 
Halle (IWH). This 2011 IWH survey database offered us the opportunity to measure the 
dependent variable (i.e., the decision-making autonomy of subsidiary) as well as the 
different control variables that are included in our model (concerning the characteristics of 
the headquarters, subsidiaries, industries and countries, see below). 
The 2011 IWH survey database is part of a larger project aimed to systematically 
collect information about innovation activities and the role of foreign investors in former 
Eastern and Central European (CEE) countries. These countries are located in proximity to 
large European markets, and most transition economies embarked on a comprehensive 
privatization process at time when FDI flows were starting to peak on a global scale. Yet, in 
distinction to many developing countries, the CEE economies started out with a long history 
of industrialization and a relatively well educated work force (Stenphen & Jindra, 2005). In 
fact, since the early 1990s, the transitional countries in CEE – including the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic – have been characterized by 
institutional change from a planned to a market economy. This process entailed policies 
targeted at privatization, liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization (Gabrisch & 
Hölscher, 2006). Post-communist countries also quickly integrated with the global, and in 
particular West European, economy via international trade and foreign direct investment. 
This process was influenced significantly by MNEs with regard to firm restructuring 
(Djankov & Murrell, 2002), private enterprise R&D (Kalotay & Hunya, 2000; UNCTAD, 
2005), export competitiveness (Rugraff, 2006; UNCTAD, 2002), and productivity growth 
(Jindra, 2006; Schadler et al., 2006). Differences in the developmental experience of 
individual transition economies are largely explained by initial conditions, macroeconomic 




policies and structural reforms (Berg et al., 1999). For example, several studies showed that 
foreign subsidiaries are deeping trade linkages; that direct effects of FDI materialize in 
significantly higher productivity compared to domestic firms (Giroud et al., 2012; Jindra et 
al., 2009; Meyer, 1998; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Resmini, 2000).  
The overall population of subsidiaries from which the IWH sample is taken from 
Orbis (broken down per ownership for each country) and consists of foreign-owned 
manufacturing and service subsidiaries located in the five CEE countries. The selection of 
these countries in economic transition balances country size, geographic location, and the 
level of economic development that varies strongly in this region. The population includes 
different types of foreign investors such as pension funds, banks, foundations, individuals, 
families, or any combination of these different types of owners. The surveys in the various 
countries were implemented by means of computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) 
and executed by the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (IFAS). IFAS is an research institute 
specialized in doing surveys in CEE countries. A CATI method helps to foster response rates 
in these CEE countries where managers are less experienced to answer questions from a 
survey. In order to further increase response rates, the directors of the subsidiaries were first 
invited to participate in the research via a letter or a brief telephone call. They then received 
information about the purposes of the survey as well as data confidentiality per fax and/or 
e-mail upon request. The questionnaire was the same in all countries. It was first tested for 
coherency to at least four pre-tests per country before being submitted to the subsidiaries 
between 6 August and 3 September 2009. The final questionnaire required 15 minutes on 
average for completion. The IFAS interviewers received intensive training by IWH regional 
experts concerning innovation and business activities in CEE countries. The interviews were 
conducted by native speakers from each of the countries under observation. The 2011 IWH 
survey used selection question for various parts of the survey implying that very few 
companies answered all questions in the survey.  
The IWH database for our research includes 637 observations in the five CEE 
countries. Our sample in this chapter and in next chapters is derived from this IWH 
database. After correction for missing values because of incomplete responses, the useable 
final sample in this chapter is 170 observations. This implies that out of the total observation, 
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170 subsidiaries were willing to complete the questionnaire, leading to a response rate of 
26.69 percent of 637 subsidiaries that were contacted. The response rate was the highest in 
Poland (83 observations, 48.83 percent) followed by the Czech Republic (32 observations, 
18.82 percent), Romania (22 observations, 12.94 percent), Hungary (17 observations, 10.0 
percent) and the Slovak Republic (16 observations, 9.41 percent). 
With regard to industry breakdown, this sample contains firms from all industries at 
NACE 2 digit level. The sample includes manufacturing (NACE Rev.2: 05 to 39) and service 
industries (NACE Rev.2: 45-47, 49-53, 58-68, and 69-82). We performed statistical tests to 
discern whether or not there are differences in the distribution of enterprises ordered by 
firm size and industry. Chi-squared tests showed that there are no statistically significant 
differences both in terms of the number of employees and industry (p = 0.26 and p = 0.32, 
respectively). 
Our other data sources are the Dow and Karunaratna (2006) and the Hofstede 
databases. These databases enabled us to measure a wide variety of distance characteristics, 
including language, religious and cultural distances between particular sets of countries. 
The IWH survey database enabled the identification of the country of origin (i.e., 
headquarters location) for each subsidiary. The subsidiaries were located in five CEE (host) 
countries. The headquarters of these subsidiaries were located in twenty-one different 
(home) countries. We were able to make 55 country pairs with 16 country pairs for Poland, 
11 country pairs for the Czech Republic, 11 country pairs for Romania, 9 country pairs for 
the Slovak Republic, and 8 country pairs for Hungary (see Appendix 4A for more details). 
We used this information on country pairs to measure the different distance dimensions that 
are included in this study. 
4.4.2. Dependent variable: subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Following leading studies on subsidiary decision-making autonomy (for example, 
Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000; O’Donnell, 2000) (see Appendix 4E), we determined the level of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy by means of a particular questionnaire item (see 
Appendix 4B). We asked the director of the subsidiary to indicate to which extent 




independent decisions for particular business activities were taken by the subsidiary or the 
headquarters. As shown in the Appendix, we asked them to do so for seven different 
business activities, each rated on a four-point Likert scale. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
decision-making autonomy of the seven business activities of 0.83 is satisfactory because it is 
substantially above the threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006). A Principal Component 
Factor analysis showed that the seven business activities load on one factor (with one 
eigenvalue larger than 1, i.e. 3.51). We summed the individual scale items for this construct 
and used the aggregate measure of the level of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy in 
the analysis. The aggregated index ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 28: the 
higher the score of the index, the higher level of a subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy. 
Note that this measure of decision-making autonomy differs from the one used in the 
previous chapter, as this one does not measure business functions, but actual decision 
making. We continue using this measure in the other chapters. 
4.4.3. Independent variable: home-host country distance 
Home-host country distance can be measured on many different dimensions. Home-host 
country distance is a multidimensional construct and its measurement a subject of ongoing 
debate (Prime et al., 2009). Our study uses the Dow & Karunaratha (D&K) (2006) database. 
This database presents various so-called drivers of psychic distance. The drivers of psychic 
distance are a solution to the lack of data for perceptual measures of distance, as is the case 
in the present study as well (for a discussion, see also Dikova, 2009). The Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006) measure of distance comprises macro-level factors identified by other 
distance researchers (Boyacigiller, 1990; Evans et al., 2000; Evans & Mavondo, 2002; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Language, religion, level of education, level of industrial 
development, political systems, geography, and culture are the most often used components 
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of distance (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). We use these seven aspects as a measure of distance 
in our study.11  
The first five dimensions (that is, differences in language, religion, education, 
industrial development and political systems) are based on Dow and Karunaratna’s analysis 
of 120 country pairs. That is, based on the Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) database, we 
extracted the value for each of the 55 country pairs in our sample. A major language for a 
given country is defined as any language, which can be spoken by more than 20 percent of 
the population, or a language that holds a special official status within the country. The 
D&K value for language distance in our sample varies between −3.38 and 0.52, with low 
values indicating a small linguistic distance and high values indicating large linguistic 
distances between home and host countries. The second dimension concerns differences in 
the major religions between home and host countries. A major religion is defined as any 
religion to which more than 20 percent of the population claims an affiliation. Furthermore, 
within a major religion, only divisions that represent at least one quarter of that religion’s 
adherents are considered to be relevant. The D&K value for religious distance in our sample 
varies between −1.29 and 1.27, with low values indicating a small religious distance between 
countries and high values indicating a large religious distance between home and host 
countries. 
The third dimension concerns differences in the educational level between home and 
host countries. Differences in the educational levels between countries is measured by using 
three scales, i.e. the difference in the proportion of literate adults between home and host 
countries, the differences in the proportion of the population enrolled in second and third-
level education. The D&K value for educational distance in our sample varies between −1.25 
and 2.25, with low values indicating a small educational distance between home and host 
countries and high values indicating a large educational distance between home and host 
countries. The fourth dimension concerns differences in the industrial development between 
home and host countries. This dimension is measured by differences in the degree of 
industrial development between home and host countries through nine different aspects: 
                                                            
11 We do not take time zone differences and colonial ties between home and host countries into account because i) time zone 
difference and geographic distance in our sample are highly correlated (r = 0.94), and ii) Central and Eastern European 
countries have no or very few colonial ties. 




GDP per capita, the consumption of energy, vehicle ownership, the percentage of 
employment in agriculture, the percentage of GDP from manufacturing, the difference in the 
degree of urbanization, and the differences in the development of the communication 
infrastructures (newspaper, radios, telephones, and televisions per 1,000 population). The 
D&K value for industrial development distance in our sample varies between −1.78 and 1.78, 
with low values indicating a small industrial development distance between home and host 
countries and high values indicating a large industrial development distance between home 
and host countries. The fifth component concerns differences in the political system between 
home and host countries. Two distinct aspects measure the difference in the political 
systems between home and host countries: the degree of democracy and the political 
ideology of the group in power. The D&K value for political system distance in our sample 
varies between −0.50 and 2.04, with low values indicating a small political system distance 
between home and host countries and high values indicating a large political system 
distance between home and host countries. 
The remaining two distance dimensions are cultural and geographic distance. 
Concerning geographical distance, we obtained information on the countries in which the 
subsidiary and the headquarters were located, but not on their exact location within each 
country (in order to maintain survey anonymity). We therefore measured geographical 
distance as the logarithm of the kilometer difference between the capitals (Håkanson & 
Ambos, 2010). The geographical information was obtained from the Centre d’etudes 
prospectives et d’information internationals (CEPII, 2012), which provided the pair-wise country 
kilometer distance for all the country capital pairs in our sample. The geographic distance 
measure ranges between 4.08 and 9.65, with higher scores corresponding to higher 
geographic distance. With regard to cultural distance, following the previous studies (e.g., 
Dikova, 2009; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010) we used the six 
updated cultural dimensions of Hofstede and applied the formula suggested by Kogut and 
Singh (1988) to measure cultural distance for each of the country pairs in our sample. The 
composite measure for cultural distance ranges between −1.28 and 4.13, with higher scores 
corresponding to higher cultural distance between home and host countries. 
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Before testing our hypotheses, we performed a factor analysis on the seven 
dimensions of distance to discern whether or not they cluster on different dimensions. A 
Principal Component Factor analysis with varimax rotation (see Appendix 4C) report two 
factors with eigenvalues larger than 1 (i.e., 2.47 and 1.68 for factor 1 and factor 2, 
respectively). Educational, industrial development and political system distance between 
home and host countries are clustered into the first factor and the other dimensions are 
clustered into the second factor. For the first factor, the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81, which 
satisfies the threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006). We therefore used the factor scores 
from the Principal Component Factor analysis of these three dimensions as the measure of 
distance measure in our study. We labeled this factor as economic distance. The economic 
distance measure ranges from −2.31 to 3.76 (standardized value), with higher scores 
corresponding to higher economic distance. However, the Cronbach’s alpha for the other 
four dimensions is 0.54, which is below the threshold value of 0.70. This implies that we 
cannot take religious, language, cultural and geographic distance into one common factor. 
Therefore, these dimensions were included as separate distance measures in our analysis 
(taking standardized scores of the four distance measures in order to maintain consistency 
with the economic distance measure). 
4.4.4. Control variables 
We included three sets of control variables in our model. The first set of control variables 
accounts for subsidiary characteristics. First, we include the R&D intensity of the subsidiary 
– measured by the number of R&D employees working in R&D area in subsidiaries 
currently as a percentage of the subsidiary’s total employees – because it is well-known that 
R&D intensity is an important determinant of subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
(Taggart & Hood, 1999). Second, we include subsidiary size – measured by the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees at the subsidiary – because larger subsidiaries have 
better bargaining positions and therefore larger decision-making autonomy (Gates & 




Egelhoff, 1986; Johnston & Menguc, 2007; Schüler-Zhou & Schüller, 2013).12 Third, we 
include the age of the subsidiary – calculated by subtracting the year the subsidiary was 
founded from the current year, thus measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
year  subsidiary operated – because older subsidiaries may have more decision-making 
autonomy than younger ones because of aggregated knowledge and experience offering 
them seniority over other subsidiaries and more decision-making autonomy (Björkman & 
Piekkari 2009; Chiao & Ying, 2013; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Schüler-Zhou & Schüller, 2013). 
The second set of control variables concerns the headquarters characteristics. First, 
we control for the original MNE’s form of entry mode. Subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy inherently may be different given the entry mode of the MNE. We account for 
this by including a dummy variable that equals one if the subsidiary is a greenfield location, 
and zero otherwise (Gammelgaard et al., 2012b; Luo, 2006; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
Second, we include five entry motives of MNEs: to access operational efficiency, foreign 
markets, location-bound knowledge and technology, local assets, or local natural resources, 
respectively. Subsidiaries have different positions in the overall MNE network depending 
on the entry motive and this may determine decision-making autonomy ex ante (Dunning, 
1993; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). We used 
three aspects concerning cost advantages (i.e., labour, capital and land) to measure the 
“access to operational efficiency” motive, which each was ranked according to their 
importance on a four-point Likert scale (ranging completely unimportant to extremely 
important). A Principal Component Factor analysis showed that these three cost aspects 
load on one factor (one factor with an eigenvalue larger than 1, i.e. 1.69). We measured this 
motive by the factor scores of these sub-dimensions. The remaining four motives were each 
measured according to their importance on a four-point Likert scale (ranging from 
completely unimportant to extremely important). 
The third set of control variables relates to country and industry characteristics. First, 
we control for industry effects on subsidiary decision-making autonomy. For this, we used 
the broad structure classification of NACE Rev.2 (2008) and classified subsidiaries into (1) 
                                                            
12 We tested for a curvilinear effect of size of the subsidiary on subsidiary decision-making autonomy in Chapter 3 and found 
no significant empirical support. We therefore continue with a linear effect in this chapter. 
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mining and quarrying (NACE 05−09), (2) manufacturing (NACE 10−33), (3) electricity; gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply (NACE 35), (4) water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities (NACE 36−39), (5) wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE 45−47), (6) transportation and storage (NACE 
49−53), (7) information, communication, financial and insurance activities (NACE 58−68), 
and (8) professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service activities 
(NACE 69−82). We constructed seven dummies for the first seven types of industries taking 
the eighth (i.e., professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service 
activities) as the benchmark case. Second, we control for home-country effects. The 
headquarters of the subsidiaries in the sample are located in twenty-one different countries. 
Unfortunately, we cannot include twenty home-country dummies in our model because of 
insufficient observations and the resulting degrees of freedom. As an alternative solution we 
include a dummy to differentiate between developing and developed home countries. 
Subsidiaries in developed countries have an advantage of foreignness in innovation through 
the transfer of product innovations from other parts of the MNE (Un, 2011). Headquarters 
from developed countries (18 countries in our sample) by definition may have a stronger 
inclination to innovate because their competitive environment requires them to do so in 
order to survive than those in developing countries. According to the World Bank, a 
developed country is defined as the nation having GDP per capita from US $12,000 per year. 
We used this information to construct the home-country dummy, that is, we distinguished 
whether the MNE comes from a developed country or not. 
4.5. Empirical results 
4.5.1. Main regression results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations are provided in Table 4.1. Results from the 
hierarchical OLS regression analyses are summarized in Table 4.2. In preparing the data for 
the regression analysis, we performed the usual tests to obtain reliable estimates (Hair et al., 
2006). The latter yielded satisfactory results: neither heteroskedasticity nor non-normality is 




an issue. The maximum value of the correlation coefficients is 0.41, which is far below the 
threshold value of 0.80 indicating that there are no issues with multicollinearity. We 
additionally tested for possible biases caused by collinearity among variables by calculating 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression coefficients. The maximum VIF 
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The regression results offer two conclusions. First, the various fit parameters show 
that our models fit the data well. Model 1 is a model with control variables and a constant 
only. The various dimensions of distance were added in Model 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 
respectively. The R-squared improves from 15.04 percent in Model 1 to 20.51 percent in 
Model 7. The parameter estimates remain robust in terms of signs. In Model 2 and 3 the first 
two dimensions of distance – language distance and religious distance – were included, 
respectively. The results show that language distance and religious distance are positively 
related to degree of decision-making autonomy, but they are not significant (β = 0.14, n.s for 
language distance, β = 0.12, n.s for religious distance). Next to these, we added cultural 
distance, geographic distance and economic distance in Model 4, 5 and 6, respectively. These 
three models show that cultural distance, geographic distance and economic distance are 
negatively associated with degree of decision-making autonomy and not significant (β = 
−0.56, n.s for cultural distance; β = −0.45, n.s for geographic distance; β = −0.19, n.s for 
economic distance).  
Model 7 includes all dimensions of distance and shows that the three dimensions of 
distance are negatively and significantly related to decision-making autonomy. Model 7 
shows that cultural distance (β = −0.96, p < 0.05), geographic distance (β = −1.01, p < 0.05), 
and economic distance (β = −1.46, p < 0.05) reduce degree of decision-making autonomy of 
subsidiaries. Taken together, it can be concluded that our Hypothesis 1 is supported by our 
data whereas Hypothesis 2 needs to be rejected. Our results generally support the agency 
perspective suggesting that distance induces MNEs to increase control and lower subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy.  
 The significant results for the control variables are in line with expectations. A green-
field entry mode is associated with lower levels of the decision-making autonomy (β = −1.98, 
p < 0.01). This result confirms that the parent of subsidiaries has to share information 
requirements and information processing systems with foreign subsidiaries with greenfield 
mode. This sharing propels the parents control over their subsidiaries (Luo, 2006). The 
results of Model 7 also show that the level of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
limited by the MNE’s motive to access operational efficiency in host countries (β = −0.92, p < 
0.05). This result means that subsidiaries undertaking efficiency-seeking activities aim to 




take advantage of inter-country differences in factor endowments such as natural resources 
and inexpensive labor (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). These subsidiaries often have close ties 
with other subsidiaries within the MNE network and are supplied by other subsidiaries 
rather than local firms. This implies that such subsidiaries are more integrated within the 
network of their parent and thus receive less decision-making autonomy (Prahalad & Doz, 
1987; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010).  
4.5.2. Robustness analyses 
To explore the robustness of the above findings, we performed additional analyses.13 Table 
4.3 reports these results. 
First, we determined whether our results were robust for the measure of the 
dependent variable, i.e. the subsidiary decision-making autonomy (see Panel B). Recall that 
our decision-making autonomy measure is an aggregated measure of seven different 
business activities. As a test for robustness we estimated our models with the factor scores 
for decision-making autonomy. This did not affect our findings (with β = −0.21, p < 0.05 for 
cultural distance, β = −0.23, p < 0.05 for geographic distance, and β = −0.33, p < 0.05 for 
economic distance, respectively).14 Second, we estimated the models controlling for the 
possibility of R&D instead of for R&D intensity (see panel C). The possibility of R&D, and 
R&D intensity are highly correlated (r = 0.92). The regression results are the same (with β = 
−0.45, p < 0.05 for cultural distance, β = −0.88, p < 0.01 for geographic distance, and β = 
−1.26, p < 0.01 for economic distance, respectively).  
 
                                                            
13 We tested non-linear effects of distance aspects on subsidiary decision-making autonomy and found no significant empirical 
support what so ever for non-linear relationships. 
14 Using the factor scores for the base model regressions does not affect results, thus we presented these results as one of the 
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Third, the correlation coefficient between time zone difference and geographic 
distance between home and host countries is high (r = 0.94). We estimated our models with 
the control of geographic distance as a test for robustness to discern whether our findings 
are different due to time zone effects or to the effects of transportation costs (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006). This also did not affect the results reported in Table 4.2 (with β = −0.84, 
p < 0.05 for cultural distance, β = −1.02, p < 0.05 for geographic distance, and β = −1.26, p < 
0.05 for economic distance, respectively).  
Fourth, Berry et al. (2010) used the Mahalanobis method to calculate cross-national 
distances, which is scale-invariant and takes into consideration the variance-covariance 
matrix. We used their database for an alternative measure of distance. We performed a 
factor analysis on the nine dimensions of Berry et al. (2010) for our sample. A Principal 
Component Factor analysis (see Appendix 4D) showed that the nine dimensions are 
grouped into three different factors with three eigenvalues larger than 1 (i.e., 3.17, 1.94 and 
1.50, respectively). Political, knowledge, global, and economic distance between home and 
host countries are clustered into the first factor. Administrative, financial, and cultural 
distance are clustered into the second factor. The third factor includes geographic and 
demographic distance. The Cronbach’s alpha of the first four items was 0.78, which satisfies 
the threshold value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006). Thus, we used factor scores from the Principal 
Component Factor analysis of these four items as a first alternative measure of distance and 
labeled this economic distance. However, the Cronbach’s alpha of the second and the third 
factor are 0.65 and 0.34, respectively. Therefore, cultural, geographic, administrative, 
demographic and financial distances were taken as separate measures of distance (taking 
standardized scores of the five distance measures in order to maintain consistency with the 
economic distance measure).  
The results in Panel D show that three of these alternative measures of distance – i.e., 
administrative, demographic, and financial distance – have non-significant positive effects 
on subsidiary decision-making autonomy. The other measures – i.e., cultural, geographic 
and economic distance – have negative effects on subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
with significant negative findings for geographic and economic distance, respectively (with 
β = −1.17, p < 0.01 and β = −0.04, p < 0.05, respectively). In summary, these robustness tests 
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confirm our main regression results reported in Table 4.2 and offer support to the conclusion 
that home-host country distance limits the decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries. 
4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
Our study advances our understanding of how distance is related to subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. We build on agency and business network theory, leading us to develop 
two opposite hypotheses on the relation between distance and subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. Theoretically, arguments go both ways, leading us to ex-ante predict both a 
positive and a negative association between distance and subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. Building on a micro-dataset from 170 subsidiaries in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, our empirical results show that the 
cultural distance, geographic distance and economic distance – are negatively associated 
with the degree of decision-making autonomy of a subsidiary. This suggests that as distance 
between home and host country increases, a tendency for centralization associated with 
lower levels of subsidiary decision-making can be observed.  
We should mention three limitations of our study that could serve as a roadmap for 
future research. First, the distance measures are based on the average value of each 
country’s score. This assumes country level homogeneity and excludes the possibility that 
within country variation exists. For example, headquarters and subsidiaries can locate in 
different regions or cities within home and host countries, respectively (e.g. Goerzen et al., 
2013). Whereas we see no reason to expect our results will be different and explicit control 
for subnational variation is a logical next step in distance research (Beugelsdijk & Mudambi, 
2013), in particular for research on distance and headquarters-subsidiary relations. Second, 
our study measured distance by using existing data at macro-level. We did not measure 
distance by individual perceptions. This may be important in the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship because an individual perception measure may capture the relationship 
between distance issues and power in MNE networks differently than macro-level 
measures. Future research could resolve this issue by applying both, individual perception 




measures of distance and macro-level measures of distance in a single study and compare 
the results for subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Third, although this chapter examines 
the characteristics of the parent company, the subsidiary, industry and country-contexts, the 
aspect of the individual manager is not taken into account – that is, personal relationships 
among managers in MNE networks. Personal relationships form a central determinant of 
success, both within the firm and in its external interactions (Conklin, 2011). For example, 
personal relationships can increase trust between managerial levels in an organization. Also, 
changes in the business environment may require renegotiation of contracts – a process that 
may be most effective in the context of longstanding interpersonal relationships and trust 
(see Ertug et al., 2013 for a comprehensive review). Taken together, we suggest that 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy may increase as trust between subsidiary managers 
and top managers is high due to deep personal relationships among them. We recommend 
that future work examines this aspect in more detail. 
Although our finding on the negative distance role fits the prediction of agency 
theory, it does not necessarily contradict business network theory. A larger distance to the 
host country can be associated with the need to be locally responsive (as business network 
theory suggests) for which high levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy are 
required, even when faced with an increased distance between home and host countries. In 
other words, future research would do well to explore the question how local 
embeddedness and subsidiary decision-making autonomy affect processes like innovation 
of which business network theory suggests that subsidiary decision-making autonomy is 
important. Having shown in this chapter how distance is associated with subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy, this is exactly what we explore in the following chapter. We 
analyze how subsidiary decision-making autonomy is related to the innovativeness of 
subsidiaries (Chapter 5). Together with the findings obtained in the previous chapter on the 
role of the institutional environment, we gain a more complete picture on the determinants 
and consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy.  
 




4A. The correspondent country pairs between home and host countries in the sample 
  Home countries Host countries Number of country pairs 
1. Argentina The Czech Republic 1 
2. Austria The Czech Republic 4 
  Hungary  
  Romania  
  The Slovak Republic   
3. Belgium Hungary 3 
  Poland  
  Romania  
4. The Czech Republic Poland 2 
  The Slovak Republic  
5. Denmark The Czech Republic 4 
  Hungary  
  Poland  
  The Slovak Republic   
6. Finland Poland 1 
7. France Hungary 4 
  Poland  
  Romania  
  The Slovak Republic   
8. Germany The Czech Republic 5 
  Hungary  
  Poland  
  Romania  
  The Slovak Republic   
9. Greece Romania 1 
10. Italy Poland 2 
  Romania  
11. Japan  Poland 1 
12. Luxumburg Poland 2 
  Romania  
13. Netherlands The Czech Republic 3 
  Poland  
  The Slovak Republic   
14. Norway Poland 1 
15. Poland The Slovak Republic 1 
16. The Slovak 
Republic 
The Czech Republic 1 
17. Spain The Czech Republic 4 
  Hungary  
  Poland  
  Romania  





 Home countries Host countries Number of country pairs 
18. Sweden The Czech Republic 2 
  Poland  
19. Switzerland The Czech Republic 3 
  Poland  
  Romania  
20. UK The Czech Republic 5 
  Hungary  
  Poland  
  Romania  
  The Slovak Republic   
21. US The Czech Republic 5 
  Hungary  
  Poland  
  Romania  
  The Slovak Republic   
  Total of country pairs 55 
 
4B. Measure of dependent variable: subsidiary decision-making autonomy (taken from the 
questionnaire) 
Please indicate to which extent independent decisions in the following business activities are 
currently taken by your enterprise or your headquarters. Please choose between four-point scales: 
Decisions are taken 1) only by your headquarters, 2) mainly by your headquarters, 3) mainly by your 
enterprise or 4) only by your enterprise. 
 








Only by your 
enterprise 
Finance and investment     
Strategic management     
Operational management     
Marketing and market 
research 
    
Purchases and supplies     
Distribution and sales     
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4C. Rotated factor loadings of the seven dimensions of Dow and Karunaratna (2006) – Principal 
component factor method. 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Political system distance 0.786 0.031 
Industrial development distance 0.875 -0.108 
Educational distance 0.790 0.041 
Religious distance 0.165 0.817 
Language distance -0.413 0.513 
Cultural distance -0.503 0.536 
Geographic distance (log) 0.015 0.686 
 
 
4D. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) of the seven dimensions of psychic distance of Berry, 
Guillén and Zhou (2010) (extracted from the Stata output) – Principal component factor method. 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Geographic distance -0.157 -0.042 0.889 
Demographic distance 0.342 0.333 0.623 
Admistriative distance 0.009 0.703 0.247 
Financial distance 0.054 0.934 -0.009 
Cultural distance 0.507 -0.600 0.336 
Political system distance 0.612 0.366 0.593 
Knowledge distance 0.928 -0.158 -0.076 
Global distance 0.948 0.055 0.068 
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autonomy and subsidiary innovation 
5.1. Introduction 
The two preceding chapters examine the determinants of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy by capturing the role of home- and host country context and the home-host 
distance. Next, we turn to the consequences of subsidiary decision-making autonomy by 
studying the role of decision-making autonomy in subsidiary innovation. This study aims to 
enhance our understanding of subsidiary innovation by developing a set of theoretical 
arguments that together with empirical tests complement upcoming IB literature on 
subsidiary innovation and decision- making autonomy.  
In this contemporary IB literature, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
conceptualized as a globally distributed network of affiliated firms (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989) 
or a social community crossing national boundaries (Kogut & Zander, 1993), in which 
subsidiaries play an increasingly important role to the MNEs’ competitive advantage (e.g., 
Andersson et al., 2002; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Venaik et al., 2005). One of the crucial drivers 
of this advantage is subsidiary innovation (Phene & Almeida, 2008). Various studies have 
indicated that subsidiaries are viewed as an important source of knowledge contributing to 
innovation (Frost et al., 2002; Gupta & Govindrajan, 2000; Phene & Almeida, 2008; Tallman 
& Phene, 2007; Vanaik et al., 2005). Accordingly, a good understanding of subsidiary 
innovation is important as subsidiary innovation results in increased operational efficiency, 
104  Chapter 5 
 
 
better subsidiary performance in local markets – e.g., due to first-mover advantages 
(Damanpour et al., 2009) – and better MNE performance through the spill-over of new 
knowledge and market opportunities (Ameida & Phene, 2004; Phene & Almeida, 2008; 
Roberts & Amit, 2003).  
Recent work addressing subsidiary innovation has focused on subsidiary’s 
absorptive capacity and knowledge integration within the MNE network (Frost & Zhou, 
2005; Gupta & Govindrajan, 2000; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Phene & Almeida, 2008). 
Knowledge absorbed by the subsidiary from its external and its internal networks is 
positively associated with innovation (Almeida & Phene, 2004; Frost, 2001). One of the 
questions related to the management of both intra- and inter-organizational networks by 
subsidiaries concerns the degree of decision-making autonomy that subsidiaries have. The 
level of decision-making autonomy of a subsidiary is a crucial missing link in our 
understanding of subsidiary innovation (Gammelgaard et al., 2012a). Prior research suggests 
that subsidiary decision-making autonomy plays an important role in the incentive structure 
for effectively doing research and development (Asakawa, 2001) and in the resource-
dependence structure between subsidiaries and headquarters (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; 
Preffer & Salancik, 1978). Although several useful studies on the role played by subsidiaries 
in innovation at the subsidiary level can be found in the recent international business and 
management literature (Almeida & Phene, 2004; Frost, 2001; Phene & Almeida, 2008), the 
relation between subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is not 
yet fully understood. Our study aims to unravel the role of subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy in explaining subsidiary innovation.  
To better understand the role of decision-making autonomy in explaining subsidiary 
(product) innovation, we use two theoretical perspectives that have appeared recently 
(Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Forsgren & Holm, 2010). The first perspective 
emphasizes the importance of headquarters involvement in subsidiary innovation and 
assumes that headquarters has experience and knowledge about a particular innovation 
(Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b). In this view, headquarters controls innovation processes at the 
subsidiary level in spite of the distance between home and host countries (Buckley & 
Hashai, 2009). The other perspective emanates from business network theory (Andersson et 
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al., 2007; Andersson & Holm, 2010; Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008). This perspective 
assumes that a headquarters lacks local knowledge and faces much uncertainty because the 
headquarters is a relative outsider to the subsidiaries’ (external) business networks. This is 
associated with an increased level of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy and a 
decentralization of the innovation process to the subsidiary.  
These two complementary theoretical perspectives on subsidiary innovation 
naturally lead to the question of what the optimal level of decision-making autonomy is. 
Our study develops a model that captures the role of decision-making autonomy in 
subsidiary innovation. In doing so, we theoretically explore and advance our understanding 
of subsidiary innovation by developing a set of theoretical arguments logically derived from 
the above two theories. Theoretically, the headquarters centered view predicts a negative 
relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and innovation, whereas 
business network theory predicts a positive relationship. Depending on which view 
dominates at which level of decision-making autonomy, one could also predict a non-linear 
relationship between autonomy and innovation. With increasing levels of decision-making 
autonomy, the negative effect predicted by the headquarters view may be offset by the 
positive effects predicted by business network theory, in case we may expect to find a non-
linear, U-shaped, relationship between decision-making autonomy and innovation. Given 
this ex-ante theoretical ambiguity our model is of an exploratory nature. We thus test both 
for a linear and non-linear effect of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation.  
We test our model on 134 subsidiaries located in five European countries. We find 
that the degree of decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries plays an important role in 
influencing subsidiary innovation. Our empirical test supports our hypothesis on the non-
linear relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and innovation intensity 
(a continuous measure of the fraction of new products in total sales). In particular, we find a 
U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and innovation, with 
increasing levels of decision-making autonomy first being associated with a decrease in 
innovation and after a certain level leading to higher innovation levels. Our results imply 
that to increase innovation intensity at the subsidiary level, headquarters either gives 
subsidiaries full decision-making autonomy or almost no decision-making authority (full 
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control by headquarters). Medium degrees of decision-making autonomy are associated 
with the lowest level of subsidiary innovativeness. 
5.2. Theory and hypotheses 
A substantial amount of research on the role of subsidiaries in MNEs has evolved in recent 
years, in which subsidiaries are presented as important drivers of the overall competitive 
advantage of MNEs (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Cantwell, 2001; Cantwell & Mudambi, 
2005). Given the crucial role of knowledge for firms (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996), leveraging 
knowledge across geographic boundaries is the basis for MNEs’ sustained competitive 
advantage and an effective transfer of knowledge within the MNE has become critical 
(Ambos et al., 2006; Björkman et al., 2004; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Gupta & Govindrajan, 
2000; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Rabbiosi, 2011). Depending on the subsidiary’s strategic 
role (Kuemmerle, 1997; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994), this knowledge can either flow from 
headquarters to subsidiaries or follow the reverse route (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Frost & 
Zhou, 2005). Subsidiaries are increasingly viewed as an important source of knowledge 
contributing to innovation success at the subsidiary as well as the whole MNE group (Frost 
et al., 2002; Gupta & Govindrajan, 2000; Phene & Almeida, 2008; Tallman & Phene, 2007; 
Vanaik et al., 2005). Knowledge absorbed by the subsidiary from the host country and the 
role of subsidiary capabilities – both sourcing capabilities and combinative capabilities –  
positively affect the scale and quality of innovation (Frost, 2001; Phene & Almeida, 2008).  
A key challenge for subsidiaries is the need to balance internal relations within the 
MNE network and external networks in the local host environment. Both have been shown 
to be relevant sources of knowledge. Almeida and Phene (2004) examine the external 
knowledge and the technological richness of the headquarters used by the subsidiary to 
create new inventions for its innovation and show that these sources positively contribute to 
this process. Despite these useful insights on the need to balance external and internal 
knowledge sources in generating innovations at the subsidiary level, the question rises how 
subsidiaries can achieve this.  
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We argue that subsidiary decision-making autonomy, defined as “the degree to 
which the foreign subsidiary of the MNE has strategic and operational decision-making 
authority” (O’Donnell, 2000: 528), is a crucial missing link in our understanding of 
subsidiary innovation. The degree of subsidiary decision-making autonomy is a key 
reflection of the overall organizational structure of subsidiaries as well as current power-
dependence structures between headquarters and subsidiaries (Asakawa, 2001; Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Preffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, decision-making autonomy is a key 
feature of the value system and incentive structure for effectively doing research and 
development (Asakawa, 1996, 2001; Brooke, 1984), and provides a platform for establishing 
initiatives of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Mudambi, 2011).  
To assess the pivotal role of subsidiary decision-making autonomy, we build on two 
theoretical perspectives that have emerged in the recent subsidiary literature (Ciabuschi et 
al., 2011a; Forsgren & Holm, 2010). The first perspective assumes that headquarters controls 
and coordinates various innovation processes at the subsidiary level (at least indirectly), 
albeit from a distance (Buckley & Hashai, 2009). The reason is that the headquarters has a 
clear understanding of what knowledge a subsidiary lacks and which innovation processes 
to support, and how to efficiently design the innovation process (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b; 
Forsgren & Holm, 2010). In addition, headquarters possesses valuable expertise for 
innovation projects and find ways of intervening that will ensure the relevant application of 
the knowledge at the subsidiary. The other perspective stems from business network theory 
(Andersson et al., 2007; Andersson & Holm, 2010; Forsgren et al., 2005; Forsgren, 2008), and 
assumes that headquarters suffers not only from a lack of knowledge about the particular 
innovation process at local subsidiaries, but also from genuine uncertainty for accessing and 
obtaining information and knowledge at the local level. The reason is that the headquarters 
is a relative outsider to the local business network of the subsidiary (Andersson et al., 2007). 
Therefore, in order to enhance the quality and scale of innovation, headquarters needs to 
decentralize decisions to subsidiaries. As both perspectives essentially hinge on the role of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy, we theoretically advance our understanding of 
subsidiary innovation by focusing on the role of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
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 The first perspective centering on the function of headquarters sheds light on 
negative effects of high levels of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation and 
suggests headquarters should take full control. Two main reasons exist for such an 
argument. Both refer to the importance of the function of the headquarters in subsidiary 
operations. First, high levels of decision-making autonomy are likely to decrease 
opportunities to recombine different types of knowledge (internal and external) in the 
subsidiary. High levels of decision-making autonomy indicate a lack of integration in the 
MNE network that may limit the chances of gaining recognition for specialized resources in 
the innovation process of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw et al., 1998). High levels of decision-
making autonomy means more organizational power of an unit (Brooke, 1984), and the 
more power exercised by sub-units in the MNE network, the less common identity and the 
less incitement there will be to combine knowledge between the units (Andersson & Holm, 
2010). Headquarters’ function is to create synergies (Foss, 1997) and to share core 
competences (Chandler, 1991; Markides, 2002) including the transfer of knowledge. High 
levels of decision-making autonomy may result in over-confidence of local subsidiary 
managers and therefore reduce incentives to use and adopt available knowledge and 
competences from headquarters (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Blanc & Sierra, 1999; Castellani & 
Zanfei, 2006; Kuemmerle, 1997).  
Moreover, the innovation literature has shown that different technologies and 
knowledge from different sources are important to the innovation process (Cantwell, 1989, 
1992; Frost, 2001; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Phene & 
Almeida, 2008; Tsai, 2001). The reason is that when innovating, the existence of different 
technology and knowledge enhances the possibility of new combinations and thus fosters 
the likelihood of the emergence of novel ideas (Frost et al., 2002; Phene & Almeida, 2008; 
Turner & Fauconnier, 1997). Accordingly, the recombination of technological knowledge 
resources available from both home headquarters and other subsidiaries in other host 
countries may facilitate a subsidiary to generate new ideas and inventions from this 
knowledge pool. Therefore, subsidiaries that only use local knowledge without recombining 
home headquarters knowledge may restrict their possibilities of innovation (Ameida & 
Phene, 2004). In addition, not all local networks are equally innovative or “rich” in 
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technological knowledge (Almeida, 1996), whereas technology and knowledge from the 
headquarters is by definition expected to encompass a rich diversity for the innovation 
(Phene & Ameida, 2003, 2008). In sum, subsidiaries with increasing levels of decision-
making autonomy will lose opportunities of combining knowledge resources and this affects 
their innovation potential in a negative way. 
Second, related to the above argument is the observation that the role of expatriate 
managers is ignored when subsidiaries have high levels of decision-making autonomy. 
Expatriate managers are often home-country assignees who hold control and management 
positions in a foreign subsidiary (Björkman et al., 2004; Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Fang et 
al., 2010; Gammelgaard et al., 2012b; Harzing, 2001). The use of expatriate managers is one of 
the mechanisms used by the headquarters to implement their strategy and control the 
foreign subsidiary (Gammelgaard et al., 2012b; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Takeuchi et al., 
2008; Tung, 1982), and strengthens the knowledge transfer within the MNE network. These 
expatriate managers fulfill specific managerial skills not available in local markets (Edstrom 
& Galbraith, 1977) and thus bring direct personal experience and individual knowledge to 
the subsidiary (Delios & Björkman, 2000; Goerzen & Beamish, 2007). Additionally, expatriate 
managers enhance formal and informal inter-unit communication channels. These valuable 
sources of knowledge facilitate the innovation process of the subsidiary (Dunning, 1993; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Through these roles, expatriate managers have been deemed 
as successful facilitators in the parent firm knowledge transfer to subsidiaries (Björkman et 
al., 2004; Bonache, & Brewster, 2001; Fang et al., 2010; Hébert et al., 2005; Kostova & Roth, 
2003). High levels of decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries reduce the extent of parent 
firm knowledge transfer to the subsidiary because of a decrease in the use of expatriate 
managers. This reduction of parent-firm expatriate managers negatively affects the extent of 
knowledge transfer from the headquarters, which hinders the innovation process taking 
place in the subsidiary. Taken together, the headquarters centered view leads us to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy are associated 
with lower levels of subsidiary innovation. 
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Although the first perspective centering on the role of headquarters develops a set of 
arguments predicting a negative relationship between decision-making autonomy and 
subsidiary innovation (suggesting full control by headquarters is best), business network 
theorists stress the potential positive effects of higher levels of decision-making autonomy 
on innovation (Ambos et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). In the business network 
perspective, each unit’s most important resource is the web of specific local relationships in 
which the subsidiary is embedded (Andersson & Forsgren 1996, 2000; Andersson et al., 2002; 
Ciabuschi et al., 2011). That is, each subsidiary is embedded in a specific network of business 
relationships which is more or less distinct from networks of other subsidiaries. Decision-
making autonomy enables a subsidiary to develop its own business network (Ambos et al., 
2011; Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Asakawa, 1996), to increase its ability to understand its 
local business environment (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998), and to 
obtain local business legitimacy (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). As a 
result, it can actively obtain new knowledge and ideas needed to explore new opportunities 
that foster its innovation potential and outcome (Ambos et al., 2011). Decision-making 
autonomy thus fosters incentives and opportunities for creativity of local subsidiary 
managers. This is required for successful innovation because innovation implies risk taking 
and investments (in time and capital) with only a certain probability of success (Damanpour 
et al., 2009).  
Subsidiaries with decision-making autonomy can make investment decisions 
required to explore unknown products and processes. Greater decision-making autonomy is 
also a sign of trust meaning that the headquarters perceives that the subsidiary will perform 
its tasks competently, will keep its agreements and will not behave opportunistically even 
when the subsidiary has opportunities and inclinations to do so (Verbeke, 2009). Trust 
enables subsidiaries to explore new routes outside the domain of its current business 
activities. Therefore, decision-making autonomy enables subsidiaries to pro-actively develop 
and maintain its local network of business partners, universities and other research institutes 
(Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). With 
decision-making autonomy at the level of the subsidiary, the headquarters offers a necessary 
condition for subsidiaries to innovate (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b). Decision-making 
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autonomy creates opportunities and incentives to take profitable initiatives (Birkinshaw et 
al., 1998; Venaik et al., 2005) which are more conducive to creativity, knowledge creation, 
absorption and assimilation than strict headquarters control. Following business network 
theory, we develop the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Increasing levels of subsidiary decision-making autonomy are associated 
with higher levels of subsidiary innovation. 
As becomes clear from these first two hypotheses, extant theory on decision-making 
autonomy actually and innovation suggest two opposing relationships. The headquarters 
perspective suggests full control and limited decision-making autonomy is the best way to 
increase subsidiary innovation, whereas business network theory suggests decision-making 
autonomy should be maximized. Given the theoretical arguments going in both directions 
for the effect of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation, we cannot know 
whether the arguments based on business network theory are dominant over those based on 
headquarters centered perspective or vice versa. Either may be right. Moreover, which effect 
dominates may depend on level of decision-making autonomy. The headquarters effect may 
dominate at low levels of decision-making autonomy, whereas the business network effect may 
dominate at high levels of decision-making autonomy, in which case a non-linear U shaped 
relationship results. It is a priori unclear which effect dominates. We therefore put forward 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A non-linear relationship exists between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and subsidiary innovation, with increasing levels of decision-making autonomy 
first leading to decreases in innovation and after a certain level leading to higher levels of 
innovation. 
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5.3. Research methods 
5.3.1. Survey and sample 
We test our hypotheses using data from a unique multi-country, multi-industry database. 
Our source is a 2011 subsidiary-level survey conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic by Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH). 
This 2011 IWH survey database offered us the opportunity to measure the dependent 
variable (i.e., subsidiary innovation), the key independent variable (i.e., the decision-making 
autonomy of subsidiary) as well as headquarters, subsidiary and industry characteristics.  
The 2011 IWH survey database is part of a larger project aimed to systematically 
collect information about innovation activities and the role of foreign investors in former 
Eastern and Central European (CEE) countries. The overall population of subsidiaries from 
which the IWH sample is taken from Orbis (broken down per ownership for each country) 
and consists of foreign-owned manufacturing and service subsidiaries located in the five 
CEE countries. The selection of these countries in economic transition balances country size, 
geographic location, and the level of economic development. The population includes 
different types of foreign investors such as pension funds, banks, foundations, individuals, 
families, or any combination of these different types of owners. 
The IWH database is constructed by means of a survey. The surveys in the various 
countries were implemented by means of computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) 
and executed by the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (IFAS). IFAS is a research institute 
specialized in doing surveys in CEE countries. A CATI method helps to foster response rates 
in these CEE countries where managers are less experienced to answer questions from a 
survey. In order to further increase response rates, the directors of the subsidiaries were first 
invited to participate in the research via a letter or a brief telephone call. They then received 
information about the purposes of the survey as well as data confidentiality per fax and/or 
e-mail upon request. The questionnaire was the same in all countries. It was first tested for 
coherency to at least four pre-tests per country before being submitted to the subsidiaries 
between 6 August and 3 September 2009. The final questionnaire required 15 minutes on 
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average for completion. The IFAS interviewers received intensive training by IWH regional 
experts concerning innovation and business activities in CEE countries. The interviews were 
conducted by native speakers from each of the countries under observation. The 2011 IWH 
survey used selection question for various parts of the survey implying that very few 
companies answered all questions in the survey. Between 21 September and 16 December 
2011 IWH completed the required interviews in line with the sample stratification.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the relevant IWH database for our research includes 637 
observations in the five CEE countries. After correction for missing values because of 
incomplete responses, the useable final sample in this chapter is 134 for innovation intensity 
(see below). For innovation intensity, the response rate is 21.03 percent of the 637 contacted 
subsidiaries. The response rate was highest in Poland (70 observations, 52.24 percent of the 
final sample) followed by the Czech Republic (24 observations, 17.91 percent), Romania (18 
observations, 13.43 percent), the Slovak Republic and Hungary (11 observations for each, 
8.21 percent). We performed statistical tests on our sample to discern whether or not there 
are differences in the distribution of enterprises ordered by firm size, industry and country. 
Chi-squared tests showed that there are no statistically significant differences both in terms 
of the number of employees and industry (p = 0.26 and p = 0.32, respectively). With regard 
to industry breakdown, the sample contains subsidiaries from all industries at NACE 2 digit 
level. The observation is restricted to manufacturing industries (NACE Rev.2: 05 to 39) and 
service industries (NACE Rev.2: 45-47, 49-53, 58-68, and 69-82). 
In addition, the IWH also conducted the subsidiary-level survey in East Germany. 
The survey stages in East Germany were repeated the same as the survey stages in the five 
CEE countries. The total sample in East Germany consists of 725 subsidiaries that were 
contacted. Out of this sample, 210 subsidiaries were willing to participate in the interviews, 
leading to a response rate of 28.97 percent. We use this East-German sample as an additional 
test (see the next Section).  
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5.3.2. Dependent variable: subsidiary innovation 
Our measure of innovation, defined as “the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations” (OECD, 2005), is 
in line with the international standards as codified in the Oslo and Frascati manuals (OECD, 
2005). Our study focuses on product innovation of subsidiaries, thus the definition of 
product innovation in our study as “new or significantly improved products” stems from 
the Oslo and Frascati manuals (2005) because this is the measurement standard (see 
Ciabuschi et al., 2011 for a comprehensive review). The interviewed person was provided 
with additional information following the Oslo and Frascati manuals upon request. As 
shown in Appendix 5A, we measure subsidiary innovation by means of innovation 
intensity.15 We asked for the intensity of innovation by asking the subsidiary manager to 
approximate the share of a new or significantly improved product in the subsidiary’s total 
sales. This measure for innovation intensity ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 
100. 
5.3.3. Independent variable: subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
Given the importance of subsidiary decision-making autonomy for the field of international 
management, it is no surprise that numerous definitions and measures of this term can be 
found in the literature. Appendix 4E in Chapter 4 provides an overview of 22 studies in 
which subsidiary decision-making autonomy was the central object of study. We follow 
extant literature (for example, Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000; O’Donnell, 2000), and assess the 
                                                            
15 We also measured subsidiary innovation by means of the likelihood of subsidiary innovation. We used Logit regression to 
estimate the relation between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and the possibility of innovation (a dummy variable based 
on the question “do you innovate? yes/no”). In addition, we also used this variable to apply the Heckman two-step estimation 
procedure and estimate the effect of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation intensity conditional on the 
innovation possibility. We found no empirical support for Heckman two-step procedure as the inverse Mills ration was 
insignificant. Our Logit estimation did not yield a significant relation between decision making autonomy and subsidiary 
innovation measured by the innovation possibility. The latter is likely caused by the fact that the vast majority of the firms 
indicate that they do innovate (87%) reducing the variation considerably. This is an additional reason for us to prefer the OECD 
based continuous measure of innovation intensity. 
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level of autonomy with regard to decision-making in business activities of subsidiary 
through a questionnaire asking the directors of subsidiaries to indicate to what extent 
independent decisions are currently taken by the subsidiaries or their headquarters on a 
range of business activities. As shown in Appendix 5B in this chapter, we asked them to do 
so for seven different business activities on four-point Likert-type scales. These seven areas 
covered by our indicator include the “main business functions” of any subsidiary. The 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83 is satisfactory because it is substantially above the threshold value 
of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006). A factor analysis showed that the seven business activities load on 
one factor (with one eigenvalue larger than 1, i.e. 3.51). We therefore summed individual 
scale items to construct an aggregate measure of the level of subsidiary’s decision-making 
autonomy. The aggregated index ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 28. This 
index means that the higher score of the index, the higher level of a subsidiary’s decision-
making autonomy.  
5.3.4. Control variables 
We include three sets of control variables in our model. The first set of control variables 
accounts for subsidiary characteristics. First, we include the R&D intensity of the subsidiary 
– measured by the number of R&D employees working in R&D area in subsidiaries 
currently as a percentage of the subsidiary’s total employees – because it is well-known that 
R&D intensity is an important determinant of a subsidiary’s innovative performance 
(Simões et al., 2002; Taggart & Hood, 1999). Second, we include subsidiary size – measured 
by the natural logarithm of the number of employees at the subsidiary – because a large 
subsidiary has more resources and knowledge available that allows for higher innovation 
(Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Ciabuschi & Martín, 2011). Third, we include the age of the 
subsidiary – calculated by subtracting the year the subsidiary was founded from the current 
year – because older subsidiaries may have lower innovation levels than younger ones 
because of the continued use of outdated knowledge and experience and their resistance to 
new approaches (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Taggart & Hood, 1999).  
116  Chapter 5 
 
 
The second set of control variables concerns the headquarters characteristics. First, 
we control for the entry mode because the subsidiary’s level of innovation in terms of a 
greenfield investment or an acquisition may be different. We account for this by including a 
dummy variable that equals one if the subsidiary is a greenfield location, and zero otherwise 
(Jindra et al., 2009; Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Slangen, 2011). Second, we include the MNE’s 
main entry motive in our model specification, i.e. location-bound knowledge and technology 
access because the advantage of knowledge and technology in the host country directly 
affect subsidiary’s innovative performance (Dunning, 1993). The aforementioned dimension 
was ranked according to importance on a four-point Likert scale ranging from completely 
unimportant to extremely important. 
Third, we control for country and industry characteristics. First, we control for 
industry effects in innovation. For this, we used the broad structure classification of NACE 
Rev.2 (2008) and classified subsidiaries into (1) mining and quarrying (NACE 05−09), (2) 
manufacturing (NACE 10−33), (3) electricity; gas, steam and air conditioning supply (NACE 
35), (4) water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (NACE 
36−39), (5) wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE 
45−47), (6) transportation and storage (NACE 49−53), (7) information, communication, 
financial and insurance activities (NACE 58−68), (8) professional, scientific, technical, 
administrative and support service activities (NACE 69-82). We constructed seven dummies 
for the first seven types of industries taking the eighth, i.e., professional, scientific, technical, 
administrative, and support service activities as the benchmark case. Second, we control for 
host-country effects. Our subsidiaries operate in five different countries each with its own 
path-dependent institutional environment affecting firm-level innovation (see the previous 
Chapters 3 and 4). We therefore constructed four host country dummies, that is, one for the 
Czech Republic, Romania, Poland and the Slovak Republic, respectively (taking Hungary as 
the benchmark dummy that was not included in the model). Third, we also control for 
home-country effects. The headquarters of the subsidiaries in the sample in this chapter 
stems from 23 different countries. However, including 22 home-country dummies in the 
model reduces our degrees of freedom, and we therefore include one dummy to 
differentiate between developing and developed home countries. This admittedly second 
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best approach is realistic because subsidiaries in developed countries have an advantage of 
foreignness in innovation through the transfer of product innovations from other parts of 
the MNE (Un, 2011).  In addition, we also argue that headquarters from developed countries 
(19 countries) by definition may have a stronger inclination to innovate because their 
competitive environment requires them to do so in order to survive compared to those from 
developing countries. According to the World Bank, a developed country is defined as a 
nation having a GDP per capita from US $12,000 per year. We hence constructed one home-
country dummy, that is, we distinguished whether the MNE comes from a developed 
country.  
5.3.5. Common method bias 
Method biases are a problem since they can be a main source of measurement error 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). The latter threatens the validity of the conclusions about the 
associations between measures and has both a random and a systematic component 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1991). Our data for dependent and focal explanatory variables were collected 
from the same respondents. In such a case, self-report data can create false correlations if the 
respondents have a propensity to provide consistent answers to survey questions that are 
otherwise not related. Therefore, common methods can cause systematic measurement 
errors that either inflate or deflate the observed relationships between constructs, generating 
both Type I and Type II errors (Chang et al., 2010). We therefore conducted a Harman single 
factor test a post-hoc statistical procedure to check for common method variance bias. We 
gained seven factors with eigenvalues over one, explaining between 22.61 and 7.77 percent 
of variance. This result shows that diversity of factors is captured by the model constructs 
and a single factor would unlikely explain the covariance in the exogenous and endogenous 
constructs. In addition, our database is a pooled (cross-sectional) database. The different 
databases have been constructed from surveys in different countries and then combined into 
one. Thus, these suggest that common method bias is of no concern in our study. 
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5.4. Empirical results 
5.4.1. Main regression results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations for innovation intensity are provided in Table 
5.1. We measure the innovation intensity by means of the percentage of new or significantly 
improved products in the subsidiary’s total sales for which Tobit estimates are appropriate 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
The results from the Tobit regression models with respect to innovation intensity are 
shown in Table 5.2. In preparing the data for the regression analysis, we performed the 
usual tests to obtain reliable estimates (Hair et al., 2006). The latter yielded satisfactory 
results: neither heteroskedasticity nor non-normality is an issue. All correlation coefficients 
are maximum 0.48 indicating that there are no issues with multicollinearity. We tested for 
multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression 
coefficients. Except for the squared terms, the VIF values for all variables in the model are 
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The various fit parameters show that our models increasingly fit the data better. 
Regarding innovation intensity, Table 5.2 shows that the log likelihood value improves from 
−559.48 in Model 1 to −553.60 in Model 3. This improvement in model fit is significant (∆ Chi 
squared = 11.76, p < 0.01). Also, the estimates remain robust in terms of sign and significance 
levels. In Model 1 of Table 5.2, innovation intensity was regressed on our control variables. 
In Model 2, the level of decision-making autonomy was included. The results show that the 
level of decision-making autonomy is negatively and significantly related to subsidiary 
innovation (β = −0.80, p < 0.05), providing support for our first hypothesis and rejecting our 
second hypothesis. In Model 3 however, we entered the squared decision-making autonomy 
term to test for the non-linear effect as hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. The empirical results 
confirm that the parameter estimates for subsidiary decision-making autonomy and 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy squared are significant, leading us to find support for 
our Hypothesis 3. We find that subsidiary decision-making autonomy is negatively and 
significantly related to innovation intensity (β = −8.09, p < 0.01), and the squared decision-
making autonomy term positively and significantly related to innovation intensity (β = 0.18, 
p < 0.01). We find a U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
and innovation intensity. The inflexion point for innovation intensity is estimated at 22.5, in 
between the observed range of levels of decision-making autonomy. This means that when a 
subsidiary has this level of decision-making autonomy, the intensity of innovation would be 
lowest. However, if a subsidiary has a lower or higher degree of decision-making autonomy 
than this level, the subsidiary’s innovation intensity will be higher. This is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The last column in Table 5.2 presents the marginal effect of decision-
making autonomy on the innovation intensity of subsidiary. The marginal effect analysis 
shows that R&D intensity has the largest effect on subsidiary innovation followed by 
decision-making autonomy. 
The results we obtained for our control variables were as expected. Table 5.2 shows 
that a higher R&D intensity has a significant and positive effect on innovation intensity 
(with β = 24.5, p < 0.01). In addition, the result indicates that subsidiaries located in the 
Czech Republic have a significant and positive impact on the intensity of innovation 
compared to the subsidiaries in Hungary (with β = 11.6, p < 0.05).  













5.4.2. Robustness analyses 
To explore the robustness of the above finding on innovation intensity, we perform several 
additional analyses, whose results are summarized in Panels B through E of Table 5.3. To 
facilitate the comparison with our earlier findings, Panel A repeats our most important 
initial results (i.e., those from Model 3 of Table 5.2). 
First, in Panel B we estimated the models for innovation intensity (Tobit estimates) 
with an alternative measurement for our key independent variable, i.e. subsidiary decision-
making autonomy. Recall that our subsidiary decision-making autonomy measure is 
constructed as an index of decisions concerning seven different business activities. As with 
any multi-dimensional construct, we performed a factor analysis on the different business 
activities. This test reported one factor (as described earlier in the research method section). 
 
Figure 5.1.The effect of subsidiary’s decision-making autonomy on 
innovation intensity 
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As a test for robustness we estimated our Tobit models with the factor score for decision-
making autonomy of subsidiary. This did not affect the regression results (with β = −5.02, p 
< 0.01 for decision-making autonomy, and β = 4.18, p < 0.01 for decision-making autonomy 
squared).  
Second, in Panel C we estimated the Tobit models using a R&D dummy as a control 
variable instead of controlling for the presence of R&D by means of our continuous measure 
of R&D intensity. The reason for using a dummy is that our data for R&D intensity is only 
limited available. The use of a dummy increases the number of observations from 134 (for 
R&D intensity) to 277 (for R&D by means of a dummy). The regression results on this larger 
sample are however the same (with β = −6.62, p < 0.01 for decision-making autonomy, and β 
= 0.15, p < 0.01 for decision-making autonomy squared).  
Third, next to subsidiary level information for the five eastern European countries, 
we have additional data for subsidiaries located in former East Germany. We estimated the 
models including East German subsidiaries, meaning that we consider East Germany as a 
(sixth) host country. The reason to include East Germany is that the East German context 
still resembles the ones in the five central and eastern European countries. Studies on 
transition economies often exclude East Germany because of theoretical and empirical 
difficulties derived from the fact that it became subsumed into a larger and more mature 
economy (Giroud et al., 2012; Günther et al., 2008; Tunzelmann et al., 2010). There is 
however still quite a big difference with respect to West Germany in terms of technology, 
industrial structure and investment which affects the organizational structure and 
innovation of business units. Including East German subsidiaries in our sample (we go from 
134 observations to 344), we obtain similar regression results in panel D (with β = −4.31, p < 
0.01 for decision-making autonomy, and β = 0.10, p < 0.05 for decision-making autonomy 
squared).  
Fourth, recall that our subsidiary decision-making autonomy measure is constructed 
as an index of decisions concerning seven different business activities. Thus, our subsidiary 
decision-making autonomy measure index does not necessarily relate to knowledge related 
activities of the subsidiary. For that reason, we estimated our Tobit regressions with 
decision-making autonomy referring to only one, i.e. decisions regarding research and 
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innovation (see Appendix 5B). The results in Panel E are the same (with β = −22.2, p < 0.05 
for decision-making autonomy, and β = 3.85, p < 0.05 for decision-making autonomy 
squared). These robustness tests corroborate our main findings and provide further support 
for our finding on a non-linear, U-shaped, relationship between autonomy and innovation. 
5.5. Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter theoretically advances our understanding of subsidiary innovation by building 
on business network theory and headquarters functions to predict a non-linear relationship 
between the degree of decision-making autonomy of subsidiary and innovation. Building on 
a dataset of 134 subsidiaries in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the 
Slovak Republic from 23 home countries, our empirical results show that the degree of 
decision-making autonomy of subsidiaries is negatively associated with the intensity of 
innovation until at a certain cut-off point. This finding is in line with the perspective 
centering on the headquarters functions (Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; 
Forsgren & Holm, 2010). However, we also find that a subsidiary’s innovative output will 
increase when a subsidiary has a level of decision-making autonomy higher than this cutoff 
point, a finding in line with the arguments put forward by business network theorists 
(Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Ciabuschi & Martín, 2011; Venaik et al., 2005). This latter finding is 
also in line with our theoretical argument that greater decision-making autonomy positively 
affects the motivation of subsidiary managers to take initiatives, to acquire knowledge and 
to integrate in the host country (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Forsgren, 2008; Forsgren et al., 2005; 
Forsgren & Holm, 2010) and to enhance the firm’s ability to understand the local business 
environment (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). An increased level of 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy is associated with a higher level of innovation at the 
subsidiary contributing towards firm specific-advantages at global level (Birkinshaw et al., 
1998). Taken together, our results imply that either low or high levels of decision-making 
autonomy are associated with subsidiary innovation. Establishing such a non-linear effect of 
decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation is new, and presents a new insight for 
international management scholars and practitioners. 
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 Before we derive the implications of our findings, we should first discuss two 
limitations of our study that could serve as routes for follow up research. First, our study 
treated the degree of decision-making autonomy of subsidiary in a static way. However, 
headquarters-subsidiary relationships tend to steadily evolve and are characterized by a 
continuous bargaining process over positions in the firm (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). These 
relationships also result in changing power positions over time (Ambos et al., 2011). 
Therefore, future work could follow Gammelgaard et al. (2012a) and take a dynamic 
perspective on subsidiary decision-making autonomy. Second, organization theorists have 
argued that two types of organizational tension exist: an autonomy-control tension (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) and an information-processing tension (Galbraith, 1977; Egelhoff, 1982). 
The former relates to “the extent to which autonomy is granted by the headquarters to the 
subsidiaries” (Asakawa, 1996, 2001). The latter infers to “the degree of information-sharing 
between the parent and local units” (Asakawa, 2001; De Meyer, 1993; Teece, 1977). Although 
our decision-making autonomy measure captured the degree of decision-making by the 
subsidiaries, these types of tensions are not taken into account. That is, neither “granted” 
nor “obtained” autonomy is explicitly considered. We recommend that future work examine 
these aspects in more detail.  
 In spite of these limitations, our study implies that higher levels of subsidiary 
innovation are associated with either a situation in which subsidiaries have relatively high 
levels of decision-making autonomy or almost no decision-making autonomy (i.e. full 
control by headquarters). This implication fits both business network theory and the 
complementary perspective centering on the function of headquarters. It is important for 
multinational firms to arrive at an appropriate level of decision-making autonomy for their 
subsidiaries, because as our study shows, intermediate levels of decision-making autonomy 
are likely to lead to suboptimal levels of subsidiary innovation. 
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APPENDIX 
5A. Measure of dependent variable: Subsidiary innovation (taken from the questionnaire) 
Subsidiary innovation intensity 
Please approximate the share of new or significantly improved product(s) introduced during 2009 to 
2011 in the total sales of your enterprise in 2011. 
 2011 
Share of new or significantly improved product(s) in total sales (in %)  
Note: During the survey, the interviewed subsidiary was explained that product innovation refers to 
the “introduction” of new and significantly improved products by the subsidiary. 
 
5B. Measure of key independent variable: Subsidiary decision-making autonomy (taken from the 
questionnaire) 
Please indicate to which extent independent decisions in the following business activities are 
currently taken by your enterprise or your headquarters. Please choose between four-point scales: 
Decisions are taken 1) only by your headquarters, 2) mainly by your headquarters, 3) mainly by your 
enterprise or 4) only by your enterprise. 








Only by your 
enterprise 
Finance and investment     
Strategic management     
Operational management     
Marketing and market 
research 
    
Purchases and supplies     
Distribution and sales     







making autonomy, and internal and 
external embeddedness 
6.1. Introduction 
The number of studies on the role of subsidiary embeddedness for subsidiary and MNE 
performance has evolved rapidly in the recent years (Andersson et al., 2001, 2002, 2007; 
Ambos et al., 2011; Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Dellestrand, 2011; Figueiredo, 2011; Santangelo, 
2012; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). Subsidiary embeddedness is increasingly viewed as an 
important source for creating new knowledge contributing to the innovation success of the 
subsidiary and the multinational enterprise (MNE) (Forsgren et al., 2005). Despite all efforts, 
however, the embeddedness-innovation (E-I) relationship is still subject of ongoing debate 
(Meyer et al., 2011; Garcia-Pont et al., 2009). On the one hand, the headquarters view 
suggests that subsidiaries should embed in MNE internal networks to obtain benefits from 
sister subsidiaries or headquarters about knowledge and resources. The latter enhances the 
likelihood of a subsidiary’s innovation. On the other hand, according to business network 
theory, embeddedness in host country enables subsidiaries to improve learning ability and 
reap external knowledge from local partners in generating for innovation. Subsidiaries are 
confronted with a need to be simultaneously embedded in internal and external 
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embeddedness, a challenge that has been referred to as dual embeddedness (Figueiredo, 
2011). 
 The previous chapter directly linked subsidiary innovation and decision-making 
autonomy. We established a U shaped effect. The mechanism linking innovation and 
decision-making autonomy can be argued to be related to the degree of subsidiary 
embeddedness. In the subsidiary literature, both internal and external embeddedness are 
associated with innovation, yet also in interaction with decision-making autonomy. There is 
a direct relation between embeddedness and innovation because embeddedness in the 
MNE’s internal network and the local external network are both good for innovation 
according to business network theory. The question rises how the U-shaped relationship we 
found between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is affected when 
explicitly controlling for subsidiary embeddedness. We may expect the U shape to become 
more pronounced for higher levels of internal and external embeddedness. The reason for 
such an indirect effect of embeddedness is that when internal or external embeddedness is 
high, the pressure for headquarters to take control or for subsidiaries to make decisions 
becomes more important. When the MNE network is not important (and the need for 
internal embeddedness is low) or when the local external network is not important (and the 
need for external embeddedness is low), the importance of decision-making autonomy for 
subsidiary innovation is reduced. Alternatively, when the local MNE network or the local 
external network becomes more important, the need for internal or external embeddedness 
increases, and the question on who takes decisions (headquarters or subsidiary) becomes 
more and more relevant. Given our previous finding that it is optimal for subsidiary 
innovation to either have headquarters or subsidiaries take decisions, we may expect that 
the U-shaped relation between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation 
becomes more pronounced at higher levels of internal and external embeddedness. We thus 
test for the role of internal and external embeddedness on the relationship between 
subsidiary decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation.  
We test our models on 95 subsidiaries located in five European countries. We find 
that the degree of external embeddedness of subsidiaries plays an important role in 
influencing the U-shaped relation between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary 
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innovation. Our empirical test supports our hypothesis that the U-shaped relation between 
decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation becomes more pronounced at higher 
levels of external embeddedness. In particular, we find that at the mean value of external 
embeddedness the relation between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation 
is U shaped. When external embeddedness increases, the U-shaped relationship between 
decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation becomes steeper and more 
pronounced. However, we also find that when external embeddedness decreases to one 
standard deviation below the mean (external embeddedness has a score of −1 because it is 
standardized), the U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy 
and innovation disappears. Our results imply that to obtain an optimal level of subsidiary 
innovation, headquarters either should let subsidiaries full decision-making autonomy or 
give almost no decision-making authority, especially when the subsidiaries highly embed in 
external networks in the host country.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We begin by reviewing research in two areas 
that serve as the foundation for our contingency framework of subsidiary innovation: 
business network theory (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Andersson et al., 2007) and the role 
of headquarters (Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b). Next, building on this 
theoretical background, we formulate our hypotheses. Then, we introduce this chapter’s 
research methodology, addressing issues related to our measures of the variables and 
estimation methods. Following that, we present our empirical evidence. Finally, we discuss 
limitations and offer a reflection on opportunities for future research as well as implications.  
6.2. Theory and hypotheses 
To develop our hypotheses, we use insights from two leading theories in IB research, that is, 
the perspective centering on the role of headquarters (Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Ciabuschi et al., 
2011a, b; Forsgren & Holm, 2010) and business network theory (Andersson et al., 2007; 
Forsgren et al., 2005). In the business network literature, the embeddedness of a subsidiary 
partly explains its innovation (Andersson et al., 2002, 2007; Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Forsgren et 
al., 2005; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). Embeddedness is defined as “closeness in a 
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relationship”; it reflects the intensity of information exchange and the extent to which 
resources between the parties in the dyad are adapted (Andersson et al., 2001: 1016). 
According to business network theory, the economic activities of a subsidiary occur both 
externally and internally, i.e., within the MNE network. The embeddedness of a subsidiary 
is therefore addressed by means of two different aspects: internal and external 
embeddedness of a subsidiary (Forsgren et al., 2005). Internal embeddedness refers to the 
extent to which a subsidiary’s activities and resources are actualized through relationships 
with other corporate actors in the MNE network (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Ciabuschi et 
al., 2011). Internal embeddedness potentially provides the subsidiary financial support, 
management resources, and competences from other subsidiaries and from the headquarter, 
while at the same time also facilitating MNE leverage of local knowledge and capabilities as 
they are available for transfer (Andersson et al., 2002, 2007; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). 
External embeddedness infers to the extent to which a subsidiary is embedded in a local 
business network (Andersson et al., 2002), that is, the extent to which a subsidiary 
establishes and maintains business linkages with external actors vis-à-vis other MNE units 
(Hallin et al., 2011). External embeddedness allows the subsidiary to reap local market 
opportunities and foster the subsidiary’s competences and market performance (Andersson 
et al., 2002; Santangelo, 2012). 
6.2.1. Internal embeddedness and subsidiary innovation 
The perspective focusing on the role of a headquarters assumes that the interference of a 
headquarters in the innovation process of the subsidiary is best (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; 
Ciabuschi et al., 2012; Ciabuschi et al., 2011a, b). It can be argued that a high level of 
subsidiary internal embeddedness increases the volumes of firm-specific strategic resources 
between actors enhancing subsidiary innovation (Figueiredo, 2011; Garcia-Pont et al., 2009). 
There are two main explanations for a positive relationship between internal embeddedness 
and subsidiary innovation. 
First, a high level of internal embeddedness indicates a greater level of headquarters 
involvement in subsidiary operations (Ciabuschi et al., 2011) triggering attention (Andersson 
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et al., 2007) and strengthening resource and knowledge support in the innovation process. 
Headquarters with strong ties to a subsidiary have an in-depth understanding of resource 
gaps at the subsidiary and know how to efficiently organize the innovation process 
(Ciabuschi et al., 2011b). Headquarters involvement is oftentimes induced by means of 
expatriate managers. Expatriate managers can facilitate knowledge transfer within the MNE 
network because they have MNE specific managerial skills not available in local markets 
(Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977). They bring relevant firm-specific experience and knowledge to 
the subsidiary (Delios & Björkman, 2000; Goerzen & Beamish, 2007). Additionally, expatriate 
managers enhance formal and informal inter-unit communication within the MNE network. 
Through these roles, expatriate managers have been deemed as successful facilitators in the 
parent firm knowledge transfer to subsidiaries (Björkman et al., 2004; Bonache, & Brewster, 
2001; Fang et al., 2010; Hébert et al., 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2003), fostering the innovation 
process of a particular subsidiary (Dunning, 1993; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
Second, the business network literature indicates that high levels of internal 
embeddedness are likely to increase the possibility to successfully access and combine 
resources from corporate counterparts (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Forsgren et al., 2005). The 
more internally embedded a subsidiary is, the stronger its cooporative ties and relationships 
with other subsidiaries in the MNE network are (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Yamin & Andersson, 
2011). This increases the subsidiary’s opportunity to use and combine relevant resource and 
knowledge controlled by other corporate actors (Ciabuschi et al., 2011). With the virtue of 
the membership in the same organization, the partners in the MNE network are tied and 
know each other (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). High levels of internal embeddedness aligns 
with high levels of trust between the focal subsidiary and other affiliates as well as between 
the focal subsidiary and the headquarters fostering the inclination to participate in 
innovation sharing risks and reducing uncertainty (Szulanski, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000). Thus, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Internal embeddedness will have a positive effect on subsidiary 
innovation.  
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6.2.2. External embeddedness and subsidiary innovation 
Business network theory (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Andersson et al., 2001; Andersson et 
al., 2001, 2002, 2007; Forsgren, 2008; Forsgren et al., 2005; Hallin et al., 2011) proposes that 
networks exist both within the multinational enterprise and in the local environment of the 
subsidiary. Subsidiaries differ in terms of their history, quality and level of linkages inside 
and outside the MNE (Forsgren et al., 2005). Linkages also may evolve over time developing 
from those characterized by arm’s length interactions to relationships based on mutual trust, 
adaptation and the willingness to make relation-specific investments needed for successful 
innovation (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Relationships with other business and 
institutional actors are important because through the mutual adaptation process with 
counterparts, subsidiaries develop technological and organizational competencies that 
strengthen the use of dispersed resources and enable new knowledge flows at the subsidiary 
and within the MNE (Andersson et al., 2002; Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). Adopting the 
business network approach, we argue that a high level of external embeddedness is likely to 
enhance subsidiary innovation. Two main explanations can be given for this hypothesized 
positive relationship.  
First, a high level of external embeddedness is likely to enable a subsidiary to 
incorporate valuable resources from external network (Ambos et al., 2011; Andersson et al., 
2005; Andersson & Forsgren, 1996, 2000) and foster learning opportunities (McDonald et al., 
2008; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The nature of a subsidiary’s external 
relationships is one important aspect of embeddedness. A high level of external 
embeddedness implies strong ties and intensive interactions between a subsidiary’s and 
specific local customers, suppliers, competitors, research institutions and other counterparts. 
Through these ties and interactions, the level of information exchange and opportunities for 
new information identification is substantially fostered (Andersson et al., 2005; Andersson et 
al., 2002; Hansen, 1999; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). These strengthen the learning abilities of the 
subsidiary (Uzzi, 1997) and improve the subsidiary’s capability to assimilate new 
information (Andersson et al., 2002; Santangelo, 2012; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). As a 
result, valuable resources and learning opportunities that support subsidiary innovation 
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accumulate. From a different perspective, a lack of external embeddedness is likely to lead to 
outdated knowledge, a decrease in valuable resources and a decline in up-to-date and 
relevant information. As a consequence, a subsidiary with low levels of embeddedness may 
suffer losses of new technology updating and of learning improvement, both hampering the 
subsidiary’s innovation (Andersson et al., 2001).  
 Second, several scholars argue that a subsidiary with high levels of external 
embeddedness have extensive relationships with suppliers, customers, and other agents in 
its business network (Andersson, 1996, 2000; Andersson et al., 2002, 2005; Yamin & 
Andersson, 2011). These relationships bring two benefits to the subsidiary innovation 
process, at least. The first benefit is that actors in the network are willing to share new 
knowledge about recent technological opportunities and allow access to other resources 
(Andersson et al., 2005; Andersson et al., 2001; Forsgren, 1997). Especially the process of new 
knowledge exchange becomes easier because of high levels of mutual understanding and 
optimal cognition (Grant, 1996; Hansen, 1999). By combining valuable resources and new 
knowledge, subsidiaries are likely to create new ideas, invent new business initiatives with 
new directions, and develop new technologies that are all conducive to innovation 
(Andersson et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2008; Zander & Kogut, 1995; Yamin & Andersson, 
2011). Another benefit is that high levels of external embeddedness align with high levels of 
trust and better adaption and cooperation between actors in the network that foster relation-
specific investments. As a result, the possibilities and opportunities of investments for 
innovation improve. The subsidiary literature also asserts that close relationships help 
subsidiaries to have a better understanding of customer needs and supplier abilities (Kotler 
& Armstrong, 1991), which are acknowledged drivers for continuous innovation. From these 
perspectives, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: External embeddedness will have a positive effect on subsidiary 
innovation.  
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6.2.3. Decision-making autonomy, embeddedness and subsidiary 
innovation 
In the previous chapter, we found that a U-shaped relationship exists between decision-
making autonomy and subsidiary innovation. The theoretical arguments of Chapter 5 imply 
that subsidiaries with intermediate degrees of decision-making autonomy have sub-optimal 
technological capabilities, resources and knowledge needed for innovation. The reason is 
that they are less likely to receive benefits from headquarters or from external partners. 
Subsidiaries with intermediate degrees of decision-making autonomy are less likely to 
innovate than those with either low or high degrees of decision-making autonomy. Our 
argumentation in Chapter 5 excluded the role of embeddedness. However, as we argue 
below, the impact of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation can be argued to 
be conditional on the level of embeddedness. We can expect the U-shaped relation between 
decision-making autonomy and innovation to be more pronounced at higher levels of 
embeddedness. Hence, next to the direct effects of embeddedness, there is an indirect 
channel through which embeddedness affects subsidiary innovation as well. 
 Our arguments on the relation between decision-making autonomy and innovation 
were derived from the headquarters view and business network theory. We argued in 
Chapter 5 that the headquarters view argues that too high levels of decision-making 
autonomy will be associated with subsidiary innovation in a negative way, whereas the 
latter view leads us to predict a positive association between innovation and decision-
making autonomy at the subsidiary level. The underlying yet implicit assumption is that 
both internal and external embeddedness play a role in this relationship. The headquarters 
view stresses the importance of being embedded in an internal network which can be 
optimized when headquarters takes decisions. Business network theory assumes that both 
internal and external embeddedness are important and for that reason it is best to give 
subsidiaries autonomy to make their own decisions. In both cases, the implicit assumption is 
that embeddedness is important, either internal or external. The relation between decision-
making autonomy, embeddedness and subsidiary innovation that remained implicit in the 
previous chapter is one we wish to explicitly explore here. 
Subisdiary innnovation, decision-making autonomy,…   137 
 
 
Theoretically we expect the U-shaped relation between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and innovation to become more pronounced for higher levels of internal and 
external embeddedness. The reason is straightforward: when internal or external 
embeddedness is high, the pressure for headquarters to take control or have subsidiaries 
make decisions becomes more important. When the internal MNE network is not important 
(and a corresponding low degree of internal embeddedness) or when the local external 
network is not important (and a corresponding low degree of external embeddedness), the 
importance of decision making autonomy for innovation is reduced. Alternatively, when the 
internal MNE network or the local external network becomes more important, the need for 
internal or external embeddedness increases, and the question on who takes decisions 
(headquarters or subsidiary) becomes more and more relevant. Given our finding in Chapter 
5 that it is optimal for subsidiary innovation to either have headquarters take decisions or 
have subsidiaries take decisions, we can expect that the U-shaped relation between DMA 
and innovation becomes more pronounced at higher levels of embeddedness. This is our 
third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: The U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and subsidiary innovation becomes more pronounced at higher levels of internal 
embeddedness. 
Hypothesis 3b: The U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and subsidiary innovation becomes more pronounced at higher levels of external 
embeddedness. 
6.3. Research methods 
6.3.1. Survey and sample 
We test our hypotheses using the 2011 Institute for Economic Research Halle (IWH) FDI 
micro database (for methodological details see Günther et al., 2011). The 2011 IWH firm-
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level survey is conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic. The survey offered us the opportunity to measure the key variables of our model 
as well as various headquarters, subsidiary and industry characteristics that serve as 
controls. The survey database is constructed in various steps. The population from which 
the sample is taken consists of foreign owned manufacturing and service subsidiaries 
located in the aforementioned Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The selection 
of these regions in economic transition balances country size, geographic location, and the 
level of economic development. IWH surveys use Orbis to identify subsidiaries for foreign 
investors in the CEE countries. The IWH questionnaire was designed and a survey was 
implemented to optimize the chances of satisfactory response rates (Dillman, 2000). The 
survey was implemented by means of computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The 
subsidiary managers were invited to participate in the survey via a letter or personal phone 
call. They then received information about the purpose of survey and were ensured data 
confidentiality. Choosing subsidiary managers as respondents is important given the focus 
of the research on subsidiary innovation, embeddedness and decision-making autonomy. 
The questionnaire was tested for coherency before being submitted to at least four pre-tests 
per country. The pre-test necessitated minor changes and resulted in a questionnaire that 
required approximately 15 minutes on average for completion. The interviews were 
executed by native speakers from a research institute specialized in firm-level surveys in the 
CEE countries and received intensive training about the main subjects of the survey. 287 
Subsidiary managers answered the questions relevant for our study (with 121 observations 
in Poland, 67 in Czech Republic, 38 in Romania, 35 in the Slovak Republic, and 26 in 
Hungary). We use 95 observations after deleting cases with missing values. With regard to 
industry breakdown, the sample contains firms from manufacturing industries (NACE 
Rev.2: 05 to 39) and service industries (NACE Rev.2: 45-47, 49-53, 58-68, and 69-82). Across 
industries there were no statistically significant differences in terms of the number of 
employees and regional distribution (p = 0.26 and p = 0.32, respectively). 
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6.3.2. Dependent variable: subsidiary innovation 
Following up the previous chapter, this chapter also applies the well-known OECD (2005) 
definitions and measures of innovation that are in line with the international standards as 
codified in the Oslo and Frascati manuals (OECD, 2005) and most commonly used in 
innovation studies. Innovation is defined as “the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations”. We measure 
subsidiary innovation as innovation intensity (see Appendix 5A in Chapter 5 for 
measurement details). We measure the intensity of innovation by asking the subsidiary to 
approximate the share of a new or significantly improved product in the subsidiary’s total 
sales. This measure of innovation intensity ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 
100. 
6.3.3. Key independent variables 
Internal and external embeddedness 
Before measuring internal and external embeddedness, we carefully performed a factor 
analysis on the six items concerning internal and external embeddedness to discern whether 
or not they cluster on one or more dimensions. A principal component factor analysis with 
varimax rotation (see Appendix 6B, 6C, and 6D in this chapter) reported two factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 (i.e., 2.42 and 1.18 for factor 1 and factor 2, respectively). The 
indicators nicely divided themselves into two principal components that reflect external and 
internal embeddedness.  
Internal embeddedness reflects the subsidiary’s relationships with the headquarters 
or with sister affiliates (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Hallin et al., 2011; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). 
The subsidiary managers were asked to indicate the importance of these relationships for 
subsidiary innovation on a four-point Likert scale (see Appendix 6A in this chapter). A 
principal component factor analysis showed that the two items load on one factor with one 
eigen-value larger than 1 (see Appendix 6B in this chapter). The Cronbach’s alpha of 0.73 is 
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satisfactory. We therefore used the factor scores from the principal component factor 
analysis of the two items sources as the measure of subsidiary internal embeddedness. The 
index for internal embeddedness ranges from −2.41 to 0.91 with higher scores corresponding 
to higher levels of a subsidiary’s internal embeddedness. 
External embeddedness captures the characteristics of the subsidiary’s local business 
network in host country (Hallin et al., 2011). We asked the subsidiary managers to evaluate 
the importance of collaborations relating to technological knowledge from four different 
types of business partners for the innovation of the subsidiary: suppliers, customers, 
competitors and scientific institutes in the country of the focal subsidiary (Andersson et al., 
2002; Forsgren et al., 2005). The managers of the subsidiaries were asked to evaluate the 
degree of importance on a four-point Likert scale (see Appendix 6A in this chapter). A 
principal component factor analysis confirmed the unidimensionality of the four items (see 
the Appendix 6B). The Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 is satisfactory. We therefore used the factor 
scores from the principal component factor analysis as our measure for subsidiary external 
embeddedness. The index for external embeddedness measure ranges from −2.25 to 1.76 
(standardized values) with higher scores corresponding to higher levels of a subsidiary’s 
external embeddedness. 
 
Subsidiary decision-making autonomy  
Similar to Chapter 4 and 5, we follow extant literature (Birkinshaw & Hood 2000; O’Donnell 
2000), and assess the level of subsidiary decision-making autonomy through a questionnaire 
item asking the directors of subsidiaries to indicate on a four-point Likert scale to what 
extent decisions are currently taken by the subsidiary or their headquarters for seven 
different business activities (see Appendix 5B in Chapter 5). The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
seven items of 0.83 is above the threshold value of 0.70 and therefore satisfactory (Hair et al., 
2006). A factor analysis showed that the seven items load on one factor. We therefore used 
the index of the seven aggregated items as the measure for subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy. The index ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 28 with higher scores 
corresponding to higher degrees of subsidiary decision-making autonomy. 
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6.3.4. Control variables 
We include three sets of control variables in our model. The first set of control variables 
accounts for subsidiary characteristics. First, we include the R&D intensity of the subsidiary 
– measured by the number of R&D employees in subsidiaries as a percentage of the 
subsidiary’s total employees – because it is well-known that R&D intensity is an important 
determinant of a subsidiary’s innovative performance (Simões et al., 2002; Taggart & Hood, 
1999). Second, we include subsidiary size – measured by the number of employees at the 
subsidiary – because larger subsidiaries have more resources and knowledge available for 
innovation than smaller ones (Ciabuschi et al., 2011). Third, we include the age of the 
subsidiary – calculated by subtracting the year the subsidiary was founded from the current 
year. Older subsidiaries may have lower levels of innovation than younger ones because of 
the continued use of outdated knowledge and experience and their resistance to new 
approaches (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Taggart & Hood, 1999).  
The second set of control variables concerns the headquarters characteristics. First, 
we control for the entry mode originally chosen by the MNE: a subsidiary’s level of 
innovation in terms of a greenfield investment or an acquisition may be different. We 
account for this by including a dummy variable that equals one if the subsidiary is a 
greenfield location, and zero otherwise (Jindra et al., 2009; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
Second, we include the MNE’s main original entry motive in terms of the importance of 
location-bound knowledge and technology access. The importance of knowledge and 
technology in a (host) country directly affects a subsidiary’s innovative performance 
(Dunning, 1993). The importance of location-bound knowledge as entry motive was 
measured on a four-point Likert scale ranging from completely unimportant to extremely 
important. 
Third, we control for country and industry characteristics. we control for industry 
effects by using the well-known NACE Rev. 2 classification and stratified subsidiaries into 
(1) mining and quarrying (NACE 05−09) , (2) manufacturing (NACE 10−33), (3) electricity; 
gas, steam and air conditioning supply (NACE 35), (4) water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities (NACE 36−39), (5) wholesale and retail trade; repair 
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of motor vehicles and motorcycles (NACE 45−47), (6) transportation and storage (NACE 
49−53), (7) information, communication, financial and insurance activities (NACE 58−68), 
and (8) professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service activities 
(NACE 69-82). We constructed seven dummies for the first seven industries (the eighth 
industry – i.e., professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service activities 
– served as the benchmark case and was therefore not included in the model). Second, we 
control for host-country effects. Our subsidiaries operate in five different countries each with 
its own path-dependent institutional environment that co-determines firm-level innovation. 
We constructed four host country dummies, that is, one for the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic, respectively (taking Hungary as the benchmark case that 
was not included in the model). Third, we also control for home-country effects. The 
headquarters of the subsidiaries in the sample are located in 17 different home countries. It 
was not possible to including 16 home-country dummies due to reduced degrees of 
freedom. We therefore include one dummy to differentiate between developing and 
developed home countries. Headquarters located in developed countries (11 countries in our 
case) by definition may have a stronger inclination to innovate because their competitive 
environment requires them to do so in order to survive than those from developing 
countries. We used the World Bank classification of countries, where a developed country is 
defined as a nation having a GDP per capita of US $12,000 or more. The home-country 
dummy distinguishes whether or not the headquarters of the MNE is located in a developed 
country. 
Common method biases are potentially problematic since they can be a main source 
of measurement error (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The latter threatens the validity of the 
conclusions about the associations between measures and has both a random and a 
systematic component (Bagozzi & Yi, 1991). Our data for dependent and focal explanatory 
variables were collected from the same respondents. In such a case, self-report data can 
create false correlations if the respondents have a propensity to provide consistent answers 
to survey questions that are otherwise not related (Chang et al., 2010). Before using the data 
we analyzed the possibility of common method variance. The questionnaire was constructed 
in such a way that the variables were spread across the questionnaire. The database is a 
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pooled cross-sectional database with observations from different countries. Additionally, 
our model specification is complex that is a common solution to prevent common method 
variance (Chang et al., 2010). We also conducted a “Harman’s One-factor test” as a post-hoc 
statistical procedure to check for common method variance bias. We gained five factors with 
eigenvalues over one, explaining between 24.95 and 8.14 percent of variance. This result 
shows that diversity of factors is captured by the model constructs and a single factor would 
unlikely explain the covariance in the exogenous and endogenous constructs. Taken 
together, we have no reasons to expect that common method bias is driving our results.  
We performed the usual tests to obtain reliable estimates (Hair et al., 2006). The latter 
yielded satisfactory results: neither heteroscedasticity nor non-normality is an issue. All 
correlation coefficients are maximum 0.47 indicating that there are no issues with multi-
collinearity. We also tested for multi-collinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each of the regression coefficients. Except for the squared terms of decision-making 
autonomy, the maximum VIF value in the model is 4.5 and thus well below the cut-off value 
of 10 (Hair et al., 2006). There is no reason that multi-collinearity should cause 
misinterpretation of the predictive ability of the regression results. 
6.4. Empirical results 
6.4.1. Main regression results 
Means, standard deviations and correlations are provided in Table 6.1. The results from the 
hierarchical Tobit regression models with respect to innovation intensity are reported in 
Table 6.2 (both internal and external embeddedness). Our third set of hypotheses relates to 
an interaction effect and can be tested with a product-term analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The interaction variables were mean-centered before entering them into the regression in 
order to avoid multicollinearity problems.  
The various fit parameters show that our models increasingly fit the data better. For 
example, with respect to the interaction effects, Table 6.2 shows that value for the log 
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likelihood improves from −559.48 in Model 1 to −384.65 in Model 8. This improvement in 
model fit can be observed for all of our regression models. 
We first report the findings for our baseline model including only the control 
variables. In column 2 and 3 of Table 6.2 we add decision making autonomy and its squared 
term, respectively. This is the models we estimated in Chapter 5. It shows that the relation 
between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is U-shaped, a result we 
already described extensively in Chapter 5. In Model 4 and 5 we enter internal and external 
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The results indicate that internal embeddedness is not significant, meaning we find 
no support for our first hypothesis. External embeddedness has a significant positive 
relation with innovation, albeit only when including internal and external embeddedness 
simultaneously. This means that our Hypothesis 2 is supported. Models 7 and 8 test our 
interaction effect between decision-making autonomy and internal and external 
embeddedness, respectively. The interaction with internal embeddedness in model 7 shows 
no significant effect (although it should be noted that the p-values are 0.053 for internal 
embeddedness, 0.065 for the interaction variable between internal embeddedness and 
decision-making autonomy, and 0.080 for the interaction variable between internal 
embeddedness and decision-making autonomy squared, making them significant at 10 
percent). This means that our Hypothesis 3a is not supported. Model 8 shows that the 
interaction between decision-making autonomy, its squared term and external 
embeddedness is significant (β = −174.2, p < 0.05 for interaction between decision-making 
autonomy and external embeddedness, and β = 88.5, p < 0.05 for decision-making autonomy 
squared and external embeddedness). To obtain a better insight in the nature of the 
interaction Figure 6.1 plots the relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy, 
external embeddedness and innovation.  
Figure 6.1 plots subsidiary innovation on the vertical axis. Subsidiary decision-
making autonomy is plotted on the horizontal axis, and external embeddedness on the third 
(z) axis. The figure shows that as external embeddedness increases, subsidiary innovation 
increases as well at both high and low levels of decision making autonomy. The figure also 
shows the non-linear effect of decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation. At the 
mean level of external embeddedness (where external embeddedness is zero, because it is a 
standardized variable), we observe that the relation between decision-making autonomy 
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When external embeddedness increases, we can see that the U-shaped relationship 
between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and innovation becomes more pronounced, 
which is supporting our Hypothesis 3b. However, we also find that when external 
embeddedness decreases to one standard deviation below the mean (external embeddedness 
has a score of −1, as it is standardized), the relation between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and innovation becomes virtually horizontal. In other words, the U-shaped 
relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and innovation disappears. At 
very low levels of external embeddedness, Figure 6.1 even suggests that the U-shaped effect 
becomes hump-shaped reversing the relationship between decision-making autonomy and 
subsidiary innovation. It is however easily shown that this is an artifact of the extrapolated 
extreme scores of a limited number of firms. As observed on the range of the data, we see 
that most of subsidiaries in our sample are on external embeddedness above the mean. We 
see that the total numbers of subsidiaries with value of external embeddedness above the 
mean are 67 subsidiaries, the rest is below the mean value of external embeddedness. 
Outliers drive the hump-shaped effect reversing relationship between subsidiary decision-
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6.4.2. Robustness analysis 
As tests of robustness, we performed several additional analyses. These results are 
summarized in Panels B through E in Table 6.3. Given the significant effect of external 
embeddedness in the interaction model, we only report the robustness tests of this model. 
To facilitate the comparison with our earlier findings, Panel A repeats the initial results (i.e., 
those from Model 8 in Table 6.2).  
First, in Panel B we estimated the models for innovation intensity (Tobit estimates) 
with an alternative measurement for our key independent variable, i.e. external 
embeddedness of a subsidiary. Recall that external embeddedness is originally measured by 
factor scores. As an alternative, we aggregated the scores of the four items into one index 
(Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78). As a test for robustness we estimated our Tobit models with this 
aggregated index for external embeddedness. This did not affect the regression results (with 
β = 33.3, p < 0.05 for external embeddedness, with β = −3.24, p < 0.05 for the interaction term 
between external embeddedness and decision-making autonomy, and with β = 0.07, p < 0.05 
for the interaction term between external embeddedness and the squared decision-making 
autonomy term).  
Second, in Panel C we estimated the Tobit models using an R&D dummy as a control 
variable instead of R&D intensity. The reason for using a dummy is that our data for R&D 
intensity is only limited available. Using the dummy measurement we are able to increase 
the number of observations from 95 (for R&D intensity) to 190 (for R&D measured by means 
of a dummy). The regression results for this larger sample are similar to our main results 
(with β = 57.7, p < 0.05 for external embeddedness, β = −105.2, p < 0.05 for the interaction 
term between external embeddedness and decision-making autonomy, and with β = 51.2, p 
< 0.05 for the interaction term between external embeddedness and the squared term of 
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 Third, next to subsidiary level information for the five eastern European countries, 
we have additional data for subsidiaries located in former East Germany. We estimated the 
models including East German subsidiaries, meaning that we consider East Germany as a 
(sixth) host country. The reason to include East Germany is that the East German context 
still resembles the level of development as the five other Central and Eastern European 
countries. Despite the re-unification of East and West Germany, there is still a substantial 
difference between the regions in terms of technology, industrial structure and foreign direct 
investments which affect the organizational structure and innovation of business units. By 
including East German subsidiaries in our sample we increase the number of observations 
from 95 to 253. The regression results in panel D are similar to our main findings (with β = 
56.8, p < 0.05 for external embeddedness, β = −105.3, p < 0.05 for the interaction term 
between external embeddedness and decision-making autonomy, and with β = 56.3, p < 0.05 
for the interaction term between external embeddedness and the squared term of decision-
making autonomy).  
Fourth, recall that our decision-making autonomy measure is constructed as an index 
of decisions concerning seven different business activities. Thus, our decision-making 
autonomy measure index is not necessarily related to the knowledge-related activities of the 
subsidiary. For that reason, we estimated our Tobit regressions with decision-making 
autonomy referring to only one business activity, i.e. research and innovation (see Appendix 
5B in Chapter 5). The results in Panel E are again in line with the main findings (with β = 
47.8, p < 0.01 for external embeddedness, β = −91.5, p < 0.01 for the interaction term between 
external embeddedness and autonomy, and with β = 52.0, p < 0.01 for the interaction term 
between external embeddedness and the squared decision-making autonomy term). These 
robustness tests corroborate our main findings. 
6.5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, we follow up on Chapter 5 and advance our understanding of how internal 
and external embeddedness are related to subsidiary innovation. We build on business 
network theory and the perspective centering on the role of headquarters in subsidiary 
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innovation processes, leading us to develop hypotheses concerning the expected positive 
direct effects of internal and external embeddedness on subsidiary innovation. Moreover, as 
the theoretical arguments on embeddedness and subsidiary decision-making autonomy are 
related, we also test for the interaction between embeddedness and decision-making 
autonomy and their joint effect on subsidiary innovation. Using a subsidiary-level dataset of 
95 subsidiaries in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, 
our empirical results show that the level of subsidiary external embeddedness is positively 
associated with the degree of subsidiary innovation. We find a modest direct relation 
between external embeddedness and subsidiary innovation, and no such relation for 
internal embeddedness. This direct relation of external embeddedness disappears when 
including the interaction between external embeddedness and decision-making autonomy. 
This interaction effect is significant, such that as the level of external embeddedness 
increases, the U-shaped relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and 
innovation becomes more pronounced. At both high and low levels of decision-making 
autonomy we find that external embeddedness is positively related to subsidiary 
innovation. This suggests that subsidiaries benefit from being externally embedded, 
whatever the level of decision-making autonomy. Our results show that the U-shaped 
relationship between subsidiary decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation that 
we established in Chapter 5, is contingent on the level of external embeddedness. At low 
levels of external embeddedness, there is no relation between subsidiary decision-making 
autonomy and subsidiary innovation. At the mean value of external embeddedness, we 
found that the relation between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation is 
slightly U-shaped. It is when the importance of external networks increases, and a structure 
has to be developed who makes decisions when working with external partners that it is 
important to either have headquarters make decision or allocate decision making autonomy 
to subsidiaries (and U-shaped relationship results).  
We should address two limitations of this chapter that could serve as routes for 
follow up research. First, although we control for the characteristics of subsidiary, parent, 
industry, home and host countries, this chapter did not examine the role of other factors 
such as a subsidiary’s absorptive capacity required to engage in internal and external 
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embeddedness and management initiative in response to local incentives. These factors 
could affect the subsidiaries’ embeddedness with internal and external counterparts 
(Figueiredo, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011). For example, the subsidiary’s absorptive capacity 
required to engage in internal and external networks in developing countries could be 
different from those in developed countries (Figueiredo, 2011). Therefore, future research 
should take this into account. Second, our data were collected at the subsidiary level. 
Therefore, this chapter cannot capture the importance of the effect of internal and external 
embeddedness on innovation beyond the perception of the subsidiary managers (Ciabuschi 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, we cannot know the role of a headquarters in shaping and 
designing intra-firm and inter-firm networks (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999) because 
headquarters may manage the complexities of multiple embeddedness (Meyer et al., 2011). 
Hence, we cannot distinguish between the importance of embeddedness at different levels, 
i.e., the subsidiary, division/business area, or headquarters (Ciabuschi et al., 2011). Future 
research may take these into account so that the theoretical and practical implications can be 
even further developed. Third, the direction of causality is almost always a concern in cross-
sectional studies since the possibility of reverse causation cannot be ruled out automatically. 
Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the majority of the case-study subsidiaries had 
accumulated previous capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or that subsidiaries that 
developed more links with local organizations for sophisticated projects (e.g., Omega and 
Epsilon) seem to have done so because they had been accumulating high innovation 
capability levels (Figueiredo, 2011). Therefore, reverse causality may potentially be an issue 
with respect to our analysis of decision-making autonomy, embeddedness and subsidiary 
innovation. That is, subsidiary innovation causes the degree of decision-making autonomy 
rather than the other way round. Theoretically, no theory predicts this direction, but it is 
worthwhile to investigate this issue. To tackle this issue, we can lag variables or use 
instrumental variable(s).  
 In spite of these limitations, this chapter offers important implications for our 
scholarly and practical understanding of the interaction between external embeddedness 
and decision-making autonomy on subsidiary innovation. First, this chapter implies that the 
U-shaped relationship between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation 
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found in Chapter 5 is contingent on level of a subsidiary’s external embeddedness. In 
particular, when the level of external embeddedness increases, the U-shaped relationship 
between decision-making autonomy and subsidiary innovation becomes steeper. This 
implication confirms that both business network theory and the headquarters view play an 
important role in explaining this relation, that is, they are not mutually exclusive. Second, 
our results imply that to obtain an optimal level of subsidiary innovation, headquarters 
managers either should let subsidiaries making full decisions or give almost no decision-
making authority, especially when subsidiaries are highly embedded in external networks in 
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APPENDIX 
6A. Measure of Internal and external embeddedness (taken from the questionnaire) 
Please indicate the importance of the following cooperation partners as source for knowledge relevant 
for innovation in your enterprise. Please choose between: 1) not important, 2) little important, 3) 







Other units of your foreign 
investor’s enterprise within your 
country 
    
Headquarters or other units of your 
foreign investor’s enterprise group 
abroad 
    
External suppliers within your 
country 
    
External customers within your 
country 
    
External firms of the same sector 
within your country 
    
Universities and other public sector 
research within your country 
    
 
6B. Rotated factor loadings of the seven items concerning internal and external embeddedness 
(extracted from Stata) – principal component factor method  
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Other units of your foreign investor’s enterprise within your country 0.483 0.588 
Headquarters or other units of your foreign investor’s enterprise 
group abroad 
-0.070 0.849 
External suppliers within your country 0.696 -0.243 
External customers within your country 0.707 0.001 
External firms of the same sector within your country 0.695 0.044 
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Table 6C. Rotated factor loadings of only the four items concerning external embeddedness of factor 1 
in Table 6B: (extracted from Stata) – principal component factor method 
 
Variable Factor 1 
External suppliers within your country 0.714 
External customers within your country 0.767 
External firms of the same sector within your country 0.797 





6D. Rotated factor loadings of only the two sources concerning internal embeddedness of factor 2 in 
Table 6B: (extracted from Stata) – principal component factor method 
Variable Factor 1 
Other units of your foreign investor’s enterprise within your country 0.804 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om tot een beter begrip te komen van de oorzaken en 
gevolgen van besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen in de relatie tussen 
hoofdkantoor en dochteronderneming binnen het netwerk van een multinational enterprise 
(MNE). De belangrijkste onderzoeksdoelstellingen in dit proefschrift zijn de relaties tussen 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen en de context van het thuisland en 
het gastland, en de rol hiervan in innovatie door de dochteronderneming. De belangrijkste 
onderzoeksvraag is tweeledig:  
(1) Wordt besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen bepaald door de 
context van het thuisland en het gastland? En welke invloed hebben de verschillen 
tussen de context van het thuisland en het gastland op besluitvormingsautonomie van 
dochterondernemingen? (Deze vragen beantwoorden we in hoofdstuk 3 en 4.) 
(2) Wat is de rol van besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen in 
innovatie door de dochteronderneming? En welke interactie is er tussen 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen en de mate van inbedding van 
de dochteronderneming binnen het MNE-netwerk en het externe locale netwerk? 
(Deze vragen beantwoorden we in hoofdstuk 5 en 6.)  
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft het belang en de 
doelstelling, de aanpak en de scope, de theoretische en empirische bijdragen en de 
theoretische en praktische gevolgen van dit onderzoek. Verder bevat dit hoofdstuk een 
samenvatting van de empirische bevindingen van het onderzoek. In hoofdstuk 2 besteden 
we uitgebreid aandacht aan zeven theorieën met betrekking tot de determinanten en 
gevolgen van besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen, waaronder het 
integratie-responsiviteitskader, de theorie van afhankelijkheid van middelen, de 
bemiddelingstheorie, de institutionele theorie, de theorie van zakelijke netwerken, de 
informatieverwerkingstheorie en het perspectief dat de nadruk legt op de rol van 
hoofdkantoren in het functioneren van dochterondernemingen. Met behulp van deze 
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theorieën en de kritische beoordeling van eerdere empirische onderzoeken kunnen we een 
aantal onderzoekshiaten identificeren. Op basis hiervan kunnen we een 
onderzoeksprogramma afbakenen met specifieke onderzoeksvragen die zullen worden 
beantwoord in de volgende hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 3, 4, 5 en 6) van dit proefschrift. Met 
name in hoofdstuk 2 worden vier belangrijke aandachtspunten benoemd die betrekking 
hebben op (a) de rol van de institutionele omgeving van het thuisland en het gastland; (b) de 
rol van de afstand tussen het thuisland en de gastlanden in het bepalen van de 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen; (c) de rol van 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen in innovatie door de 
dochteronderneming; en (d) de rol van de inbedding van dochterondernemingen in de 
relatie tussen besluitvormingsautonomie van en innovatie door dochterondernemingen. 
Het belangrijkste doel van hoofdstuk 3 is een empirische ontrafeling van de 
onderliggende oorzakelijke structuur die de besluitvormingsautonomie van 
dochterondernemingen bepaalt. Met behulp van de institutionele theorie stellen we dat de 
verdeling van besluitvormingsautonomie over het hoofdkantoor en de operationele eenheid 
vooral een reactie is op de institutionele context van beide eenheden: de 
moedermaatschappij en de dochteronderneming. De reden hiervoor is dat een MNE een 
bestuursstructuur is die dochterondernemingen aanstuurt in veel en heel verschillende 
institutionele contexten. Onze stellingen worden getest op een database die is afgeleid van 
Orbis en waarin 263 Europese dochterondernemingen van 18 MNE's in 25 Europese landen 
zijn opgenomen. De empirische resultaten onderschrijven ons institutionele perspectief en 
laten zien dat de besluitvormingsautonomie van de dochterondernemingen sterk verbonden 
is met de institutionele omgevingen van het thuisland en het gastland waarin respectievelijk 
het hoofdkantoor en de dochteronderneming zijn gevestigd. De resultaten blijven ook 
overeind als we ze verifiëren aan de hand van verschillende belangrijke kenmerken van de 
moedermaatschappij en de dochteronderneming. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we het effect van de afstand tussen het thuisland en de 
gastlanden op de besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen volgens de theorie 
van zakelijke netwerken en de bemiddelingstheorie. Uit eerdere onderzoeken is gebleken 
dat de eigenschappen van het bedrijf of de context belangrijk zijn om de 
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besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen te kunnen begrijpen. Wij stellen dat 
de literatuur over dochterondernemingen grotendeels voorbijgaat aan de afstand tussen de 
context van het thuisland en het gastland als essentiële determinant voor 
besluitvormingsautonomie voor dochterondernemingen. De theoretische argumenten voor 
afstand en besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen leiden tot twee 
verschillende opvattingen. Volgens de bemiddelingstheorie bestaat er een negatieve relatie 
tussen afstand en autonomie, terwijl de theorie van zakelijke netwerken juist een positief 
effect van afstand op autonomie voorspelt. Dit is een van de eerste onderzoeken waarin het 
effect van afstand op autonomie wordt onderzocht met behulp van de unieke dataset van 
het Institute for Economic Researh Halle (IWH). Deze dataset bevat gegevens uit meerdere 
landen en meerdere branches van 170 dochterondernemingen in vijf Centraal- en Oost-
Europese landen (CEE). De dochterondernemingen rapporteren aan hoofdkantoren in 21 
verschillende thuislanden. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat een heel verfijnd perspectief van 
afstand vereist is en dat de culturele, geografische en economische afstand de 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen beperkt. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft de 
belangrijke rol van afstand tussen thuisland en gastlanden bij het bestuderen van 
besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het effect van besluitvormingsautonomie op innovatie door de 
dochteronderneming geanalyseerd op basis van het perspectief dat is gericht op de rol van 
het hoofdkantoor en de theorie van zakelijke netwerken. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om te 
onderzoeken hoe besluitvormingsautonomie van invloed is op de mate van innovatie door 
de dochteronderneming. Dochterondernemingen worden steeds meer gezien als bronnen 
van innovatie en als vehikel om nieuwe competenties internationaal over te dragen. De 
vraag hoeveel besluitvormingsautonomie dochterondernemingen zouden moeten hebben, 
vormt een essentieel onderdeel van het managen van de relatie tussen hoofdkantoor en 
dochteronderneming. Met behulp van twee complementaire theoretische perspectieven 
veronderstellen we dat er zowel een negatief als een positief verband bestaat tussen 
besluitvormingsautonomie en innovatie door de dochteronderneming en dat er een niet-
lineaire relatie bestaat tussen de twee factoren. We testen onze hypothese aan de hand van 
de IWH-database met gegevens uit meerdere landen en branches en maken daarbij gebruik 
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van gegevens uit onderzoeken onder 134 dochterondernemingen gevestigd in vijf CEE-
landen uit 23 thuislanden. De empirische resultaten wijzen op een niet-monotone U-vormige 
relatie tussen besluitvormingsautonomie van dochterondernemingen en de mate van 
innovatie. Hoofdstuk 5 biedt dan ook nieuwe inzichten over het belang van 
besluitvormingsautonomie in de innovatieprocessen van dochterondernemingen.  
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we ten slotte de rol van besluitvormingsautonomie van 
dochterondernemingen in de relatie tussen innovatie door de dochteronderneming en de 
inbedding van de dochteronderneming. Uit eerder werk is het belang gebleken van interne 
en externe verbanden voor innovatie door de dochteronderneming. Maar ondanks alle 
inspanningen is de relatie tussen inbedding en innovatie nog steeds onderwerp van 
discussie. Wij stellen dat de internationale bedrijfsliteratuur grotendeels voorbijgaat aan 
besluitvormingsautonomie als essentiële determinant van de relatie tussen inbedding en 
innovatie. Naar onze mening is het effect van inbedding op innovatie door de 
dochteronderneming afhankelijk van de mate van besluitvormingsautonomie van de 
dochteronderneming. Ons onderzoek is een van de eerste onderzoeken waarin het effect van 
besluitvormingsautonomie op de relatie tussen inbedding en innovatie wordt onderzocht 
met behulp van de unieke, op onderzoeksgegevens gebaseerde IWH-dataset van 
dochterondernemingen in CEE-landen. De empirische resultaten vormen overtuigend 
bewijs voor ons afhankelijkheidsperspectief. Dit hoofdstuk biedt nieuw inzicht in de rol van 
besluitvormingsautonomie bij het absorberen van externe kennis om innovatie door de 
dochteronderneming te verbeteren. 
De hoofdstukken 3, 4, 5 en 6 van dit proefschrift bieden samen “empirische 
wetmatigheden”. De algehele conclusie van dit onderzoek is dat MNE's te maken hebben 
met een wisselwerking: bij een grotere afstand van het thuisland is het waarschijnlijker dat 
het hoofdkantoor op de lokale expertise en kennis van de dochteronderneming vertrouwt 
(hoofdstuk 2), vooral in sterk geïnstitutionaliseerde landen waar lokale inbedding belangrijk 
is (hoofdstuk 3). Als de afstand toeneemt, dan neemt de mate van 
besluitvormingsautonomie af (hoofdstuk 4), terwijl voor meer innovatie zowel het laagste 
als het hoogste niveau van besluitvormingsautonomie van de dochteronderneming het beste 
is (hoofdstuk 5), vooral als de dochteronderneming extern sterk ingebed is (hoofdstuk 6). 
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Deze algehele conclusie is een afspiegeling van het belangrijkste en bekendste 
spanningsveld bij internationale bedrijven en in internationaal management: hoe de beste 
balans te vinden tussen lokaal reactievermogen en mondiale coördinatie en integratie. 
Ondanks de aangegeven beperkingen van dit onderzoek, vertrouwen wij erop dat dit 
proefschrift een nieuw perspectief biedt op deze belangrijke kwestie. 
 

